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ABSTRACT
The last two decades have seen more and more cities joining the competitions for
hosting the Olympic Games, resulting in soaring investments, both public and private, in
Olympic-related projects. The Olympic Games have become a two-week gigantic event
with tremendous costs burdening host cities. Meanwhile, the last three decades have
witnessed underused facilities and lack of financial support for maintenance of the
Olympic venues after the Games.
Based on previous literature, the “white elephant” effect has happened in every
Olympic city during the last twenty years. In terms of Beijing, scholars have yet to
substantially investigate the post-Games utilization of the Olympic venues in the city.
This study made an effort to address this concern. This study investigated Beijing’s
post-Games utilization of Olympic venues and examined what cultural, social, economic,
political, and historical reasons underscore their current status. To achieve the goal, the
researcher interviewed venue managers, municipal officials, scholars and sport
administration officials in Beijing.
By describing the various conditions of the venues and analyzing the interviews,
the study indicated that post-Games utilization of Beijing’s Olympic venues varied
significantly. Use of venues differed depending on their ownership, administration system,
management and operational mode, sports/event functions, locations, structural scale and
complexity, and even their reputation and popularity throughout the city. In general, a
brief summary in terms of utilization can be concluded. During three and a half years
after the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games: (1) venues built on campuses were well utilized;
(2) pre-existing venues were largely well utilized such as the Workers’ Stadium, the
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NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, the Ying Tung Natatorium, and the Lao Shan
Mountain Bike Course; (3) multifunction venues were largely better utilized than those
with mono functions such as the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and the Clay Target Field,
the Olympic Archery Field, and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park; (4) medium scale
venues were better utilized than the large scale ones such as the Bird’s Nest and the Shun
Yi Olympic Aquatic Park; (5) those owned by the governments, especially the five
district governments, were underused, which included the Feng Tai Sport Center Softball
Field, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, the Olympic Tennis Court, the Ming
Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Course, and the Olympic Hockey Field; and (6), in contrast,
those owned by the universities, GASC, and private enterprise, largely showed better
utilization conditions than their government-owned (district governments) counterparts.
Because of the co-existence of both well-used and underused venues in Beijing, the study
contends that the status of Olympic venues in Beijing cannot be simply evaluated as
either positive or negative, due to the complicated socio-cultural environments and
historical and traditional background. However, some practical experiences in Beijing
can be recommended, while certain lessons should be learned for the future.

Keywords: 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Olympic Legacy, Post-Olympic Utilization,
Sport Venues, Olympic Host Cities

iv

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT...........................................................................................................................................iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................vii
LIST OF APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................viii
Chapter 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................1
1. Identifying Olympic Venues: The Beijing Case ..........................................................................4
2. Significance of the Study ............................................................................................................9
3. Study Purpose and Research Questions ....................................................................................10
4. Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 11
4-1. Research Rationale......................................................................................................... 11
4-2. Data Collection ..............................................................................................................13
4-3. Data Analysis .................................................................................................................17
5. Limitations and Delimitations ...................................................................................................20
6. Outline of the Findings..............................................................................................................21
Chapter 2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................23
1. Post-Olympic Effect on Host Cities ..........................................................................................23
2. Historical Retrospect: “Olympic Cities” ...................................................................................32
3. Current Studies on Post-Games Utilization of Beijing Olympic Venues ..................................33
Chapter 3. Findings ...............................................................................................................................41
1. An Overview of the Olympic Venues in Beijing .......................................................................41
1-1. Geographical Distribution: A New Look .......................................................................44
1-2. Focusing on the Olympic Central Area..........................................................................48
1-2-1. Selection of Location..........................................................................................52
1-2-2. BOPAC ...............................................................................................................56
1-2-3. BODA.................................................................................................................58
2. Government-Owned Venues......................................................................................................61
2-1. By State-Owned Enterprise............................................................................................61
2-1-1. China National Convention Center (The Fencing Hall) .....................................61
2-1-2. “Water Cube”......................................................................................................65
2-2. By Municipal Level Authorities.....................................................................................76
2-2-1. Beijing Gong Ti Center.......................................................................................76
2-2-2. Urban Road Cycling Course ...............................................................................88
2-3. By District Governments ...............................................................................................88
2-3-1. Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park: Shun Yi District ...............................................89
2-3-2. BMX Course and Mountain Bike Course: Shi Jing Shan District ......................95
2-3-3. Beach Volleyball Ground: Chao Yang District ...................................................98
2-3-4. Triathlon Course: Chang Ping District................................................................99
2-3-5. Softball Field: Feng Tai District .......................................................................101
2-4. Transferred Ownerships ...............................................................................................103
2-4-1. “Birds’ Nest”.....................................................................................................103
2-4-2. National Indoor Stadium (NIS)......................................................................... 117
2-4-3. Olympic Forest Park: Tennis, Hockey and Archery Facilities ..........................126
3. General Administration of Sport China (GASC)-Owned Venues ...........................................132
3-1. Lao Shan Velodrome....................................................................................................132
3-2. Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field ....................................................137
3-3. Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) ......................................................................................142
3-4. National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC) .....................................................................147
3-4-1. NOSC Stadium .................................................................................................149
3-4-2. NOSC Gymnasium ...........................................................................................154
3-4-3. Ying Tung Natatorium ......................................................................................159
4. University-Owned Venues.......................................................................................................165
v

4-1. Peking University Gymnasium ....................................................................................166
4-2. China Agriculture University Gymnasium...................................................................172
4-3. Beijing Institute of Technology Gymnasium ...............................................................179
4-4. Beihang University Gymnasium..................................................................................185
4-5. University of Science and Technology Beijing Gymnasium .......................................190
4-6. Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium............................................................196
5. Private Enterprise-Owned Venues...........................................................................................202
5-1. MasterCard Center and Baseball Field ........................................................................202
Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................................215
1. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................215
1-1. Category 1: New, Pre-existing, and Temporary ...........................................................215
1-2. Category 2: Location....................................................................................................220
1-3. Category 3: Ownership ................................................................................................225
1-4. Post-Games Use ...........................................................................................................234
2. Recommendations ...................................................................................................................238
3. Future Research.......................................................................................................................245
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................247
Appendix A. Brief Maps of the Olympic Venues in Beijing ...............................................................254
Appendix B. List of the Olympic Venues in Beijing...........................................................................256
Appendix C. Outline of Interview Questions......................................................................................258
Appendix D. Venue Category by Newly, Pre-existing and Temporarily Built....................................261
Appendix E. Venue Category by Geographical Location....................................................................262
Appendix F. Ownerships of the Venues ..............................................................................................263
Appendix G. Map of the Venues in the Olympic Central Area............................................................265
Appendix H. Map of the Venues in the West Community Area ..........................................................266
Appendix I. Map of the Venues in the University Area.......................................................................267
Appendix J. Map of the Venues in the East Community Area ............................................................268
Appendix K. Map of the Venues in the North Scenic Area.................................................................269
Appendix L. Map of the Olympic Central Area ..................................................................................270
Appendix M. Route for the Urban Road Cycling Race.......................................................................271
Appendix N. Aerial View of the Olympic Archery Field in 2010 .......................................................272
Appendix O. Pictures of CIS...............................................................................................................273
Appendix P. Aerial View of the National Olympic Sport Center ........................................................275
Appendix Q. Pictures of the CAU Gymnasium ..................................................................................276
Appendix R. Pictures of BUAA Gymnasium......................................................................................278
Appendix S. Pictures of USTB Gymnasium .......................................................................................280
Appendix T. Pictures of BJUT Gymnasium........................................................................................282
Appendix U. Pictures of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center.....................................................283
Curriculum Vitae .................................................................................................................................289

vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEG
BIT
BJUT
BMCDR
BMX
BOBICO
BOCOG
BODA
BOPAC
BPA
BSAM
BSU
BUAA
BUCID
FIVB
CAU
CBA
CCP
CCTV
CIS
CITIC
CNCC
CNSVM
CNY
CTF
FINA
GASC
IOC
ISF
ITU
MCC
NBA
NIS
NOSC
PKU
PRC
PSB
SRH
UCI
USD
UTSB

Anschutz Entertainment Group
Beijing Institute of Technology
Beijing University of Technology
Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform
Bicycle Motocross
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bidding Committee
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad
Beijing Olympic City Development Association
Beijing Olympic Park Administration
Beijing Performance & Arts Group
Beijing State-Owned Assets Management CO., LTD.
Beijing Sport University
Beihang University
Beijing Urban Construction Investment Development Co., Ltd.
Fédération Internationale de Volleyball
China Agriculture University
Chinese Basketball Association
Chinese Communist Party
China Central Television
Beijing Capital Indoor Stadium
China International Trust and Investment Corporation
China National Convention Center
China National Sports Venue Management Co., Ltd.
Chinese Yuan Renminbi
Beijing Clay Target Field
Fédération Internationale de Natation
General Administration of Sport China
International Olympic Committee
International Softball Federation
International Triathlon Union
Beijing MasterCard Center
National Basketball Association
Beijing National Indoor Stadium
National Olympic Sport Center
Peking University
People’s Republic of China
Public Security Bureau
Beijing Shooting Range Hall
International Cycling Union
US Dollar
University of Technology and Science Beijing

vii

LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
Appendix I
Appendix J
Appendix K
Appendix L
Appendix M
Appendix N
Appendix O
Appendix P
Appendix Q
Appendix R
Appendix S
Appendix T
Appendix U

Brief Maps of the Olympic Venues in Beijing
List of the Olympic Venues in Beijing
Outline of Interview Questions
Category by Newly, Pre-existing and Temporarily Built
Category by Geographical Location
Ownerships of the Venues
Map of the Venues in the Olympic Central Area
Map of the Venues in the West Community Area
Map of the Venues in the University Area
Map of the Venues in the East Community Area
Map of the Venues in the North Scenic Area
Map of the Olympic Central Area
Route for the Urban Road Cycling Race
Bird View of the Olympic Archery Field
Pictures of the Capital Indoor Stadium
Bird View of the National Olympic Sport Center
Pictures of the CAU Gymnasium
Pictures of the BUAA Gymnasium
Pictures of the USTB Gymnasium
Pictures of the BJUT Gymnasium
Pictures of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center

viii

1

Chapter 1. Introduction
On the cover page of the Final Report of the International Olympic Committee
Coordination Commission for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, Beijing 2008, one finds
the statement: “Once an Olympic City, always an Olympic City.” 1 Obviously, this speaks
about Beijing! It also speaks about all host cities in the history of the Modern Olympic
Games. But staging the Games is one thing; the influence and impact of the Olympics on
those cities, both positive and negative, to some degree, endure. The distinction of being
an Olympic city leaves a lasting image; the memories of once having hosted the Olympic
Games linger interminably.
When the brilliant Olympic moments fade, and jubilant crowds leave, the city
transforms right away from an Olympic host to a place where the Olympic festival has
been staged; such hosts become post-Olympic cities. Being an Olympic host and being a
post-Olympic city present totally different situations. Given the laudatory conclusions
rendered by IOC presidents in their closing ceremony speeches, such as “best ever,”
“unforgettable,” and “exceptional,” most host cities are seen to have accomplished their
jobs in an excellent manner. With some 10 years involved in efforts on bidding for,
preparing for, and staging the games, host cities merit such honorary remarks. The
contributions that the host cities and the Organizing Committees of Olympic Games
(OCOGs) make are vital and significant, not only to the development of the Olympic
movement and global sports, but also to building and enhancing sport enthusiasm, certain
Olympic-related economic benefits, national pride, and international identity.

1

The International Olympic Committee, Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission for the Games
of the XXIX Olympiad – Beijing 2008 (Lausanne: January 2010).
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Putting aside the aura of staging an Olympic Games, being a post-Olympic city
carries many meanings. When the Games are completed, the OCOG disbands less than a
year later. Attention from the international society and global media disappears. Athletes
start to pursue their next goals, and guests and tourists depart the city with whatever
memories they have about the Games and the host. With the disappearance of the OCOG
and IOC, the host city is the major entity responsible for handling whatever the Olympic
Games leave behind after the party.
Starting from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, commercialism has been
dramatically involved in the Olympics, which makes the leaders of potential host cities
realize that hosting the Olympic Games could be a way to generate financial profit and
build a substantial international image. As a result, the last three decades have seen more
cities than ever joining the competitions for holding the Olympic Games. This, in turn,
has prompted soaring investment, both from public and private sources, into so called
Olympic-related projects regarding athletic facilities and infrastructure for the
competitions. The Olympic Games have become a gigantic event held every four years in
various locations around the globe. The duration of the Games is short, compared with
their relatively long preparation period. On the other hand, the last three decades, in
particular, have witnessed underused facilities and lack of financial support for
maintenance of the Olympic venues after the Games, largely due to lack of practical
strategy planned for post-Games development or lack of efficient supervision and
implementation of post-Games utilization plans (see details in Chapter 2).
During the more than one hundred year history of the Modern Olympics, Olympic
host cities around the world faced diverse situations in dealing with post-Olympic issues.

3

With constantly changing global political and economic conditions, various regimes,
cultural traditions, and populations, post-Olympic effects on host cities are difficult to
simply generalize. The strength and opportunities of one city might be the weakness of
others. Although the IOC consistently uses the term “legacy” to express what the
Olympic Games leave behind to host cities, in general, there are not too many positive
exclamations heard from previous host cities regarding their post-Olympic development,
particularly, the ways used to cope with the Olympic athletic facilities in the cities. In
evaluating and planning for post-Olympic periods, a sober, objective, and practical
perspective from the academic field is needed, not only because such an academic
analysis and evaluation regarding host city post-Olympic planning and development is
beneficial to the cities, but also because it can provide the International Olympic
Movement with a pragmatic guideline for sustainable improvement.
The term “post-Olympic effect” was absent until the impact of the Olympic
Games on host cities dramatically increased during the last couple of decades. Prior to
that, little impact can be traced from earlier editions of the Olympics due to their lack of
scale and influence around the world. But, of late, changes in our world are accelerating.
The Olympics are not excluded from this. As global attention, media involvement, and
commercialism of the Olympic Games have intensified, Olympic impact as well as
post-Olympic impact increases. Specifically, the last three decades have seen
post-Olympic issues such as underused Olympic venues, public debt burdens on
taxpayers, and lack of supervision with respect to Olympic legacy, both tangible and
intangible, arising in almost all host cities, from Montreal in 1976 to Athens in 2004, and,
in the context of this study, Beijing in 2008 (see details in Chapter 2).

4

1. Identifying Olympic Venues: The Beijing Case
Past experience indicates that among various post-Olympic issues regarding sport
in host cities, post-Games utilization of Olympic venues has been one of the most
problematic issues haunting city authorities as well as taxpayers. The experiences of
certain host cities such as Montreal and Athens became typical cases generally criticized
around the world. Some others, such as Atlanta and Los Angeles, provided subsequent
hosts with semi-positive examples regarding utilization of Olympic venues after the
Games. A key point or criterion can thus be used to evaluate post-Games utilization of
Olympic venues: whether or not those Olympic facilities left in the cities continue
serving society in a sport context, either mass sport service among local communities,
national elite sport, or professional sport in the city.
Due to the diversity of various host cities, past studies regarding the investigation
of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues were usually focused on a certain Olympic
Games, which seems to (or has to) be the best (or only) method for thorough examination
and detailed analysis based on first hand evidence. Applying the same method as
presented in those existing studies regarding previous host cities’ utilization conditions,
this study exclusively focused on the 2008 Olympic Summer Games in Beijing.
In terms of the 2008 Beijing Games, according to the Beijing Organizing
Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), there were thirty-seven (37)
sport venues that were used as competition sites for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games,
either in Beijing or other auxiliary host cities in China. In Beijing proper, there were
thirty-one (31) sport venues used for the competition events held within the city,
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including eleven (11) converted or expanded pre-existing venues, twelve (12) newly-built
sport facilities specifically for the Olympic Games, and eight (8) temporary sport
facilities built for the Games and planned to be either removed or transformed for other
functions after the Games (see the map on next page and Appendix A for details). 2
An examination of the Candidature File that the Beijing Bid Committee submitted
to the IOC in January 2001 showed that one planned Olympic facility, the Beijing
Country Equestrian Park, was replaced and its location changed to Hong Kong. Other
than that one exception, all the other preliminarily planned sports events were held in
Beijing as promised in the File. 3 In addition, some Olympic facilities changed their
originally planned locations from downtown Beijing to the outskirts of Beijing, These
included the triathlon site, from the Forbidden City (the centre of Beijing) to the Ming
Dynasty Tomb Reservoir, about 30 km north; and the beach volleyball venue, from
Tiananmen Square to the Chao Yang Park at Beijing Chao Yang district, about 10 km east
of the centre of the city. 4
Geographically, according to BOCOG, the venues in Beijing were mainly located
in four areas: (1) the Olympic Central Area, (2) the West Community Area, (3) the North
Scenic Area, and (4) the University Area (see the map on next page and Appendix A for
details). 5
The highest concentration of Olympic facilities was in the Olympic Central Area,
which included the Olympic Park (the Olympic Green) and the National Olympic Sport
Centre (NOSC). There were seven Olympic sports venues built in the Olympic Park for
2

Official Website of BOCOG, “Olympic Venues,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/ (accessed April 26,
2012).
3
The Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, January 2001.
4
Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 30-34; the Candidature File of
Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, pp. 12-18.
5
Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 27-38.
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A Demonstration Map

Source: The internet (without the Triathlon Course and the Shun Yi Aquatic Park)
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permanent or temporary use. They included: the National Stadium (“Bird’s Nest”), the
National Aquatic Centre (“Water Cube”), the National Indoor Stadium (NIS), the
Olympic Tennis Centre, the Olympic Hockey Field, the Olympic Archery Field, and the
China National Convention Centre (CNCC) Fencing Hall. 6 Within this area, NOSC was
adjacent to the Olympic Park. There were three pre-existing Olympic sport venues in
NOSC built for the 11th Asian Games held in Beijing in 1990 and upgraded specifically
for the 2008 Olympic Games. They included: the NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium,
and the Ying Tung Natatorium. 7 Then, too, there were non-sport Olympic facilities in the
area, such as the International Broadcast Centre (IBC), the Main Press Centre (MPC), and
the Olympic Village. This central core area was the largest Olympic functional region
associated with the Beijing Games.
The West Community Area was another cluster of Olympic venues in the city.
There were eight Olympic venues grouped into the area, all of which were located on the
west side of the city. They included the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target
Field, the Lao Shan Cycling Centre (including the Velodrome, the mountain bike course,
and the BMX field), the Feng Tai Sports Centre Softball Field, and the Wu Ke Song
Sports Centre (including the Olympic Basketball Gymnasium and the Olympic Baseball
Field that were dismantled right after the Olympic Games). 8
The North Scenic Area contained two sites, the Shun Yi Olympic
Rowing-Canoeing Park in Shun Yi District and the Olympic Triathlon Course at the Ming
Dynasty Tomb Reservoir in Chang Ping District. 9

6
7
8
9

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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The University Area was located northwest of the city. Six Olympic venues were
built or renovated either on campus or within the same region. They included: Peking
University, China Agriculture University, Beijing Institute of Technology, University of
Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and
the Capital Indoor Stadium (not on campus but within the area). 10
In addition to these four clusters, at the east side of the city there were also four
Olympic venues built or renovated for the Games in 2008: the Beach Volleyball Ground
(dismantled and transformed into a beach theme park right after the Games) in the Chao
Yang Park in Chao Yang District, the Worker’s Stadium and Gymnasium built in the
1960s and renovated before the 2008 Olympics, and the Beijing University of
Technology Gymnasium. The thirty-one venues, built or renovated between 2004 and
2008, held all the competitions in twenty-six sports during the Games (see Appendix B
for details).
Following the Games, depending on specific tangible factors (functions, scale,
locations, administration systems, and ownerships) and intangible factors (historical
background, political context, cultural traditions, and symbolic value), Beijing Olympic
venues have been developed and utilized through various trajectories in the last three and
a half years. When facing the issues of post-Games use of the Olympic venues, on one
hand, venue supervisors in Beijing met the same situations and similar problems such as
post-Olympic use of sport facilities that haunted their previous counterparts for years. On
the other hand, specific conditions in China provided them with both opportunities and
challenges.

10

Ibid.
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2. Significance of the Study
Based on previous literature, in the last three decades, issues such as underuse,
operational finance deficit, poor organization, or even abandoned Olympic venues,
commonly known as the white elephant 11 effect, have consistently occurred in every
Olympic city during its post-Olympic period. In terms of the 2008 edition of the Olympic
Games, although three and a half years have passed, Beijing remains largely
uninvestigated regarding post-Games utilization of its Olympic venues. Moreover, the
few attempts that have been made, including academic articles and media reports, in both
English and Chinese, implicitly indicated a potential trend of polarized attitudes, either
overly positive or overly negative, toward this specific issue. Possible reasons for this
situation can be listed as follows:
(1) Lack of information regarding the venues released to the public
(2) Inaccessibility of information regarding the venues
(3) Incorrect information disseminated
(4) Public and authorities’ interests decrease
(5) Authorities of the venues do not want to disclose the facts to either the media or
academic researchers
(6) Specific venues rather than all the venues are investigated when conducting
research
(7) Political purposes
Simply speaking, what happened regarding Beijing Olympic sports venues during

11

“White Elephant” is an idiom, according to a general explanation on Wikipedia.org, for a valuable but
burdensome possession of which its owner cannot dispose and whose cost is out of proportion to its
usefulness or worth; it is an object, scheme, business venture, or facility, considered to be without use or
value, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_elephant (accessed June 10, 2012).
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the post-Olympic period has not been thoroughly examined. Such an examination is
required for both the knowledge base of international Olympic studies and Beijing’s
post-Olympic city development. Moreover, as mentioned, an objective and systematic
examination from an academic perspective is needed. This study, three and a half years
after the Games, examined the present status of all the Olympic sport venues in Beijing
utilized for the 2008 Olympic Games.

3. Study Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of the study is to investigate post-Games utilization of the Olympic
venues in Beijing and to examine and discover what socio-cultural reasons underscore the
status of the venues in Beijing three and a half years after the 2008 Olympic Games.
Based on the purpose of the study, the primary research question can be addressed:
What is the current status of post-Games utilization of Olympic sport venues in Beijing
three and a half years after the 2008 Olympic Games? To answer this general question
thoroughly and explore what the reasons behind the status were, four sub-questions that
would potentially guide the direction of the study were proposed as follows:
(1) Are those venues in Beijing “white elephant” or “precious resources” for both
local communities and the entire city (even the entire country)?
(2) Do those venues left in Beijing continue serving the city in sport contexts? For
mass sport, or elite sport?
(3) Are those venues now financially self-sustaining or are they continuing to drain
public money to offset ongoing maintenance and operating cost during the
post-Games period? And who are the owners of those venues, in other words, who

11

should be responsible for them?
(4) What lessons or recommendations from the Beijing case emerge for future host
cities regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic venues?

4. Methodology
4-1. Research Rationale
This study, presented as a qualitative exploratory research examination, is heavily
based on the material and information derived from both in-depth key figure interviews
and relevant document research. In terms of qualitative research, Creswell defined it as
an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of
inquiry that explore a social or human problem, through which researchers usually build a
complex, holistic picture, analyze words, report detailed views of informants, and
conduct the study in a natural setting. 12 To complete this study, the research has to be
done in a natural setting, namely, investigation of the Olympic sport venues in Beijing.
According to the purpose of the study, to discover the current status of post-Games
utilization of Beijing Olympic venues, the researcher was the key instrument of data
collection through applying key figure interviews, which is a major characteristic of
qualitative research. 13 With the information from the interviewees, the researcher
conducted time-consuming processes of data analysis sorting through large amounts of
data and reducing them to a few themes or categories. 14 The data results from
interviewees’ responses are complicated, personal opinions from multidimensional
12

John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions
(Thousand Oaks, CA, USA; London, UK; New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1998), p. 15.
13
Ibid., p. 16. Table 2.1.
14
Ibid., p. 16. The author considers this type of data analysis as a characteristic reason with which
qualitative research should be conducted.

12

perspectives, which are the meanings and focuses of the study and are analyzed
inductively. 15 Therefore, to answer these research questions and accomplish the purpose,
qualitative research methods were applied in this study.
In terms of exploratory research, Marshall and Rossman stated that it was a type
of research usually conducted to investigate little-understood phenomena or an unclearly
defined problem, to identify/discover important variables, and to generate hypotheses for
further research, by using certain data collection techniques such as in-depth interviewing,
elite interviewing, or participant observation. 16 According to this definition, exploratory
research usually serves a research question that has not been thoroughly investigated or
there are few previous studies focusing on it, which is suitable for this study. First,
although there is plenty of literature investigating previous Olympic host cities within
similar Olympic contexts regarding venues’ post-Games utilization, due to the diversity
among the host cities in terms of economic, cultural and social conditions and
circumstance, specifically, conclusions, potential hypotheses and theories from previous
studies cannot be simply generalized appropriate to the Beijing case. Second, there are
studies, especially from Chinese scholars, focusing on Beijing’s Olympic venues after the
Games, but most of them examined specific venues instead of the entire venue line.
Moreover, most of the studies from Chinese scholars were conducted around one year
after the Games, namely, 2009 and 2010. No studies specifically examined post-Games
utilization in the context of the entire venue line. The status of post-Games utilization of
Olympic venues is dynamic and constantly changing with passing time. Third,
inaccessibility of information due to various reasons regarding current conditions of the
15

Ibid., p. 16. Table 2.1.
Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Bewbury Park, CA,
USA; London, UK; New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1989), p. 78. Table 3.3.
16

13

Olympic venues in Beijing (see page 8) has been a major issue that potentially
undermined the value of relevant studies from Chinese scholars. The researcher of this
study intended to find out what the current status of post-Games utilization for the entire
venue line in Beijing looked like three and a half years after the 2008 Games through
conducting in-depth interviews with the managers/supervisors/directors, by which the
first-hand information regarding the venues could be achieved. Therefore, this study,
intending to find out unclear and non pre-examined conditions of post-Games utilization
of Beijing’s Olympic venues and attempted to provide future host cities with some
recommendations regarding post-Games use of Olympic venues, can be identified as an
exploratory research study.
To discover what potential factors were behind the current status of post-Games
utilization of Beijing Olympic venues, the researcher collected interview data from venue
managers, made multiple visits to the venue sites, and developed and interrelated
categories of information. As an exploratory research, at the beginning of the study, the
researcher, not influenced by the results from the studies on previous Olympic host cities,
put aside theoretical ideas and notions so that the substantive facts and conclusions can
emerge from the results of the investigation. During the investigating process of this
study, data were collected and then analyzed before potential and possible conclusions.
This procedure fits the measure of exploratory research in which usually data inducts
conclusions instead of the other way around.

4-2. Data Collection
To collect data, the researcher conducted on-site investigations in Beijing (1
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August 2011 to 31 October 2011). In-depth key figure interview was the major method
for this study for collecting data. In-depth interviewing as a data collection technique is
much more like conversations than formal, structured interviews. 17 The interviews were
conducted following a semi-structured interview outline specifically developed for this
study. The interview questions in the outline were composed by the researcher to discover
the answers for the research questions. The questions focused on three aspects of
information regarding respective Olympic venues in Beijing: (1) history of the venue, (2)
current status of the venue, and (3) future strategic development of the venue. Through
these three general topics, the researcher expanded the conversation to achieve the
interviewees’ perspectives, which is an assumption fundamental to qualitative research –
the participants’ perspectives on the social phenomenon of interest should unfold as the
participants view it, not as the researcher views it. 18 Specifically, for this study, to fully
analyze and understand reasons and motives behind the post-Games utilization of Beijing
Olympic venues, providing a context, within which socio-cultural factors intertwine with
political and economic factors, and even international relations, is a must. With a
semi-structured and in-depth interview, interviewees responded based on their first-hand
experience of both the host city development and the Olympic Games, which made it the
most suitable method by which this context could be understood.
Interviews in Beijing mainly aimed at venue managers/supervisors/directors who
were either in charge of the venues before or during the Olympic Games, or were
currently operating the venues. The researcher also interviewed some municipal and sport
administration officials and scholars sharing similar research direction. All the interviews
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were conducted in Chinese. Participant recruitment followed a non random sampling
method. For all the Beijing Olympic venues, it was impossible for the researcher to know
all the managers, so a snowballing method was used as a sampling technique to access
and contact interviewees. 19 In this study, the researcher’s acquaintanceship in the
Olympic-related field in Beijing helped the researcher find a few potential interviewees
and then pass the researcher’s contact information along to them so that they could
contact the researcher to participate in the study. Then, the interviewees who participated
in the interview helped the researcher again to pass his contact information through their
own social networks to find the next possible interviewees, and so on.
According to Rothe, with snowball sampling the researcher uses participants to
find new participants until she or he believes that a sufficient number of people have been
interviewed. 20 In this study, the researcher made an attempt to find managers of the
Olympic venues that covered the entire venue line. Finally, there were thirty-six (36)
individuals who participated in the interviews during the data collection period that lasted
one and a half months in Beijing. There were eleven (11) out of twelve (12) newly-built
venues’ supervisors/directors or marketing/management managers, ten (10) out of eleven
(11) pre-existing venues’ supervisors or marketing managers, and three (3) out of eight (8)
temporarily-built venues’ marketing managers or supervisors, who were interviewed by
the researcher at the time. Other interviewees included officials from GASC, BODA and
BOPAC, and scholars in the similar academic field in Beijing. Each interview took
approximately one hour and was held at the place and date the interviewees designated
19
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for their convenience. The interviewees were given an outline of the interview (see
Appendix C for details) on site before the interview started.
Simultaneously, document research was also conducted to collect relevant data at
the time. Although the interview is generally considered an effective way to collect data
for this kind of study, interviewees’ narratives based on their memories and opinions
about certain events might be subjective and from their own perspectives, which could
negatively affect the value of study. Thus, the researcher also applied document research
in order to find other primary sources supplemental to the data obtained from interviews.
The documents the researcher focused on included Official Report of the Beijing 2008
Olympic Games (BOCOG), Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission for the
Games of the XXIX Olympiad – Beijing 2008 (IOC), The 2008 Annual Summary of
Research Studies on Beijing Olympic Year (Beijing Social Science), Beijing Olympic
Venues and Related Facilities (Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office),
Audit Result Announcement: Financial Balance Conditions of the Beijing Olympic
Games and the Auditing Result of the Olympic Venues Construction Projects (National
Audit Office of the PRC), Beijing Olympic Action Plan (Beijing Municipal Government
and BOCOG), Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Bid, Replies to the
Applicant City Questionnaire regarding Sport Facilities (BOBICO), 2010 Beijing
Olympic Park Culture Development Forum – Collection of Speech and News Collectanea
(BOPAC), and online documents at the official website of Beijing Municipal Commission
of Development and Reform. It also included relevant official documents in the
possession of venue authorities or other managers who assumed responsibilities for the
venues, such as certain universities where an Olympic venue was on campus. Moreover,
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coverage regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic venues in Beijing in local
newspapers and magazines during the last three years complemented the material search.
All written materials were obtained by either searching online or physically accessing
them on site in Beijing.

4-3. Data Analysis
Because of the various responses received from the interviews, which usually did
not fall into pre-defined statistical designs, the researcher often analysed those diverse
responses by categorizing them and then coding the categories. 21 Creswell recommended
a standard format of the process of data analysis that typically included three steps: open
coding, axial coding and selective coding. 22
The open coding step is also known as a categorization phase. 23 In this phase, the
researcher formed the categories of the venues based on the data collected both from the
documents examined and the in-depth interviews. First of all, through investigating
relevant documents related to Beijing Olympic venues, the researcher originally
categorized the thirty-one Olympic venues into three groups in terms of new, pre-existing
and temporary built (see Appendix D for details), which was the way of categorizing
Beijing Olympic venues generally used through most of the existing studies regarding
post-Games utilization of the venues. Then, through on-site visits to the venues in Beijing
along the entire venue line, the researcher further formed a category of the venues by
21
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their geographical distribution, which divided the venues into five areas: the Olympic
Central Area, the West Community Area, the University Area, the East Community Area,
and the North Scenic Area (see Appendix E for details). The reason for forming this
category was that by his own on-site investigating, the researcher realized that his own
category of geographical location was different from the category generally used in
existing studies, and even in the official report of the Beijing Olympic Games. Finally,
based on the analysis and contemplation of the information acquired from the interviews,
the researcher formed the third category of the venues in which all thirty-one Olympic
venues in Beijing were grouped by their types of ownerships, which consisted of four
groups: government-owned, GASC-owned, university-owned and private
enterprise-owned (see Appendix F for details). The reason for using different ownership
types as an order to categorize the venues was that based on the results from the
interviews, the ownerships and the relationships between certain venues and their owners
or local authorities are the major cause underscoring present status of the venues in
Beijing; thus, putting the venues into a category by their various ownerships is the best
way to clearly show the differences of the venues’ current status. As a result, the findings
of this study followed the ownership category as an order, which is briefly listed as
follows:
(1) Government-Owned Venues
a) State-owned Enterprises
b) Municipal Level Authorities 24
c) District Government 25

24
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d) Transferred Ownership
(2) GASC -Owned Venues
(3) University-Owned Venues
(4) Private Enterprises-Owned Venues
In terms of Group 1 above, government-owned venues in Beijing, there are three
major types of ownerships. Municipal level government-owned and district level
government-owned venues are directly authorized by the governments. The third type is
so called state-owned enterprises, a specific term used in China, which means that the
venues in this sub-group are owned by those enterprises that are, in turn, owned by the
governments - municipal government, district government, or central government. Thus,
all three types of venues are actually owned by government. The fourth type in this group
is called “Transferred Ownership,” which means that during the last three and a half years,
the ownerships of the venues transferred from one of the three types to the other, while
they still belonged to “Government-Owned Venues” group.
The second step of data analysis in this study was the axial coding phase, which
followed the results from the open coding, namely, the categorization phase. 26 According
to the outline of the interview, for each venue, information from in-depth interviews was
grouped into three parts: historical background, current status, and future development of
the venue, which were reported in this phase. Moreover, the contents from other sources
such as official documents, newspapers, and information from official websites were also
25
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reported accordingly.
Based on the results derived from the axial coding phase, the third step, the
selective coding phase, was conducted. 27 In this phase, the researcher attempted to
summarize possible recommendations on the basis of both open coding and axial coding,
which was expected to be helpful and potentially applied to future Olympic host cities.
Furthermore, conclusions regarding the exploration on post-Games utilization of
Beijing’s Olympic venues were inductively addressed based on all the investigations
reported.

5. Limitations and Delimitations
A scarcity of literature sources (either hard copies or electronic documents)
regarding post-Games utilization of Beijing Olympic venues is a major limitation for this
study. Detailed and authentic information and facts regarding the venues have not been
released to the public by relevant authorities through any accessible channels. Further,
incorrect facts regarding the venues have been “copied and pasted” and circulated. In
effect, they are nothing but rumors. The researcher must be highly cautious in this regard.
In addition to written materials, accessibility is also a major limitation for key
figure interviews. Authorities of the venues were often reluctant to disclose facts to either
the media or members of the academic field, especially facts that may cause negative
repercussions for the authorities. The directors or supervisors of certain venues,
especially those owned by multi-governments were reluctant to accept interviews because
of their purviews, regulations and discipline of the system in which they work. Their
27

Ibid., according to the author, in selective coding, the researcher identifies a “story line” that integrates
the categories in the axial coding, and in this phase propositions or hypotheses are presented.

21

limiting considerations are: limit of authorization or rules, lack of mutual trust,
self-judged low-level of interviewers, not enough interest to be interviewed, or even their
own personalities. Under such situations, directors/managers/supervisors of Olympic
Tennis Center, Hockey Field, Archery Field, Olympic Softball Field, Beach Volleyball
Ground, and Triathlon Course rejected the researcher’s request for interview. Thus, the
lack of information from those venues became a limitation.
In terms of delimitations, only the thirty-one Olympic venues in Beijing were
investigated, though there are another six sport venues located at other cities in China that
were also used as competition sites during the Olympic Games in 2008. As to the
temporarily-built Olympic Venues, some of the total of eight were dismantled right after
the Olympic Games. For instance, the Road Cycling Race Course was restored back to
city roads for regular traffic. Thus, these temporary venues were not considered.

6. Outline of the Findings
1. Overall Investigation of the Venues
1-1. Geographical Distribution: A New Look
1-2. Focusing on the Olympic Central Area
1-2-1. Original Selection of Location
1-2-2. BOPAC
1-2-3. BODA
2. Government-Owned Venues
2-1. By State-Owned Enterprise
2-1-1. China National Convention Center (CNCC)
2-1-2. “Water Cube”
2-2. By Municipal Level Authorities
2-2-1. Beijing Gong Ti Center
2-2-2. Urban Road Cycling Course
2-3. By District Governments
2-3-1. Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park: Shun Yi District
2-3-2. BMX Field and Mountain Bike Course: Shi Jing Shan District
2-3-3. Beach Volleyball Ground: Chao Yang District
2-3-4. Triathlon Course: Chang Ping District
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2-3-5. Softball Field: Feng Tai District
2-4. Transferred Ownerships
2-4-1. “Birds’ Nest”
2-4-2. National Indoor Stadium (NIS)
2-4-3. Olympic Forest Park: Tennis, Hockey and Archery Field
3. General Administration of Sport China (GASC)-Owned Venues
3-1. Lao Shan Velodrome
3-2. Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field
3-3. Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS)
3-4. National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC)
3-4-1. NOSC Stadium
3-4-2. NOSC Gymnasium
3-4-3. Ying Tung Natatorium
4. University-Owned Venues
4-1. Peking University (PKU) Gymnasium
4-2. China Agriculture University (CAU) Gymnasium
4-3. Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) Gymnasium
4-4. Beihang University (BUAA) Gymnasium
4-5. University of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB) Gymnasium
4-6. Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) Gymnasium
5. Private Enterprise-Owned Venues
5-1. Wu Ke Song MasterCard Center (MCC) and Baseball Field
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
1. Post-Olympic Effect on Host Cities
In 2002, the IOC held an international symposium in Lausanne, Switzerland,
titled “the Legacy of the Olympic Games, 1984-2002.” The Proceedings of the
symposium grouped the legacies into seven aspects: urban and environmental legacies;
sporting legacies; economic and tourism legacies; political legacies; cultural, social and
communication legacies; education and documentation legacies; and organizing and
planning legacies. The messages derived drastically emphasized the importance and great
significance of Olympic legacy, in particular to the host cities, especially those hosting
after Los Angeles in 1984. 1 Some scholars discussed the Olympic legacies for the
international Olympic movement in general. From an historical perspective, Barney
grouped the legacies into five aspects: rebirth legacy, symbol legacy, (Olympic) mark
protection legacy, television (rights) legacy, and commercialism legacy, by which the
legacy of wealth from the Olympics was contended as a double edge sword. 2 Kidd stated
that the Olympic sporting legacy had been highly uneven and uncertain; and for the host
cities positive legacies did not always happen. 3 Further, it was stated that new Olympic
facilities in the host cities could be too expensive to operate and maintain or might have
little connection with local sporting culture. 4 Kidd also made positive comments on the
sport facilities built in Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic Games regarding their spatial
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distribution, but he also stated that the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games raised the bar
significantly, including the standard and requirement of sport facilities for future host
cities. 5
In terms of the context of the legacies to the host cities, Cashman questioned the
term “legacy” and stated that it should be replaced by the term “outcomes,” because there
were both positive and negative “legacy aspects” of the Olympic Games. 6 For the
negative outcomes, Cashman listed post-Games issues such as public debt and continuing
cost of operating those expensive and under-used Olympic facilities.7 Cashman classified
Olympic legacies (outcomes) into six groups: economic legacy; legacy of the built and
physical environment; information and education legacy; legacy of public life, politics
and culture; legacy of sport; and legacy of symbols, memory and history. 8 Through this
categorization of legacies, Cashman discussed how a host city should utilize the benefits
and avoid negative outcomes from the Olympic Games during the post-Games period.
In addition, Geraint John discussed the Olympic impact on urban planning policy;
he also discussed what geographical factors needed to be taken into consideration when
designing Olympic sport facilities. 9 By providing readers with the examination of the
Barcelona Olympics, Truñó reported the legacy of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games
on a positive note and stated that the impact of the Games stimulated the post-Games
development of the city. 10 In terms of the Sydney Games, facing the huge cost of the
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Olympic venues both from the construction before the Games and the maintenance after
the Games, Searle stated that the main post-Games issue concerned how the on-going
operation and maintenance costs of the venues can be paid for. 11 It was also stated that
the two main Olympic stadiums, Stadium Australia and the Super Dome, would
eventually involve significant costs to the State government and private sector. 12
Although Olympic legacies were generally considered in either tangible or
intangible context, some scholars pointed out post-Games issues for Olympic host cities.
Essex and Chalkley stated that the OCOGs and city planners might overstate the positive
post-Games impacts and understate the negative impacts for their own group interests. 13
Many post-Olympic issues that host cities face derive from the OCOGs’ unrealistic and
over-ambitious plans and expectations. 14 Unfortunately, the host cities themselves are
intricately involved in those plans and expectations. The authors also contended that
under-utilization of Olympic sport venues after the Games was a common issue in the
host cities – a problem still unsolved. 15 And finally, the authors concluded that host cities
should follow a long-term development plan that would not depend exclusively on the
Olympics for implementation.16
Hiller pointed out that post-Games outcomes instead of legacies caused serious
issues for the host cities; and one of those issues related to post-Games usage of facilities,
namely, whether those facilities built with public money would be used by elite athletes
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or the general public. 17 In terms of the economic impact of the Olympic Games, from a
longitudinal perspective, Hiller proposed a political economy model that distinguished
three kinds of linkages: forward linkages, backward linkages and parallel linkages, by
which long-term impact of the Games and their intended/unintended and
anticipated/unanticipated consequences can be identified in a longitudinal or historical
context. 18 Moreover, though Hiller admitted that Olympic sport facilities were lasting
Olympic legacies in the host cities, they also represented dilemmas and challenges. 19
Other scholars weighed in on the impacts of the Olympic Games on the host cities
in a broad context. Ritchie identified six aspects of impact from a mega-event such as the
Olympic Games on the development of host cities: (1) economic, (2) physical, (3)
tourism, (4) socio-cultural, (5) psychological, and (6) political. 20 Similarly, Malfas,
Theodoraki and Houlihan grouped the impacts into four aspects: (1) socio-economic, (2)
socio-cultural, (3) physical, and (4) political. 21 Meanwhile, certain studies focused on one
specific aspect of the impacts, such as economic impact, and analyzed the realities (or
myth) between costs and benefits with respect to the Olympic Games. 22 Furthermore,
from a global perspective, Short discussed the impact of globalization of the Olympic
Games on those host cities which tried to enhance their city image in international
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context. 23 Gratton and Preuss also made an attempt to clarify the correlation between the
Olympic impact and its so called legacies by discussing the definition of Olympic legacy
and by identifying six key elements of Olympic structures, which were: (1) infrastructure,
(2) knowledge, skill-development and education, (3) image, (4) emotions, (5) networks,
and (6) culture. 24
Some scholars investigated specific editions of the Olympic Games from which a
more detailed scenario can be scrutinized. Gerlach focused on the issue of creating a
memorial park in Salt Lake City where the 2002 Olympic Winter Games were hosted. He
stated that when the Games passed, people’s interests passed and few had passions to care
for Olympic-related matters that could adversely affect legacy left from the Games. 25
Wood described woeful economic situations in Greece and questioned whether those
luxurious and magnificent Olympic sport facilities were essential in a country in need of
more hospitals and long-term economic benefits that better highways might provide. 26 By
describing the conditions of Sydney’s Olympic venues a couple of years after the 2000
Games and discussing the lessons future host cities might learn, Ren proposed several
impacts that Olympic Games had on host cities and countries such as sporting, political,
economic and environmental impact. 27
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The Sydney case, as the first Olympic Games in the new century, inevitably
attracted the attention of scholars. Cashman made concerted efforts on the Sydney case.
In his book published in 2006, six years after the Sydney Games, Cashman provided
readers with a general description regarding post-Games issues the city faced. 28
Comparing Cashman’s view in 2006 with Cashman’s and Hughes’ message from their
book, Staging the Olympics, 29 in 1999, regarding what the Olympic legacy in Sydney
would be, it can be found that Cashman’s view about Olympic legacy and post-Games
effect evolved into an objective and rational context, in which legacy and outcomes
relative to post-Games effect was dynamic and constantly-changing. Further, Cashman
stated that the condition of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues in Sydney
fluctuated depending on various factors which intertwined with local cultural and
tradition backgrounds, international environments, and economic situations. 30 He
contended that in terms of the legacy, the most important one that was always
emphasized was economic impact because undoubtedly commercial interests and
economic benefits had higher priority than sports, culture and environment in the context
of Olympic Games, especially during the last three decades. 31 As to the venues in Sydney,
he stated that the bigger the venue, the more negative usage conditions experienced
during the first couple of years after the Games. 32 Also, nine years later in 2009,
Cashman proposed four stages of the development of Sydney’s Olympic legacy: (1) local
Olympic vision before the Games, (2) realizing the insufficient plan right after the Games,
28
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(3) belated plan developed, and (4) the vision adapted and modified to suit the changing
post-Games environment. 33
A more critical book regarding Sydney’s Olympics, Lenskyj’s The Best Olympics
Ever? Social Impacts of Sydney 2000 criticized the Olympics in Australia and the global
Olympic movement in general in various aspects, including their so-called legacy. 34 The
style of post-modernism defines the author clearly against those so-called sycophant
scholars of the Olympics. While defending the protesters surrounding the Sydney
Olympics, the author placed herself in the same position of criticism – exploitation of the
Olympics as a platform to realize one’s own purpose and group interests.
Some scholars consider the 1992 Barcelona Games as successful as Sydney 2000.
In addition to Truñó’s contribution mentioned above, Brunet stated that the Olympics in
1992 were considered a stimulant for the city to accomplish its sustainable development
during the following years and emphasized that a long-term strategy would be extremely
important for city planning in the Olympic context and maintaining the Olympic impetus
in a relatively long term after the Games. 35
Speaking of the “successful” editions of the Olympic Games, one festival cannot
be ignored, the 1984 Los Angeles Games, which were considered the turning point of the
Modern Olympic Movement. Particularly with regard to sport facilities, to control the
cost of the Games, the organizers made extensive use of existing facilities. By
refurbishing existing sport venues in Southern California, the organizers saved millions
33
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of dollars. As a result, there were only three venues, cycling, swimming and shooting,
built specifically for the Games. 36 Unfortunately, no organizers since 1984 followed this
method, that being heavily relying on existing facilities to reduce the cost of the Games. 37
MacRury compared two typical but opposite cases, the 1976 Montreal Games and 1984
Los Angeles Games, and stated that the former mainly relied on public funding, while the
latter relied on private funding. 38 Also, in tune with Los Angeles, funding for the 1996
Atlanta Olympic Games came largely from private/corporate money. On the other hand,
for Barcelona in 1992 and London in 2012, public funding exceed (ed) 70% of the total. 39
However, Crompton stated that also in the United States, professional sports often gained
public subsidies from multilevel governments such as the investment in facilities for team
sports. 40 The rationale was also provided: (1) economic impact (usually positive) from
spending of visitors, (2) increased community visibility, (3) enhanced community image,
(4) stimulations of other development, and (5) psychic benefits. 41 Contrastingly, the
different attitudes toward the Olympic Games and professional sports in the United States
can be seen from these studies.
As to comparative studies, Andranovich, Burbank and Heying undertook a
comparison among the Olympic cities in the US. 42 They examined the Olympic
experiences of Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City regarding the differences and
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similarities of the methods and approaches applied during the bidding phase and
preparation phase of their Olympic journeys. To some extent, all three US cities applied a
Private-Public Partnership (PPP) model. 43 Although they are very different in terms of
size, economic base, social composition, political history, and hosted lengthy time
periods apart, they share solid similar characteristics, such as political systems, national
structure, cultural background, traditions, social norms, and macro economic
surroundings, all of which are indispensable when composing such comparative studies.
In contrast, certain comparative studies comparing different Olympic host cities in terms
of their economy of hosting the Games, lack basic similarities, which makes it like “water
without sources” and “trees without roots.” Preuss’ book made efforts to analyze and
compare the economics of hosting the Olympic Games among host cities between 1972
and 2008. 44 Undoubtedly, solid statistical data were utilized and scientific methods were
applied throughout the entire book. Since the data used in the book when analyzing
benefits and costs of hosting the Games mainly stemmed from the OCOGs’ official
reports after the Games were finished, it was easy to organize and justify because the
OCOGs, with their short-lived life span were consistently characterized by similar
organizational structure and goal. However, a true cost-benefit analysis should not be
drawn from an obviously biased OCOG. Without essential data from reliable sources,
Preuss’ work can be misleading.
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2. Historical Retrospect: “Olympic Cities”
For general discussion of Olympic cities and relationships between the Olympic
Games and host cities, scholars have focused viewpoints from an historical perspective.
Chalkley and Essex identified four chronological phases in the development of the
Olympics in terms of the impact of each Olympic Games on a host city’s facilities,
environment, and infrastructure: (1) the period from 1896 to 1904 when the Games were
small-scale, poorly-organized and their urban impacts minimal, (2) the period from 1908
to 1932 when the Games became larger in scale, better-organized and usually involved
the construction of some substantial new purpose-built sports facilities, (3) the period
from 1936 to 1956 when sports facilities emerged as “flag-ship” symbols of the host
cities, even though urban impacts remained modest, and (4) the period from 1960 to 1996
when the Games triggered large-scale urban improvement and had more substantial
impacts on host cities’ environments. 45 Since, in certain phases, there are unique cases
that are not consistent with the others, that is, not in accord with the defined characters of
development, such as the 1936 Berlin Games in the second phase and the 1968 Mexico
Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Games in the fourth phase, the arguments Chalkley and
Essex advocated, weaken.
In an earlier article, Essex and Chalkley focused on the development of Olympic
sports facilities, namely, the built environment. Olympic venues built in various cities
were reviewed along with the order based on their influence and impact on the cities’
development. The authors categorized the cities into three groups according to the level
of the scale of facilities: (1) low impact Games (1900, 1904, 1948, 1968 and 1984), (2)
45
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modest impact Games with some additional sport facilities (1908, 1912, 1932, 1936,
1952, 1956 and 1996), and (3) heavy impact Games that stimulated transformation of the
cities (1960, 1964, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1988, 1992 and 2000). 46 Based on the
characteristics the authors defined, the 2008 Beijing Games undoubtedly should be
placed in the third group.
Gold and Gold’s book, Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning and the World’s
Games, 1896-2012, provided readers with an historical panoramic scenario of the
development of the Olympic Movement. 47 Each Olympic city was introduced, one by
one, with a time order, both for Winter Games and Summer Games, in which Olympic
sport facilities were listed and discussed, respectively, providing readers with a
systematic thread and outline for the Olympic venues and their post-Games utilization.
Chronologically, the Olympic Games were categorized by certain similar characteristics.
For instance, the 1980 Moscow Games and 1984 Los Angeles Games were grouped into
a category called “Ideological Games.” 48 In addition, several themes were also proposed
and discussed, such as the Olympic Winter Games, Cultural Olympiad, Paralympics,
commercialism and finance of the Games, which were followed by several specific
studies, such as Berlin 1936, Montreal 1976, Barcelona 1992, Sydney 2000, Athens 2004,
and Beijing 2008.

3. Current Studies on Post-Games Utilization of Beijing Olympic Venues
During the three and a half year period following the Beijing Olympic Games,
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scholars, especially those from China, paid much attention to post-Games effects on
Beijing’s Olympic venues, the city’s economic conditions, the finance of the Games, and
Olympic legacies. The 2008 Annual Summary of Research Studies on Beijing Olympic
Year, published at the beginning of 2009, stated that the Olympic economy significantly
stimulated the development of the city, improved its industrial structure, and accelerated
the progress in social environment and civil behaviors. 49 The document also pointed out
that the government should be highly sensitive towards the fact that negative influences
could occur after the Games experienced by previous host cites, such as inflated real
estate bubbles, extra public cost that burdened local residents, and imbalance of economic
development among districts in the city. 50 As to the Olympic venues, the article
contended that over-emphasized national sports led to underused conditions among
Olympic facilities in Beijing, which meant that certain venues might not be used by the
public. Also, some suggestions were proposed to better utilize the venues. 51 Wang
proposed suggestions regarding how to further make use of the venues, such as
converting sport functions to commercial or cultural functions for specific venues like the
Water Cube and the National Indoor Stadium. 52 Li, Wang, and Wan reviewed recent
studies on the Beijing Olympics and analyzed the relationship between mega-events and
host cites and the former’s impacts on the latter. 53
Lei contended that Olympic venues must be considered a public product, 54
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providing service functions for the public in host cities. 55 Lei also analyzed potential
reasons that adversely affected public functions during the post-Games period. 56 Tian
analyzed the characteristics of Olympic venues in terms of the differences between public
product and private product and provided different operating modes dependent on their
different characters. 57 Putting aside the debate regarding whether they belong to public or
private product, Chen and Dong investigated general conditions of several Olympic
venues in Beijing two years after the Games. 58 They concluded that there were some
well-operated venues, such as the National Stadium (Bird’s Nest) and the National
Aquatic Centre (Water Cube), as well as some poorly-operated ones, such as the Tennis
Facility in the Olympic Green and the Gymnasium at Peking University. 59 Liu found
similar results in his article published in 2009. According to Liu, the Water Cube was full
of tourists all the time, so that people had to wait in line to visit it, and the Bird’s Nest
made a profit (more than US$40 million within one year, including 70% coming from
admission tickets). 60 However, Zimbalist stated just a couple of months later that the
Water Cube was severely underused. 61 Matheson also pointed out that the Water Cube
would have little use as a state-of-the-art swimming facility. 62 Further, the Associated
Press predicted that it was quite hard to believe that the Bird’s Nest’s own revenue could
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offset the at least 19 million dollar annual maintenance cost and debt payments. 63 Wang
and Zhao expressed their concern in 2010 that after the first step, the Bird’s Nest and the
Water Cube faced considerable operating pressures. 64
No matter what the situation after the Olympic Games, the IOC and the OCOGs
always make their profits from the Games. Beijing is no exception. Predictably, based on
a national audit report, Shi and Feng indicated that the IOC and BOCOG made profits
from the Beijing Games much higher than that experienced relative to Athens in 2004. 65
In contrast, Zhou examined the phenomenon of Olympic economy decrease and stated
that Beijing should have learned from previous lessons. 66 In terms of venue distribution
and geographical layout, Hu and Zhou suggested that Beijing should learn from the
experiences the Australians had for the 2000 Sydney Games. 67 Meanwhile, Liu discussed
the models of both Sydney and Athens and pointed out respective advantages and
disadvantages, based on which suggestions in terms of cost reduction and venue function
conversion were proposed. 68 Liu and Li stated that Beijing’s Olympic venues, especially
the famous ones such as the Bird’s Nest and the Water Cube within the Olympic Park,
could be developed to interface with the tourism industry of the city. 69
Some scholars examined the relationship between Olympic legacies and
63
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post-Games utilization and management of Beijing’s Olympic venues. Although Li stated
that the most precious legacy the Olympics left to Beijing was the change in people’s
minds, 70 other scholars thought tangible legacies, such as tourism destinations, sport
venues, public transportation, and Olympic archives, were more important. 71 Depending
on different venue zones in Beijing, Sun proposed various solutions for public use of
facilities and, as well, their purpose as major tourist destinations. 72 By analyzing pervious
experiences in Seoul, Sydney, and Athens, as well as Beijing’s current conditions, Li and
Gao stated that Post-Games utilization and management of Beijing Olympic venues
necessarily needed certain supportive policies from multi-level governments in China. 73
Otherwise, precious Olympic legacies would be difficult to manage. 74 In addition to
supportive policies, Liu stated that certain structural reform regarding management and
administration systems for the venues should be carried out before the management
model might be changed. 75 In terms of the most expensive venue in Beijing, the National
Stadium, or Bird’s Nest, some scholars examined its management and operating model
after the Games. Zhu, Zhang and Duan analyzed the management model, the
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, and the planned rights separated between
ownership and rights of management for the Stadium proposed by Beijing municipal
government prior to the Games. 76 Wang discussed the issue of naming rights for the
70
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Bird’s Nest and contended that the Stadium should better serve professional sports in
China. 77 Zhang stated that the national stadium faced embarrassing situations because of
the negative Post-Olympic effect and the contradiction between its public character and
private character. 78
Specifically, some scholars investigated current utilization conditions of the
venues located in the universities. There were six competition venues in the universities.
Zhang and Zhang made a general examination of all six. 79 Guo, Shu and Liu realized that
companies targeted university students as their marketing target group; the venues
became a platform on which marketing strategies were based. 80 They contended that
sport venues in the universities should be put into market-making profit, maximizing
their commercial value instead of only serving students. 81 Also, a specific venues
management team should be built up to better organize and operate the venues for their
marketing activities. 82 In addition, the Olympic venues in the universities should serve
national-level elite athletes for the Olympic gold medal strategy in China and hold more
commercial sports events because of their high quality conditions. 83
Actually, well before the 2008 Olympic Games commenced, some scholars had
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already paid attention to sport venues in Beijing and the issue regarding post-Games
utilization. As early as 2003, Zhao pointed out that both the condition and the number of

sport venues in Beijing were far below the level experienced in certain developed
counties. 84 On the other hand, some sport venues were underused, especially some of
those built for Beijing’s Asian Games in 1990. 85 Shi compared the conditions between
Sydney and Beijing regarding sport venue construction and contended that the
construction of Beijing Olympic venues must follow the principle of sustainable
development of the city so that post-Games utilization of them could be successfully
handled. 86 Zhang reviewed the conditions of post-Games utilizations from previous
Olympic Games such as Seoul, Sydney, Los Angeles and Athens, and concluded that
intangible and symbolic values of Olympic sport venues should be emphasized along
with their practical planning for post-Games utilization. 87 Lin also introduced previous
cases of Olympic venue types and their geographical distribution and provided readers
with some kinds of functions with respect to post-Games utilization of Olympic venues,
such as alternative function, multi-function and sport function. 88 Wang and Guo
examined both strengths and weaknesses of authorities’ decisions regarding management
of Beijing Olympic venues and concluded that the conditions of venue management and
utilizations depended on reform of Chinese sport policies in general, both for national
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elite sport and mass sport after the 2008 Olympic Games. 89 Cui questioned the opinion
that Olympic venues would be precious legacies to the city and doubted if it was
necessary to invest so much money on sport facilities for only two-week events like the
Olympic Games. The author also contended that commercialism might be the most
important solution to post-Games utilization of Beijing Olympic venues no matter how
the venues could be defined, public product or private product. 90 From an historical
perspective, Chen and Ren reviewed the characteristics of Olympic sport venues and their
physical distribution and planning, by which the trajectory of the development of
Olympic facilities and how the Olympic built environment evolved during the last
century were examined. 91
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Chapter 3. Findings
1. An Overview of the Olympic Venues in Beijing
Among thirty-one Olympic sport venues in Beijing used as competition sites
during the 2008 Olympic Games, twelve of them were newly-built specifically for the
Games. Regarding these twelve, four of them are located at the Beijing Olympic Central
Area, which is currently supervised by certain enterprises owned by the municipal
government or district government: the National Stadium (also known as the Bird’s Nest),
the National Indoor Stadium, the National Aquatics Center (also known as the Water
Cube), and the Olympic Green Tennis Center (also known as the Lotus Tennis Court). 1
Located in the Olympic Central Region, these venues are generally considered both
sport-related facilities and major tourism destinations of the city. Another four, built on
campuses, are being used by students and local communities currently supervised by
universities: Peking University (PKU), China Agriculture University (CAU), University
of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB), and Beijing University of Technology
(BJUT). 2 Another two, the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and the Lao Shan Velodrome,
authorized by General Administration of Sport of China (GASC), are only used by
Chinese national sports teams. Of the last two, the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park (also
known as Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park), located at the North Scenic Area
and authorized by Shun Yi district government, has been open to the public with an
admission fee since May 2009. 3 The MasterCard Center (MCC, also known as the Wu
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Ke Song Arena or the Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium), is the only Olympic
venue among all of them in Beijing that is owned by private enterprise. 4
In terms of the pre-existing venues, there were five out of eleven of them
authorized by GASC and thus largely utilized by Chinese national sports teams: the
NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, the Ying Tung Natatorium, the Capital Indoor
Stadium (CIS), and the Beijing Shooting Range Clay Target Field. Although mainly used
by Chinese elite athletes, these GASC-owned venues, to some degree, are also open to
the public for either their sport functions or non sport-related events with public
assembly. 5 Two other renovated venues were also located on campus: Beijing Institute of
Technology (BIT) and Beihang University (BUAA), which largely have the similar
utilization condition and status as the other four newly-built university-owned venues. 6
The Workers’ Stadium and the Workers’ Gymnasium are another two pre-existing venues
renovated for the Games; and they are the oldest among Beijing Olympic sport venues:
the Stadium was built in 1959 and the Gymnasium was built in 1961. 7 These two venues,
also called the Beijing Workers’ Complex, are owned by the Beijing Federation of Trade
Unions, one of the governmental departments on the municipal level.8 Although the Lao
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Shan Mountain Bike Course, another pre-existing venue for the Beijing Games, is quite
close to the Lao Shan Velodrome, the course is not owned by GASC, the owner of the
Velodrome, but the Shi Jing Shan District Government who also owns the Mountain Bike
Course as a public park with free entrance. 9 The last pre-existing venue, according to
BOCOG, is the Feng Tai Softball Field located at Feng Tai Sport Center and owned by
the Feng Tai District Government. The field, closed to the public since the 2008 Games,
was planned before the Games to be modified in the future as a multi-sports complex
with tennis courts, basketball fields, shooting range and a football training field. 10
Because of its underused situation, in June 2010, the authority of the field, the Sport
Bureau of Feng Tai District, made an attempt to build a shopping mall-like recreation and
leisure center on the site of the softball field; however, the project has not been carried
out since then. 11
There were eight temporarily-built venues for the Olympic Games in the city,
which, based on the statement made by the Beijing 2008 Project Construction
Headquarters Office, were supposed to be dismantled right after the Games in 2008, 12
while actually some of them have not yet been so, three and a half years later as this
research was conducted. Only three out of eight temporary venues were dismantled after
the Games: (1) the road cycling course, through which the race route occupied urban
roads that were restored to regular roads right after the Games; (2) the fencing Hall in the
21, 2012).
9
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China National Convention Center (CNCC), which was dismantled in 2009 and
renovated as a convention and exhibition hall as planned prior to the Games; 13 and (3) the
Olympic Baseball Field, which was dismantled right after the Games; the site has been
empty since then. 14 The Olympic Hockey Field and Archery Field have not been
dismantled yet. Instead, partial facilities and auxiliary space around the two venues are
being used as football and basketball fields for the public with admission fees. The Beach
Volleyball Ground in the Chao Yang Park is still standing there empty, while beside the
venue, a beach theme park was built for the public with extra admission fees applied. 15
The triathlon venue at the Ming Dynasty Tomb Reservoir, a temporary Olympic venue
that was supposed to be dismantled after the Games, is still in use as a triathlon
competition course where the Dextro Energy Triathlon ITU (International Triathlon
Union) World Championship Series Grand Final was held in September 2011. 16 Further,
the venue was renovated and redesigned for future use in 2011. 17 The Lao Shan BMX
(Bicycle Motocross) Course still exists but is not open to the public since the Games
finished. 18

1-1. Geographical Distribution: A New Look
In terms of the geographical distribution of the Olympic venues in Beijing, in
January 2001, it was addressed in the Candidature File of Beijing’s Bidding that all the
13
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Olympic sport venues (thirty-two venues) would be located in four areas of Beijing: the
Olympic Green (the central area), the Western Community Area, the North Scenic Area
and the University Area. 19 At the time, one more sport event was planned to be held in
Beijing, the equestrian competitions, which were later removed from the northern
outskirts of Beijing to Hong Kong. In terms of the reason for the location change, Jiadong
Gao, the director of the marketing department of the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park,
contributed his point of view. According to Gao, when bidding for the 2008 Olympics,
there were two Olympic projects planning to be built in the North Scenic Area in Shun Yi
District: an aquatic park for rowing and canoeing and an equestrian park. However, if the
equestrian park was to be built in Beijing, the biggest problem would be the issue of
EDFZ (equine disease-free zone), making it highly difficult to build EDFZ around the
competition site in Shun Yi District where a rural population was the majority. In contrast,
Hong Kong had already met the requirement at the time. 20
As a result, the Beijing Games had seen thirty-one venues located in the city. In
September 2003, the Beijing Municipal Government and BOCOG jointly announced the
Beijing Olympic Action Plan, which, in terms of venues’ locations, stated that the venues
distribution can be described as “one center plus three areas.” 21 The description was the
same as the one in the Candidature File.
Moreover, two years after the Games, in the Official Report of the Beijing 2008
Olympic Games (hereafter “the Report”), published in August 2010, it also followed the
original venues distribution description mentioned above. In the report, it still stated that
19
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the Olympic Green consisted of thirteen sport venues, which was incorrect because after
the adjustment, in fact, there were ten sport venues within the area of the Olympic
Green. 22 In terms of the West Community Area, the report indicated that there were nine
venues; however, in fact, there were eight venues instead. 23 The report further stated that
the University Area consisted of four venues; but the truth is that there were six venues
located within the area. 24 As to the fourth area, the report indicated that the North Scenic
Area consisted of two venues: the Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park and the Shun
Yi Country Race Course, which was not the Olympic competition site since the
Equestrian events’ location changed. 25 According to this geographical distribution
category, there are five Beijing Olympic competition venues that cannot be grouped into
any of the categories: the Workers’ Stadium and Gymnasium, the BJUT (Beijing
University of Technology) Gymnasium, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground,
and the Ming Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Venue, which, to some degree, could confuse
people when they try to get a comprehensive picture of Olympic venues in Beijing.
Therefore, under such conditions, to make a clearer map of the venues, based on
the examination of the documents and on-site observation, the researcher developed a
new geographical distribution category for the venues trying to put all the venues through
the entire venue line into relevant groups. Except for the road race cycling route, all thirty
venues are grouped into five geographical areas.
22

Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 27-38. The ten venues are: the
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The first is the Olympic Central Area that includes the Olympic Park, the Olympic
Forest Park, and the National Olympic Sport Center that was established in 1990 for the
Beijing Asian Games. In this area, there were ten Olympic Venues: the National Stadium,
the National Aquatic Center, the National Indoor Stadium, the Olympic Tennis Court, the
Olympic Hockey Field, the Olympic Archery Field, the fencing hall in China National
Convention Center, the NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, and the Ying Tung
Natatorium (see the table in Appendix E and the map in Appendix G for details).
The second is the West Community Area where eight Olympic venues were
located: the Beijing Shooting Range Hall, the Clay Target Field, the Lao Shan Velodrome,
the Lao Shan BMX Field, the Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course, the Feng Tai Sport
Center Softball Field, the MasterCard Center, and the Wu Ke Song Baseball Field (see
the table in Appendix E and the map in Appendix H for details).
The third is University Area where six venues were located: the CAU Gymnasium,
the USTB Gymnasium, the BUAA Gymnasium, the BIT Gymnasium, the PKU
Gymnasium, and CIS (Capital Indoor Stadium) (see the table in Appendix E and the map
in Appendix I for details). In this area, all the venues were built on university campuses
except CIS, but because it was located within the area, it was thus grouped into this
category. It was consistent with how it was grouped in the Official Report of the Beijing
2008 Olympic Games.
The fourth is the East Community Area where four venues were located: the
Workers’ Stadium, the Workers’ Gymnasium, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball
Ground, and the BJUT Gymnasium (see the table in Appendix E and the map in
Appendix J for details).
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And the last is the North Scenic Area where two venues were located: the Ming
Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Venue and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park (see the table in
Appendix E and the map in Appendix K for details).
By categorizing the venues into these five areas geographically, a panoramic
picture of Beijing’s Olympic venues can be clearly seen, especially those that were prone
to be overlooked, such as the venues on the east side of the city and the triathlon venue at
Chang Ping District, a northern district of Beijing.

1-2. Focusing on the Olympic Central Area
Among various areas, the Olympic Central Area, also known as the Olympic
Functional Region, is usually the one put under the spotlight frequently as long as the
topics and issues regarding Beijing Olympic sport venues are addressed. It contains the
greatest number of Olympic-related facilities, including not only ten sport venues, but
also the Olympic Village, the Olympic Forest Park, hotels, convention center, and
shopping center built specifically for the Olympic Games. Three and a half years after the
Games, it has become one of the famous landmarks in Beijing as a tourism destination, a
recreation and leisure location for the public, and an assembly place for mega-events (see
the map in Appendix L). As a tangible Olympic legacy, the Olympic Central Area has
been acting as a stage on which the national image and city image of Beijing continue to
be shown in the post-Games period.
As one of six government-appointed, high-end industrial functional regions in
Beijing, the Olympic Central Area showcases its symbolic significance representing
Beijing as an Olympic host city in its socio-cultural context, which is the major reason
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that the Beijing Municipal Government has been paying considerable attention to this
area. 26 As the director of the Beijing Olympic Park Administration Committee (BOPAC),
Chun Wang stated, the Beijing Municipal Government had been trying to rebrand the
Olympic Green as a global tourism destination, such as the Great Wall or the Forbidden
City. 27 However, the rebranding project also meant an expensive price tag. Wang
admitted that the yearly maintenance fees for the Park were around CNY 600 million
(USD 92 million) in 2009, which were paid by both the Beijing Municipal Government
(50%) and the Chao Yang District Government (50%). 28 Despite the high maintenance
cost, it seems that the government will keep financially supporting the development of
the Park. Huiguang Zhang, the director of the Beijing Tourism Administration, stated that
the Beijing Municipal Government would invest CNY 65 billion (USD 10 billion)
towards developing tourism at the Park by 2015. 29
Undoubtedly all the investment made for the Olympic Park comes and will come
from public money. Compared to the huge maintenance cost, on the other hand, the
Olympic Green as well as the Olympic Forest Park is opened to the public for free, which
means that there is no “revenue return” to offset the cost directly. 30 Some venues such as
the National Stadium and the National Aquatic Center within the Park apply entrance
admission (CNY 50 (USD 7.7) for the former and CNY 30 (USD 4.6) for the latter),
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which could generate tax revenue for the government indirectly. However, booming
tourism raised another issue, the revenue of the venues (the National Stadium and the
National Aquatic Center) heavily relied on the entrance admissions from the tourists,
which was not what the authorities of the Park expected. According to the official website
of the Park, by May 2011, the number of tourists of the Park reached 100 million. 31 For
the two venues, the revenue from the entrance admissions produces 70% to 90% of the
total revenues they earned, according to Aiqing Li, the board chairman of the Beijing
State-owned Assets Management Co. Ltd. (BSAM), the owner of the two venues. 32
Lianyuan Cheng, the governor of Chao Yang District, said during an interview that the
authority of the Olympic Park, both the Beijing Municipal Government and the Chao
Yang District Government, expected to create the Park as a stage on which Chinese
culture and national image could be showcased and to stimulate sport, exhibition, and
culture industries by carrying forward the Olympic elements around the Park, rather than
merely supporting the venues in order to earn revenue from entrance admissions. 33
However, with time passing by, the number of tourists at the Park dramatically
declined. According to Ping Yang, the deputy director of BOPAC, the number of visitors
to the National Stadium decreased by 50% every year since 2009. 34 The researcher’s
on-site observation witnessed a declining trend in tourists. During August 2011, there
were not too many tourists in the Park as the Chinese media usually described unless
certain events were held in the national stadium such as the Italy Super Cup football
31

Official Website of the BOPAC, “The Number of Tourists Entering the Olympic Park Reached 100
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34
Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011.

51

match or famous singers’ concerts. Among the tourists within the Olympic Park were
those who entered the National Stadium even less, as they were reluctant to spend CNY
50 for merely entering a stadium, even though it was the “Bird’s Nest.” The Xin Ao
Shopping Center, located in the Olympic Park, as large as 400,000 square meters, was
labeled the biggest shopping park in the world. 35 A new shopping center inside the Park,
elaborately renovated, had nothing inside but a movie theater and three restaurants:
McDonald’s, Yoshinoya and Sevenana, in October 2011. It can be predicted that adding
more stores would not guarantee an increase in the number of customers. 36
Despite the existence of certain issues regarding the Park, the government still
feels confident about its future. As the most important Olympic legacy left to Beijing, the
Olympic Park is still attracting the attention of the governments. Since 2009, the Beijing
Olympic Park Development Forum has been held annually. As District Governor Cheng
stated in August 2011, by 2020, aside from being a tourism destination, the Olympic Park
would be an exhibition zone for the innovation of culture and sport, a stage for
international communication of culture and sport, and a public service area bearing
Olympic elements as well as sport and recreation functions. 37 As its symbolic
significance to the city and quite huge investment the governments put on it, the
governor’s grand ambition regarding the Olympic Park may be realized in the future. It
remains a priority.
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1-2-1. Selection of Location
Being one of the most significant landmarks of the city, the Olympic Central Area
is an important, indeed strategic part of the city’s post-Olympic development. The
Municipal Government made the long-term plan for this area prior to the Olympic Games.
Thus, the question why the city planners selected the location as well as the importance
of the selection should be firstly examined in the study. In the Official Report of the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, the procedure of site selection of the Olympic Central
Area was recorded from a perspective of BOCOG. Originally there were a dozen site
selection plans worked out based on the expertise from professional institutions. And,
during the second selection step there were five plans focusing on two major suburban
areas left for further selection: the Northern Area Plan and the Southeast Area Plan. 38
The Northern Area Plan included two adjacent areas: the National Olympic Sports
Center (NOSC: central area established for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games) and Wali
Village (at the north of NOSC). 39 The Southeast Area Plan contained three site choices.
The first was within the southeast section of the Fourth Ring Road of Beijing where the
green land around the area would be the site for major Olympic venues and the Olympic
Village. The second was beyond the southeast section of the Fourth Ring Road where the
venues and the Olympic Village would be built in an area of three hundred hectares in
Fatou Area. The last choice was Yizhuang Area with more than three hundred ecological
hectares, which used to be the emperors’ hunting park of the Qing Dynasty, currently
located at the southeast section of the Fifth Ring Road of Beijing. 40 The experts and
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municipal officials had quite heated debate regarding those potential areas. 41 As a result,
the question became: the north or the south. Certain factors were listed as criteria of the
selection: overall layout of venues; sports competitions operations; spectators; media
coverage; investment return; city development and land usage; framework of the city at
the time; infrastructure; environmental protection; and post-Games utilization. 42 Finally,
in December 1999, the Beijing Municipal Government adopted the Northern Area Plan
with a clear rationale: the northern area plan had obvious advantages such as existing
infrastructure and sport venues, which the southern plans did not have, while the southern
area had obvious disadvantages such as poor environment, long distance from other
venues and other facilities, and ineffective post-Games use. 43 A potential negative side
for the final choice was also listed: land shortage and excessive reliance on facilities in
the northern part of Beijing, heavy traffic and ineffective post-Games use plan. 44
Some scholars and officials provided readers with various supplemental points of
view and reasons regarding the site selection of the Olympic Central Area. According to
Professor Hai Ren of Beijing Sport University, originally, the government made an
attempt to balance the development between the north and south of the city with the
opportunity of the Olympics, because it was a problem for Beijing that city-north had
been more developed than city-south for a relatively long time. However, the attempt
failed when the government realized that there would be much more financial burden
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borne if the Olympic venues and facilities were built at the south side of the city. 45
Strategically, it was different from certain Olympic host cities in western countries, which
used Olympic opportunities to regenerate old or degenerated city areas to balance the
whole city’s development, such as what London has recently done. Ren stated that this
different Olympic strategy regarding city growth plans came from the difference between
the developed countries and the developing countries. 46 Moreover, Ren indicated that due
to the time limit for infrastructure and venue constructions, the site selection caused
potential problems regarding too many sport venues concentrated within one area, namely,
the Olympic Central Area, though at the time the government could do little about it,
which was probably the only choice left to the governments under that circumstance. 47
Ping Yang, an official of BOPAC, contributed his point of view regarding the site
selection. Yang stated that the venues legacy of the 1990 Beijing Asian Games was the
key factor of the site selection. 48 NOSC and the reserved lands around it were the original
location for the plan of the Olympic Green’s site. The government did consider the
southern area of Beijing, however the projects would be too huge and too many, and the
investment would be four to five times higher than that of the north area plan. There was
at least a thirty-year difference between city-north and city-south of Beijing in terms of
economy, infrastructure and urban civilization. General evaluation of the condition of
city-south indicated that there was no sport venue there that could be considered an
existing venue for Olympic use. 49 Apparently, balancing city development would be a
correct way for the Olympic-involved urban strategic plan processing; however,
45
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realistically, Beijing chose another way to realize its Olympic dream, and that turned out
the best way suitable for its own circumstances. 50 Otherwise, the government would have
spent too much on such projects as road building to connect to the new airport and urban
infrastructure to meet the requirement of the Games. Thus, Yang stated that the
government’s decision about this was a wise choice for the city.51
Xinxin Zhou, the manager of the Beijing Guoao Investment & Development Co.
Ltd., also confirmed that the decision of the site selection was made as early as the 1990s
when the Chinese sport authority made an attempt to bid for the 2000 Olympic Games.
The location was the combination of Wali village and NOSC on the north side of the
city. 52 According to Zhou’s idea on this, the decision was made before 1993, the year
Beijing lost its first bid to Sydney. Zhou also mentioned the idea regarding the plan of
“city-south,” while she admitted that tremendous works of infrastructure and local
residents’ relocation, which meant huge public money invested, was the key reason that
forced the government to finally give up the Southern Area Plan. 53
Weiguo Zhao, Manager of the NOSC Stadium, posed different ideas about the site
selection. According to Zhao, as early as the 1990s, the current location of the Olympic
Central Area, Wali Village at the north of NOSC was not reserved as a future Olympic
Games. Instead, in 1993, before Beijing’s first bid, the other half circle at the south of
NOSC, which, when combined with NOSC, could compose an entire circle, was reserved
for future Olympic Games. 54 Zhao was reluctant to explain the reason why the
government changed its mind later, implying that it could be a result of high speed
50
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increase in China’s economy at the time. 55 In 2011, the Beijing Municipal Commission of
Urban Planning announced that three national cultural organizations selected another half
circle at south side of NOSC, which Zhao mentioned as unselected for the Games, as
their new locations three year after the Beijing Olympics. 56
Another scholar contributed different reasons why the Southern Area Plan was
abandoned. According to Xudong Wan, environmental reasons potentially influenced the
decision of site selection. Because of the contamination of soil in the over-industrialized
area around the southeast region of the city, the cost for solving this problem would be as
high as CNY 50 billion (USD 7.7 billion). 57 Further, it would take two years to
completely solve the issue, which was not acceptable due to the time limit at the time. 58
Thus, the North Area Plan was finally chosen by the government.

1-2-2. BOPAC
The Beijing Olympic Park Administration Committee, the governmental
authority of the Olympic Central Area, is the direct government of the area, delegated by
the Beijing Municipal Government and operated under the control of the Chao Yang
District Government. 59 BOPAC has been administering its governing functions over the
Olympic Park since its establishment in November 2008 such as monitoring, supervising,
executing the law, collaborating among the business within the Park, planning and
55
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organizing events, security protection, and attracting potential corporate investment. 60
The venues within the area that are administered under BOPAC include the National
Stadium, the National Aquatic Center, the China National Convention Center, the
Olympic Tennis Center, the Olympic Hockey Field, and the Olympic Archery Field,
while the venues in NOSC are administered by GASC. As generally accepted, both in
China and abroad, due to China’s one party political system, government is always the
leader or “boss” in every single region throughout the country, although it keeps infusing
and advocating its service function for the public and corporate sectors. BOPAC, as the
government of the Park, is not an exception. In January 2010, BOPAC initiated the
Olympic Functional Area Development Alliance in an effort to better share and integrate
the social resources and integrate all the business, non-governmental organizations, banks,
hotels, and venue owners within the Park. 61 According to Jun Ding, an official of BOPAC,
the venues in the Park need to submit proposal applications to BOPAC before they plan
to organize or hold any events (sport or culture-related, commercial or non-commercial)
in their own venues; and BOPAC then evaluates those proposals based on certain internal
complex criteria to decide if the applications could be approved. 62 This function is
obviously beyond the service function the government usually emphasized. Thus, the
relationships between BOPAC and the owners of the venues under its authority, which is
a kind of typical relationship between governments and enterprises (especially
state-owned enterprises) throughout the country, has become one of the key points on
which the venues’ various development trajectories and current statuses depend.
60
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Shaofeng Chen, a scholar from Peking University, contributed his point of view
regarding the Olympic Park and BOPAC. According to Chen, the Park needed an
authority to generally administer. 63 The functions such as service and coordination were
necessarily needed by the business inside the Park. BOPAC was supposed to be a
platform of service for the business within the Park rather than government
administrative intervention. Furthermore, Chen also pointed out that BOPAC should pay
more attention to the future strategy planning of the Park so that all business initiatives in
the Park would develop together. 64 In terms of future development, BOPAC Official Yang
stated that the Olympic Functional Region was officially recognized as a National 5A
Scenic Spot of China. 65 BOPAC targeted four major industries for this region: tourism,
sport events, culture events, and conventions; the core task of BOPAC, based on Yang,
would be to secure that the Park could develop following this direction. 66

1-2-3. BODA
The Beijing Olympic City Development Association (BODA), a successive
organization of BOCOG, was officially established in August 2009, one year after the
Beijing Games. 67 BODA was announced as a non-governmental and non-profit
organization of which the Mayor of the Beijing Municipality was selected as the
Executive Chairman, and the Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Government was
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selected as the Chairman. 68 According to its Chairman, Qi Liu, the main goal of BODA is
to carry forward Olympic spiritual, cultural, education, and material legacies the Beijing
Games left to the city; meanwhile, BODA will expand sustainable development of the
Olympic movement in China on a wide social basis. 69 Moreover, since there are financial
surpluses from the Beijing Olympic Games and donations from certain organizations,
BODA also has the function of assets management. 70 Yang also pointed out that assets
management was one of the major tasks of BODA, while it was also responsible for
youth Olympic education and international communication with other Olympic host cities
and sport organizations. 71 Moreover, Nan Liu, an office staffer at BODA told the
researcher that the major part of BODA’s regular task was Olympic-related conference
organizing, event and forum holding, and having exhibitions regarding Olympic culture.
There were few academic activities carried out by BODA, though a research department
existed in BODA since its establishment. 72
In terms of post-Games utilization of Beijing’s Olympic venues, Xiaoyu Jiang, the
vice chairman of BODA stated that BODA made a report on this issue and communicated
with other Olympic host cities. 73 Jinghong Li, an Official of BODA, stated that for letting
governmental leaders better know what post-Games utilization of Olympic venues looked
68
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like, BODA attempted to conduct an examination of Beijing’s Olympic venues in 2009.
However, due to a lack of research capability, BODA asked some scholars from Beijing
Sport University (BSU) to assist them to complete it. 74 Some researchers from BSU led
the project at the time, as asserted by Professor Lin of BSU. 75 According to Li, BODA
held a conference gathering the directors and managers of the Olympic venues in Beijing
by which BODA expected to collect the data regarding post-utilization status of the
venues. Following the conference, BSU started the follow-up investigation. 76 BSU’s
project team faxed questionnaires to the venues to collect detailed information regarding
venues’ utilization conditions; however, the result was not too positive. According to Li,
the data collected had some problems: first, the team did not receive feedback from all
the venues; second, although there was feedback from some of the venues, certain critical
information was missing; and third, the team found that certain data they received was
manipulated, especially the financial information. Considering it was not what BODA
originally expected, Li stated that the result of the investigation was not reported to upper
authorities. 77 BSU’s Professor Xianpeng Lin, the leader of the project at the time,
authenticated what Li stated. According to Lin, it was difficult for the team to collect
financial information from the venues, which were highly reluctant to expose such data to
an academic organization. 78 Most of what the team got was something like venues’
organizational structure, the record of events at venues, and the procedure of events
organizing. 79
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2. Government-Owned Venues
In this section, there are sixteen venues grouped into four sub-categories:
“state-owned enterprise,” “municipal level authority,” “district level government,” and
“transferred ownership.” All these venues are owned by municipal authorities, various
district governments, or certain enterprises that are owned by municipal or district
governments, namely, so-called “state-owned enterprise.” Aside from the first three
groups, there is the fourth group, titled “transferred ownerships,” by which it categorized
those whose ownerships had been transferred from one state-owned enterprise to another
or from the Beijing Municipal Government to certain district governments during the
three and a half year post-Games period.

2-1. By State-Owned Enterprise
2-1-1. China National Convention Center (The Fencing Hall)
As a temporary Olympic venue, the Fencing Hall was built in the China National
Convention Center (CNCC) located at the Olympic Green. During the Beijing Games, the
plenary hall on CNCC’s fourth floor was the competition site for Olympic Fencing events,
Modern Pentathlon events (Fencing and Shooting); the exhibition space on the ground
floor was the Olympic International Broadcasting Center (IBC) and the Main Press
Center (MPC). 80 In addition, the Paralympic Games utilized the Ballroom section in
CNCC as the competition site for Wheelchair Fencing and Bocce. 81 Following the Games,
all the competition sites were removed from CNCC; presently, there is no trace by which
any Olympic marks can be found in CNCC. It looks like the building had nothing to do
80
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with the Olympics except its location is in the Olympic Green. 82
At the 2011 Beijing Olympic City Development Forum in August, Tony Xu, the
marketing director of CNCC, accepted an interview request from the researcher.
Although CNCC is no longer used as a sports venue or Olympic-related facility, Xu
continued to discuss the status and the brief history of the building. The owner of CNCC
is the Beijing North Star Industrial Group, a state-owned enterprise supervised by the
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s
Government of the Beijing Municipality. 83 When the Beijing North Star Group won the
bid for the CNCC project in 2004, according to Xu, it was written into the agreement that
the temporary functions as competition sites, as well as the IBC and the MPC projects,
would be the responsibility of the owner. Establishing a clear function for post-Games
use, namely, a convention center, the construction design was quite specified and future
functioning oriented. The design and construction had to meet not only the requirement
from municipal government and BOCOG in terms of sports events’ specification, but also
the requirement for future convention center functions. Thus, despite CNCC being used
as a temporary Olympic competition site, the Beijing North Star Group built it as an
international convention center for the future. 84
According to Xu, most Olympic facilities in Beijing were built by state-owned
enterprises, which was a must. The negotiations between the government and state-owned
enterprises were usually easier than those between the government and private enterprises
in China, especially for mega-events like the Olympic Games. If private enterprise took
82
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the project, for their own group interests and profit they would not accept certain
requirements demanded by the government because they would not be a fair deal
typically existing in a free market, which would definitely undermine economic benefits.
Under such condition, cooperation could not proceed. Usually, private enterprise
considered an Olympic project a one time deal, which meant they had to secure a
maximum profit from the deal. However, for state-owned enterprises in China, since their
relationship with the government was something like a family, namely, the latter
belonged to the former, state-owned enterprises did not consider the Olympic projects as
one time deals, which meant if you lost money at one occasion, you would earn it back
and more the next time. The principle is that state-owned enterprises must contribute to
the country, not specifically individuals or private enterprise. The government almost
always acts following this principle. It could ask state-owned enterprises to do whatever
it needed them to do, irrespective of free market rules. In return, state-owned enterprises
would be considered the priority choices when there were mega projects appearing for
this high speed developing country, which would offer potentially huge opportunities for
state-owned enterprises. This was probably the reason why most of the Olympic projects
in Beijing were under the jurisdiction of and built by state-owned enterprises. 85
During the Games, in terms of the rental of space for IBC and MPC, Xu had no
idea if a fee was paid or the facility used for free, which was the secret part in the
agreement. But BOCOG paid for the technical equipment and logistics as well as the
security and cleaning. Also, if BOCOG asked CNCC’s staffers to work for it, BOCOG
paid for them. When the Games finished in September, BOCOG was supposed to remove
all the Olympic-related equipment and supplies used in CNCC. However, due to the
85
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global financial crisis occurring at the time, BOCOG postponed the removal plan because
it wanted to hold the material for a longer time so that it could sell at a better price. The
delay negatively affected the renovation plan for CNCC. CNCC had to wait until all the
material was removed to start their reconstruction project. They could not require the
government to remove the material as promised, although CNCC had signed a contract
for their own convention business. The delay meant more cost had to be paid if CNCC
wanted to finish the reconstruction project on time. All the cost incurred for post-Games
reconstruction was paid by CNCC based on the agreement with the government. 86
In terms of business operation after the Games, CNCC was fortunate because the
ownership of the facility was consistent, compared with what happened to the National
Stadium and the National Indoor Stadium, where the ownership transfer, to some degree,
influenced the regular daily operations after the Games. In general, Xu was satisfied with
the current status of CNCC’s convention business. The location, apparently, was a
positive factor; according to Xu, a detailed and a function-oriented plan was also a
positive. In addition, consistent and stable ownership should be another positive. Xu
emphasized that function-oriented design and marketing prior to the Games was the key
point for post-Games utilization. This turned out well for CNCC. In terms of the
operation’s profit, Xu stated that the Center was reopened in November 2009, and the
first complete business year was 2010, during which the revenues were more than CNY
10 million (USD 1.54 million). Xu felt that intervention from the government was slight
throughout the business operation, while the independence of CNCC was secured
generally. Most of time, BOPAC carried out support and service functions to CNCC,
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instead of initiating and monitoring. 87
As to current weakness, Xu stated that relatively small usable business space
within the Center was a factor that might limit future development. Haiying Liu, Board
Chairman of CNCC, expressed the same concern. Liu stated that the [convention and
exhibition] market developed so fast in China, that current space in CNCC would become
a limitation for its growth in the market. 88 Moreover, both Liu and Xu considered that a
lack of professional practitioners in management and convention business was a concern
for current conditions and also challenges in the future.89 As to the challenge in the future,
Xu also stated that increasingly intensified competitions in the convention business
market was forcing CNCC to be alert and adaptive as quickly as possible; the competition
not only came from other convention centers in Beijing or other cities in China, but also
from certain international competitors, especially those around the Asian-Pacific region,
such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia and Seoul. But the good thing was that the market
had been greatly expanding. For future development, Chairman Liu stated that as
state-owned enterprises, CNCC needed more support priority policies and less
intervention in the business from the government at the same time. 90

2-1-2. “Water Cube”
The National Aquatic Center, also known as the Water Cube, hosted the
swimming, diving and synchronized swimming events during the 2008 Beijing Olympic
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Games. At the time the Water Cube witnessed twenty-one world records. 91 This
record-breaking tide was considered a miracle in the history of international swimming
competition. The Water Cube has become a model for modern swimming pools in the
world, and was called the “Magic Water Palace.” 92
On 27 December 2011, at a national working conference for directors of sport
bureaus nationwide in China, Qiyong Yang, Deputy General Manager of the National
Aquatic Center, reported that in the year 2011 the Water Cube’s business revenue was
CNY 88 million (USD 13.54 million), while the total operational expense was CNY 99.3
million (USD 15.28 million); thus, the Water Cube had to seek financial support from the
relevant department in the government to cover the deficit.93 This is the first instance that
an official of the Water Cube publicly admitted that the venue could not balance the
financial sheet by its own efforts and had to seek the government help to continue
operation. Yang explained that for the last three years (2009-2011), the Water Cube had
been experiencing an “exploring period” and a “market cultivating period,” during which
the Water Cube experienced few sports events. They were sporadic instead of regular.
However, an extremely high maintenance and operation cost had to be paid to properly
run the venue. 94 The expenses included energy cost, facilities maintenance cost,
management cost, sale and service cost, depreciation of fixed assets, financial cost, and
human resource expenses, of which 58% of the total cost came from energy, maintenance,
and human resource expense (there are more than 1, 200 individuals working for the
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Water Cube). 95 To solve the issue and secure proper daily operation of the venue, the
Beijing Municipal Government appropriated CNY 9.6 million (USD 1.48 million) as the
Beijing Sport Industry Development Funds Contribution to the Water Cube in 2011. 96
The future of the Water Cube projects pessimism. For 2011, the number of tourists
in the Water Cube was more than 20 million, which was a reduction of 30% compared
with 2010. 97 Yang stated that as visiting enthusiasm to the Olympic venues declined, the
number of “Cube” visitors would further reduce, leading to the financial pressure getting
worse. 98
However, on 31 October 2011, on the contrary, the Water Cube, as a Beijing
landmark, was considered an excellent example of post-Games utilization of Olympic
venues. This statement was made at the National Working Conference on Sport Industry
held in Nanjing, in which the post-Games operation of the Water Cube, as a praised
exemplar, was described as exploratory, brand-new, multidimensional operation mode. 99
This was a dramatic and inconsistent description of the venue’s status from Yang’s
evaluation two months later. But still, Yang at the end of 2011, felt confident about the
venue’s future. He said that with the government’s financial support and employees’
effort, the Water Cube could achieve a good balance on the financial sheet. 100
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Confused by what was reported publicly, particularly in contradiction of Yang’s
statement, some practitioners’ opinions and points of view might provide the reader with
a wider picture regarding the Water Cube during the last three and a half years. Haitao
Shi, manager of the Department of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Water
Cube, made a comment on post-Games operation of the venue. Shi stated that generating
revenue was not the only criterion to evaluate the Water Cube’s operation condition. The
Water Cube was the only Olympic venue in Beijing that all the investment for the project
came from donations from overseas Chinese. 101 The donations were made to the Beijing
Municipal Government that later appointed the Beijing State-owned Assets Management
Co. Ltd. (BSAM) to supervise the design and construction of the venue. BSAM became
the owner of the Water Cube since 2003. 102 BSAM established a branch company in
2004 to specifically focus on the business of the Water Cube’s operation. Later, in August
2007, BSAM registered a wholly-funded subsidiary, the National Aquatics Center Co.,
Ltd., to supervise post-Games operation of the Water Cube. 103 Therefore, as an Olympic
venue, owned by the government and constructed with the donations from overseas
Chinese, according to Shi, its social service functions must be continued and it must
contribute to public benefits; thus, embodiment of social responsibility was a major
functional part of the venue. 104
According to Chen Sun, former marketing manager of the Water Cube, there were
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detailed post-Games operation and management plans written for both the Water Cube
and the National Stadium (also known as the “Bird’s Nest”). 105 First, in 2005, in an effort
to exploit intangible legacies, the marketing team designed a platform for future
partnership of the Water Cube, in which three levels of potential partners would be
categorized: the top level was the “naming rights” partner; the middle level signified
sponsors; and the bottom level defined suppliers. Then, the Water Cube signed a contract
with China Sports Industry International, a consulting company in sport industry in China,
commissioning them to initiate an evaluation and analysis report regarding feasibility of
post-Games operation of the Water Cube. 106 As a result, three solution reports were
submitted to the Water Cube: The Report on Water Cube’s Post-Olympic Function
Positioning and Commercial Distribution Planning, The Report on Water Cube’s
Post-Olympic Management Mode, and The Report on Water Cube’s Post-Olympic
Management and Operation Evaluation and Analysis. 107 Following the Games, according
to Sun, AC Neilson, a marketing survey company, was engaged to conduct a marketing
survey on customers’ expectancy regarding the Water Cube’s naming rights sale, the
value of intangible legacy of the Water Cube, and kinds of potential partnerships. 108
Based on the results of the study, Sun’s team submitted a detailed post-Olympic operation
and management solution report to the director of the venue. Although the solution
recommendations were highly detailed, offering items for partnership and commercial
development specifically for the Water Cube, the solution recommendations were not
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adopted. No reasons were forthcoming. 109
Frank Bi, Manager of the China National Sports Venue Management Co., Ltd.,
(CNSVM) reiterated what Sun offered regarding the fruitless post-Olympic operation
solution recommendations. CNSVM was the consulting company for the Water Cube;
and Bi was the project manager for CNSVM working on reconstruction planning for the
Water Cube, helping the owner to initiate post-Olympic reconstruction solutions in 2007.
Bi stated that the Water Cube was one of the venues that seriously considered
post-Games utilization, which was recognized as a kind of strength at the time. However,
very few suggestions were adopted after the Games. For example, the competition pool,
which was a key factor in commercial development ended up as merely a rest area, where
tourists congregated and watched Olympic video clips on the big screen. 110 Bi stated that
the reason for this was the low level of management, in other words, a lack of
professional practitioners was a glaring weakness of the venue’s management. 111
In terms of “naming rights” for the Water Cube, Sun stated that based on the
result of the study conducted by AG Neilson, the public did not want to see the venue’s
name attached to a commercial logo; thus, the director cancelled the original plan about
selling the “naming rights” to commercial companies. The term “national” in the title of
the venue was also a main limitation, because the government thought that a commercial
logo added before “national” would undermine the national image. 112 The same issue
about naming rights sales also occurred when the National Stadium wanted the same
thing. Moreover, according to Bi, Arena, a sportswear company, attempted but failed to
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gain naming rights for the 08 Pathway (a main pathway in the Water Cube) as ARENA 08
Pathway. Arena was willing to pay a fee of CNY 400 million (USD 61.54 million) per
year. 113 Since venues such as the National Aquatic Center and the National Stadium were
actually controlled by the government, according to Shi, it was exceedingly difficult to
introduce marketing strategies into the post-Games operation and management plans of
venues. If the government relaxed its control, generating revenue might well be
enhanced. 114
The Water Cube did carry out reconstruction projects between October 2009 and
July 2010. More than 11,000 seats on the spectator stands were removed around the main
competition hall. On the upper floor, an exhibition hall was established, around which
business stores (gift shops) and restaurants were built. The reconstruction expense was
covered by BSAM, its chief owner. After the reconstruction, an indoor water park for
amusement and swimming pool (warm up area) were opened to the public with entrance
admission (CNY 200 (USD 31) for the Water Park and CNY 50 (USD 7.7) for the pool
for two hours). In addition, on the third floor, a museum about the history of Olympic
swimming and Chinese swimmers was opened to the public. A Water Cube Theater
presented a continual video clip about the evolution of the venue. 115
In terms of current condition, Shi stated that the entire operation team had been
trying their best over the last three and a half years to strive towards creating a balance
between economic profit and social benefits. For example, considering the advanced
equipment and physical environment, the admission price for swimming was lower than
the average in other aquatic facilities in Beijing, making it more affordable; this was
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considered a social benefit for the public, although with the lowered rate, Water Cube
revenue from this business was negligible. 116 Moreover, hosting international or national
swimming events did not make a profit for the venue. Unlike certain western countries,
where the TV rights fees and sponsor fees might be the main parts of the revenue for
hosting sports events, in China, there were generally no TV rights fees for the organizers,
and sponsorship for the events was difficult to engage. Even though there was some
sponsorship for the events, the beneficiaries were the organizers and sports federations
such as FINA, instead of the venue provider. 117 In contrast, the Water Cube sponsored a
synchronized swimming team in Beijing Sport Training School, which was considered as
another kind of contribution to social benefit. 118
In the first year after the Games, according to Sun, both economic profit and
social benefit reached a good balance. The total revenue reached more than CNY 100
million (USD 15.4 million), which included four parts: venue sponsors, tourism, holding
commercial events, and licensed products selling. Among these businesses, licensed
product selling earned almost CNY 30 million (USD 4.6 million) for the year. The
maximum number of daily tourists reached 30 thousand; and the average in 2009 was
roughly 20 thousand. However, for the next two years, partially due to the closure for
reconstruction that lasted some ten months, the number of tourists dramatically declined.
In 2011, according to Sun, the daily tourists were about one thousand; 119 although Sun
indicated that despite tourism’s decline, the other three parts of revenue generating
maintained the same level as the year 2009. It was hard to believe, because when tourism
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of the venue declined, the other business in the venue, such as gift shops and licensed
goods stores, would certainly decline; the two factors, tourism and sales are linked.
Moreover, a link also existed between tourism and sponsorship of the venue, namely, the
sponsorship of the venue might correspondingly decline when tourism declined. Sun also
addressed the matter of the timing of reconstruction. The Water Cube closed for
reconstruction at the time when business almost reached the peak of the unprecedented
enthusiasm for the Olympics in China. The Water Cube disappeared from the public’s
sight at a most critical moment. 120
Furthermore, the plan for reconstruction, according to Sun, was proposed almost
five years ago. The five-year plan needed detailed revision based on new environments
and circumstances, or even a brand new plan if the changes caused too many
shortcomings to overcome. Unfortunately, the Water Cube did not re-design the
reconstruction plan when they carried it out in 2009. 121 In terms of the possible reasons
for this inaction, risk avoidance was one of the main factors. Officials were reluctant to
change the plan, because any responsibility for potential mistakes would be borne by
those who made the changes, while if no change at all occurred, then any mistakes would
be the original planners’ fault since the original one had been approved by relevant
governmental departments. 122
The managers or directors of the Olympic venues in the Olympic Park usually
played dual roles; they were originally government officials and became venue
supervisors during or before the Olympic Games. As a result, they maintained original
appointments in the government; on the other hand, they were titled as Directors of the
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Venues. This dual identity sometimes caused conflicts when they faced particular
situations in venue operation and management. The conflicts embodied the contradiction
between governmental behaviors and free market strategies, between corporate economic
profits and corporate social responsibility, and between the point of view from the public
and society in general and the point of view from the perspective of profit maximizing.
This could be one limitation on the operation of the Olympic venues, which were owned
by state-owned enterprises in China. 123
In addition, Bi stated that the distribution and structure of human resources of the
Water Cube were not appropriate for post-Games operation and management. The
qualifications of management needed to be improved and more professional practitioners
were needed to assure duties during post-Games operation. Some of the employees were
originally professionals in venue construction and sports competition operation. Some
remained in place after the Olympic Games. However, the duties and content of
post-Games operation and management were significantly transformed; updated
professional training to meet new needs was not initiated in time. For example, the
cleaning department needed to hire a professional company to regularly clean the Water
Cube’s outer coating; but due to new technology and new materials of the coating, they
did not know what cleanser they should use. In fact, neither did any of the bidding
cleaning companies. When a German company suggested a sample of the coating to
conduct experiments related to what product might be effective, the Water Cube was
reluctant to release a sample because they thought it was supposed to be a secret of the
venue’s construction character. 124 On 22 September 2011, during a tour around the
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Olympic Park organized by the Sport For All World Conference, a tour guide in the Water
Cube told the researcher that the outer coating was cleaned twice per year simply by tap
water rinsing, and admitted that for now the outer coating looked dirty at day time but at
night when the lights were on it looked much better. 125
Shi told the researcher that the operation of the swimming pool was handled by a
professional company hired by the Water Cube. The Company was responsible for all the
business focused around the pool, such as marketing, ticketing, and membership
management. Also, for the Water Park inside the venue, the Water Cube merely leased the
spot; all the associated businesses were handled by the lessee, a professional company. 126
Although Shi mentioned that there were many commercial events held in the Water Cube,
actually the Water Cube simply leased its space to event organizers. As a result, the
businesses that the Water Cube operated on its own were the entrance admission,
Exhibition Hall, 3D Theater, Swimming Museum and some gift shops; for the rest, the
Water Cube could be considered a landlord which leased out both the physical space and
its intangible legacy, its brand. In terms of the brand, Shi stated that “Water Cube” was an
invaluable intangible asset, which would be an excellent potential opportunity for the
future: First, licensed products would keep earning profits for the Company; second, the
state of the art venue and its symbolic status in China would attract more customers to
hold commercial events there; and third, potential sponsors would be attracted to the
venue. 127 The Deputy General Manager of the Water Cube, Qiyong Yang, also expressed
confidence about the future of the venue. Yang projected that in 2012 the number of
tourists would remain the same as 2011, the main competition hall would be open in 2012
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to the public, and with the government’s financial support, the Water Cube would
maintain a favorable balance on the financial sheet. 128
In terms of challenges the Water Cube faces, Shi stated that the government’s
strict control in terms of marketing policies, venue image, and social benefit function,
could be a limitation for the development of the venue. However, Shi also admitted that
the authority sometimes could bring opportunities, which other venues with different
ownerships could not obtain, such as the opportunity to hold international sports events
and attain governmental financial support. 129 Sun stated that certain tactics of BOPAC’s
management in the Olympic Park, to some degree, constrained the progress of the Water
Venue; however, the Beijing Municipal Government and BSAM, the owner of the Water
Cube, would definitely assist (or direct) the venue regarding its future development,
because the Water Cube as well as the Bird’s Nest were extensions of government
function and behavior. 130 Bi addressed another challenge of the future. He stated that in
China there were not too many sports events on a regular basis, especially aquatic sports.
The basic function of the venue was supposed to be the sport function. However, if there
were not enough events held in the venue, it would hardly meet its basic function, leading,
in time, to a waste of this state of the art, world-applauded venue. 131

2-2. By Municipal Level Authorities
2-2-1. Beijing Gong Ti Center
The Beijing Gong Ti Center, also known as the Beijing Workers’ Sports Complex,
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including the Workers’ Stadium and the Workers’ Gymnasium, belongs to the Beijing
Federation of Trade Unions, a governmental division authorized by the Beijing Municipal
Government. 132 During the Beijing Olympic Games, soccer events were held in the
Stadium and boxing events were held in the Gymnasium. Both venues were adjacent to
the downtown east section of Beijing and pre-existing sport facilities for the Olympic
Games. Respectively, the Stadium was built in 1959, which was the first large-scale sport
venue built in the People’s Republic of China. It held the first Chinese National Games in
the same year. The Gymnasium was built in 1961; and in the same year, the 26th World
Table Tennis Championships were held there. 133 The Gong Ti Center has the longest
history and tradition regarding sport among all the Olympic venues in the city. The
Workers’ Stadium was the main stadium for the 1990 Asian Games, the 2001 21st World
University Games, and the China National Games on five occasions. Thus, the Stadium
witnessed the development of national sport in China. 134 Before the “Bird’s Nest” was
built in 2008, the Workers’ Stadium had been considered the “National Stadium.” 135 The
two venues were selected as Olympic competition sites in 2005, and in April 2006, to
meet Olympic demands, the transformation projects started to update the venues.
Following the Olympic Games, as Shiwei Shao, the deputy general director of the Press
and Publicity Department of GASC commented, the pre-existing venues like the
Workers’ Stadium and Gymnasium were basically restored to their original operation
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status, while the Olympic renovation plan could assist them to explore new opportunities
beyond their original business. 136
The Gong Ti Center was also named the Beijing Workers Sport Service Center,
which was a governmental subdivision of the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions. 137
Zhihong Zhang, the supervisor of the operation department of the Center, provided the
researcher with the information on the two venues from the perspective of the
government. The Workers’ Stadium and Gymnasium were the two oldest among Beijing
Olympic facilities, which was an obvious disadvantage; but it was also a strength in terms
of post-Games utilization because its original functions and operation mode had been
fixed for a relatively long time prior to the Olympics. Before the “Bird’s Nest,” this was
the National Stadium for years, namely, it was a “state-owned” stadium. Staffers in the
Center, Zhang admitted, did not need to think too much about marketing strategies,
customer positioning and targeting, and the financial balance of regular operation of the
venues, since all these issues were controlled and handled by the government, particularly
from the 1960s to the 1980s. The venues were an extension of the government, under the
authority of governmental endeavors such as the National Games, political propaganda
events, and public assemblies. The government built the venues, owned them, and
decided on how to operate them. This was different from venues built by private
enterprise, though there were not too many in China. Thus, the Gong Ti Center
previously served the government, which meant the public, indirectly. Unlike sport
venues usually associated with professional sport teams or sports associations and

136

Shiwei Shao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 5, 2011.
Official Website of Beijing Gong Ti Center, “Introduction of the Center,”
http://www.gongti.com.cn/Corporation/infoDetail.asp?cInfoId=176&dInfoId=141 (accessed March 3,
2012).
137

79

organizations in western countries, sport venues in China usually have a close
relationship with government. 138
However, there could be some changes, according to Zhang, in terms of the
management mode of sport venues and their relationships with governments, which was a
part of national political structure reforms in China. By 2015, those
government-controlled sport venues could be transformed to private enterprise-like
administration modes or semi private enterprise-like modes. Also, the relationship
between venues and governments might be switched to the point that government would
make sport venues in China operate independently without governmental financial
support. Meanwhile, governments would not interfere in a sport venue’s daily operation
and marketing strategies. This would be a trend of future development of sport venues in
China; further, it would be opportunities not only for sport venues themselves, but also
for professional venue management companies both in China and abroad. This would be
an open market in China with enough sport space resources and huge potential customer
base because of the large population in China. 139
Actually, in terms of venue management and operation, the Gong Ti Center was
transformed in the 1990s. As a major business partner, the Beijing Sportswindow
Development Co., Ltd. has cooperated with the Gong Ti Center since 2001. 140 James Xie,
the general manager of the Company provided the researcher with background
information on the Center. In the middle 1990s, the Center leased out the rooms under the
spectator stands around the Stadium as business space to certain sport product companies
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and some small sport clubs; the Center also operated a hotel located under the spectator
stands named the Gong Ti Hotel. Sportswindow signed a contract with the Center in 2001
by which the Center authorized Sportswindow to operate the business space around the
outer circle as well as the hotel. 141 Sportswindow adjusted the target customers,
re-positioning the theme of the business circle, and implementing a series of marketing
promotions to attract potential businesses. 142 Although the theme was still sport-related,
the content and style of the businesses introduced into the Gong Ti Center were diverse,
which dramatically improved the operation condition of the Center. The leader of the
Center gradually agreed with this change at the time, since the improvement was seen
soon after Sportswindow became involved. 143 From a different perspective, Zhang stated
that Sportswindow was a lessee who leased the business space from the Center and then
sub-leased it to its clients, thereby acquiring the rate difference from the deal. 144
Sportswindow signed the basic contract with the Center for 7-8 years, but signed the
sub-lease contracts with its business clients for 3-4 years. Further, Sportswindow was not
the operations supervisor of the Stadium. Rather, the Center was, which meant that if
potential customers would like to use the main field of the Stadium to host events, they
would have to apply to directors of the Center instead of to Sportswindow. 145
Furthermore, according to Xie, Sportswindow also renovated and upgraded the
Gong Ti Hotel, renaming it the Gong Ti Sport Hotel, which served as the Official Hotel
of the Olympic Games. Sportswindow redesigned and reconstructed the hotel, then
improved the management level in order to create a fashionable commercial facility, a
141
142
143
144
145

James Xie, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 17, 2011.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 1, 2011.
Ibid.

81

change to match the theme and style of the entire business circle. 146 According to Vivian
Cao, Director of the Product Marketing Department of Sportswindow, following the
Olympic Games the hotel was upgraded again and its name changed to the “A Hotel.”
More than half of the hotel’s customers were from abroad, since nearby were located
several entertainment businesses serving customers who would prefer to stay there rather
than to go a great distance to find a place to stay overnight. 147
Actually, arranging the Gong Ti Center as an Olympic competition site influenced
the operation of its regular business. 148 When the Olympic designation was announced in
2005 by the Beijing Municipal Government, some clients leased business space around
the Stadium circle through contracts signed with Sportswindow. However, needing the
“stadium circle” space for the Games, the lessees were ordered by the government to
vacate within six months, regardless of the contracts. Due to the governmental decision
that all the businesses must move out during the period of venue reconstruction for the
Games, Sportswindow had to do the unpleasant task of persuading all businesses to
vacate, despite contracts in effect at the time. 149 Fortunately, most of the clients expressed
understanding toward the situation. The Olympic Games were a state task in China that
had top priority; there was no possibility to negotiate. As a result, in 2006, all the
businesses vacated, among them some had been operating since 2001. When
Sportswindow reopened the business circle after the Games in 2009, only 30% were old
clients, and the remaining 70% were all new clients attracted by Sportswindow’s new
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marketing promotions. 150 The good thing, Xie stated, was that the governments, both the
Municipal Government and the Federation of Trade Unions, were responsible for most of
the cost incurred during the Olympic-related reconstruction. Sportswindow also invested
in the project, because, according to Xie, as a business partner, Sportswindow hoped that
through its financial involvement “paid in advance”, the Company might have a voice
when discussing the reconstruction plan for the venues, especially the plan for
post-Games development. The result turned out to be a worthwhile investment, because
the adjustment of the plan was made based on Sportswindow’s suggestion, while the
premise was that the requirement of the Olympic Games must be met unconditionally.
From the perspective of the Gong Ti Center, Zhang also commented on the
influence of the Olympic Games on the venues. The original function of the Stadium and
the Gymnasium did not change due to Olympic reconstruction. The Stadium remained a
soccer field. The Gymnasium was used as an Olympic boxing site, which needed little
reconstruction. The total investment for the reconstruction was approximately CNY 40
million (USD 6.15 million) from the government. Given the fact that they were quite old
venues, most of the investment was directed toward renovating and upgrading rather than
core venue structure change 151
The Workers’ Stadium was the home of the Beijing Guo An Soccer Club, a
professional team. It was the only venue among all the Olympic venues in Beijing in
which a professional sport team remained as a main tenant. The Olympic Games did not
change this. The Guo An Soccer Club had been using the Stadium as its home field since
the early 1990s when the Chinese Professional Soccer League was established. According
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to Zhang, the rent revenue accrued from the Guo An Club did not compensate for the
expense incurred in the facility operation. The Center needed to take care of basic
security and the Stadium and field maintenance. Despite the deficit, the Center did not
abandon the business, because the Guo An Club’s continued presence would indirectly
bring potential client opportunities and enhance the image and reputation of the venue
among soccer fans. In addition, the rental business could also increase in value if the
Club stayed. Thus, in terms of venue management, decision-makers had to consider the
entire picture rather than one specific project. 152
In terms of Olympic influence on the current status of the venues, Zhang admitted
that there remained little impact of the Olympics on the venues at the Gong Ti Center. 153
Cao agreed with this opinion by stating that it did not matter what the venue director
thought, but rather what the market indicated. If the market did not need the concept of
the Olympics anymore, it would be inappropriate for the marketers to continue with that
ploy. The fact was that Chinese people to some degree considered the Olympic Games a
political movement, a campaign enveloped with the enthusiasm of nationalism. However,
when the Games were over, this feeling disappeared. For a host city, the Olympic
economy was neither a constant economic model nor an ideal way that could change
people’s lives. Olympic-involved marketing was not appropriate for people’s routine life
on a regular basis in China. As a marketer, Cao had to be guided by what people really
wanted and felt well with. Based on Cao’s opinion, the Olympics were over; it was time
to “move on.” 154
In general, the operation and management of the Center were restored to their
152
153
154

Ibid.
Ibid
Vivian Cao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 17, 2011.

84

original status. However, indirectly, certain influences could be felt regarding the
competition from other Olympic venues, either newly-built ones such as the MasterCard
Center, or renovated ones such as the NOSC Stadium and Gymnasium and the Capital
Indoor Stadium. Due to the significantly increasing number of large-scale sport venues
existing in the city after the Olympic Games, the Center felt pressure from its competitors.
To deal with the situation, the Center prepared a series of reform plans after the Games.
In terms of the Gymnasium, the Center decided to change the name of it from
Workers’ Gymnasium to Workers’ Gymnasium Theater. The difference of a word in the
title could have impact. According to Weidong Li, Manager of the NOSC Gymnasium, if
a venue was named “gymnasium,” when the number of spectators at an event exceeded
one thousand, the venue had to submit an application regarding the event to the Public
Security Bureau (PSB) for their approval and paid an extra CNY 100,000 (USD 15,385)
to provide relevant services such as ambulances, firefighting trucks, and equipment such
as security scanning machines. In contrast, if the venue was named “theater,” then the
venue did not need to submit the application and could save the CNY 100,000. “Theater”
people gathering at such events were considered a regular operational condition.
Meanwhile, to meet other regulations about “theater,” the Center reduced the seats in the
Gymnasium from 12,000 to 3,000 and hung large curtains over one side of the spectator
stands. By making these changes, although the scale of events was reduced, costs were
also reduced. 155
In addition, according to Zhang, the Center also contemplated a title change for
the Stadium. To give prominence to professional soccer, a new name for the Stadium was
155

Weidong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. The NOSC Gymnasium is one of the major
competitors of the Workers’ Gymnasium. When Li, as the manager of the venue, said about it, he was
thinking how his venue should react to deal with this change.

85

proposed, the “National Soccer Stadium.” The proposal has been submitted to the
government and still awaits approval. By doing this, the Stadium would be differentiated
from the National Stadium in the Beijing Olympic Park. The Center planned to cover the
running track around the soccer field with artificial grass and add seats close to the field,
making the venue particularly suited for soccer games. Further, luxury boxes were
envisioned for sale to meet the demand from high-end customers. Due to the intervention
from the government, the sale of naming rights would not be completed in the near future,
but according to Zhang, the possibility of “naming rights” still existed, which meant the
government could make it happen in the future. 156
Even before the Chinese National Professional Soccer League was established,
major matches of the Beijing Soccer Team, as well as national team matches, were
usually held in this stadium. Soccer formed an important tradition of the venue. In
Beijing, the soccer team of the city was always associated with the Workers’ Stadium, a
tradition that was strengthened when it became the home stadium of the Guo An Club.
Thus, the Center tried to take advantage of the tradition by transforming the management
and operation to a soccer-related mode, which meant that factors such as marketing focus,
venue positioning, theme of venue, and all the services needed to give prominence to
soccer would be considered. In a word, soccer was to be the main focus for the Stadium’s
future development. 157
Cao also confirmed that the great advantage of the Workers’ Stadium was its
historical tradition and its symbolic status in the city’s soccer development. However, she
also stated that it was a two-edged sword. Due to the Stadium’s symbolic status, when
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Sportswindow planned its business projects, it had to be quite careful to maintain the
image of the Stadium, because it was not only considered a business, but also an icon
with graceful reputation that must not be impaired. In addition, its geographical location
was also a two-edged sword for its business development. On one hand, it was close to
the Downtown area, which would be convenient for people to reach, thus providing a
large customer base; on the other hand, there remained limited physical space for new
business exploitation. 158 The soccer theme and tradition of the Stadium also were
opportunities for Sportswindow to initiate soccer-related commercial events utilizing both
the main field and the business square adjacent to attract fans and potential business
customers. However, the soccer theme was also problematic for Sportswindow’s
marketing planning. Because the Soccer League schedule was tight and constant, and
basically occupied the best weather period of the year for an outdoor stadium, namely,
from April to November, meant that the Guo An Soccer Team would use the main field as
its League Home Stadium from spring to fall. The period left for commercial events in
the Stadium was quite limited. Moreover, a priority for using the Stadium required by the
government or with events for the public, further infringed on the best season for Stadium
use. 159 But in general, Cao remained confident about her company’s future in the Stadium
and believed that with further marketing promotions, necessary social networking, and
the reputation of the Stadium, more business partners would be introduced into this
commercial complex and a positive circle for its business would be finally established. 160
From the perspective of the Center, Zhang also mentioned that there was a
contradiction between soccer games and commercial events both being held in the main
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stadium. Soccer games require a high quality of grass, while commercial events
sometimes ravaged the grass. Although the Center tried to avoid or reduce the damage,
such as separating the two kinds of events as long as possible so that the grass could be
sufficiently reestablished, the issue persisted. In securing soccer matches with their
demand for top grass conditions, commercial events often had to be reduced or even
cancelled. 161 Zhang doubted that the business mode of Sportswindow was worthy of
being generalized. According to Zhang, the reason that Sportswindow expanded its
business mode at the Gong Ti Center was because the Center was the home stadium of
the Guo An Club, a key factor for attracting both businesses and customers. However,
this particular condition was seldom met among venues throughout the city, even the
entire country. 162 Besides, Zhang stated that the staff at Sportswindow lacked the
experience of venue management, thus did not expect too much about its development in
the Center. 163
In terms of the future of the Gong Ti Center, Zhang stated that it depended on
government reform regarding organizational structure, management mode and ownership
of sport venues. After all, the biggest investment of Olympic venues in Beijing was made
by the government. So it was reasonable that social benefits should be first met; but that
economic benefits should not be neglected at the same time. The two principles
sometimes conflicted with each other in the context of the Gong Ti Center. Government
reform was urgently needed in terms of the separation of marketing function from
governmental function. 164

161
162
163
164

Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011.
Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 1, 2011.
Ibid.
Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011.

88

2-2-2. Urban Road Cycling Course
The Urban Road Cycling Course for the Beijing Olympic Games, one of the eight
temporary Olympic venues in Beijing, passed through eight districts in the City of
Beijing: Chong Wen District, Xuan Wu District, Dong Cheng District, Xi Cheng District,
Chao Yang District, Hai Dian District, Chang Ping District, and Yan Qing District. 165
During the Olympic Games, the course was authorized and supervised by the Beijing
Municipal Government in partnership with eight district governments as well as BOCOG.
The course was restored to its original function as an urban road for regular traffic right
after the Games; thus there was no specific post-Games utilization needed to be examined
in this study (see Appendix M for the map of the route).

2-3. By District Governments
The venues described in this section were owned by different district governments
in the city. District level governments in Beijing are under the authority of the Beijing
Municipal Government. 166 Five districts in Beijing were involved in the Olympic
competition venue projects: Shun Yi District (the Olympic Aquatic Park), Shi Jing Shan
District (the Lao Shan BMX Field and Mountain Bike Course), Chao Yang District (the
Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground), Chang Ping District (the Ming Tomb
Reservoir Triathlon Course), and Feng Tai District (the Feng Tai Sports Center Softball
Field).
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2-3-1. Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park: Shun Yi District
The Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park, also known as the Shun Yi
Olympic Aquatic Park, was located at Ma Po Village, a north rural area of Beijing. The
Park, built on the Chao Bai River’s dry riverbed, was completed in July 2007. During the
Games, the rowing, canoe/kayak (flat-water and slalom), and marathon swimming events
were held in the Park. 167 The venue was built and owned by the Shun Yi District
Government. The Shun Yi Olympic Venues Administration Committee, a governmental
division, has supervised the venue since it was completed. In 2007, the government
allowed the committee to register a company, the Shun Yi Aquatic Park Investment and
Development Center, to specifically operate and manage post-Olympic utilization of the
Park. 168 In fact, the two organizations (the committee and the Center) were supervised,
administered, and operated by the same personnel. For example, the deputy director of
the committee, Fenghui Yang, was also the deputy general manager of the Center.169
According to Yang, the Park was the largest newly-built Olympic sport facility in
Beijing. What made it really unique was its combination of Slalom and Flat-water
facilities, the only one of its kind in the world. 170 After the Olympic Games, the Park held
several international and national aquatic competitions, such as sailing, canoeing, water
skiing, and rowing; meanwhile, there were some high-end sports clubs opened in the Park
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for water skiing, rowing, sailing, and canoeing enthusiasts. 171 Although the Park was also
a tourism destination after the Games, Yang admitted that the tourists in the Park during
the last three years were not plentiful enough that the maintenance and operation cost
could be compensated by the tourism revenue. 172 Yang also complained that the Park was
not directly connected to any major subway line or bus route to Downtown Beijing,
which was a major issue for potential tourists. 173 In fact, there was only one bus route
connecting the Park to Ma Po Village in every 30 minutes during day time everyday. 174 In
addition, according to Yang, catering service in the Park was lacking, which was another
major concern that the committee would try to solve in the near future. 175
In addition to the published information from online newspapers and official
websites, the researcher interviewed the marketing director of the Shun Yi Olympic
Aquatic Park Investment and Development Center, Jiadong Gao, in an effort to find more
detailed information. The interview appointment was arranged at 3:00 pm in the
afternoon. The researcher set out from the Bird’s Nest right after lunch time by public
transportation; and was almost late when he arrived at the Park, which meant it would
take tourists about three hours to reach the Park from the Olympic central area, if public
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transportation was the choice. 176
In terms of the Park’s location, Gao stated that the site was chosen by GASC and
the Beijing Municipal Government when Beijing first bid for the Olympic Games in 1993.
At the time, the location for the venue was called “Bai Fa Red Line” named after the
former Mayor, Baifa Zhang, who decided to reserve the land for future Olympic
Games. 177 There were opposition voices regarding the location selection. For instance,
according to Shan Jin, the supervisor of the Sport and Culture Research Center at the
Beijing Academy of Social Science, the location of the Park was a section of dry riverbed.
To build the Park, 3.5 million cubic meters of underground water had to be pumped “up
and out” in order to fill in the race course. This was considered a waste for the city where
a lack of water was one of the major issues. 178 Jin also estimated for maintaining the Park
after the Games, 0.8 million cubic meters water had to be consumed every year. 179
Despite the opposition voices, the venue was completed on time in 2007 and has been
well maintained since the Games finished.
The investment in the venue was CNY 449.3 million (USD 69.1 million), of
which one half was from the Beijing Municipal Government and the other half from the
Shun Yi District Government. Originally, the governments asked certain enterprises to
invest in the project; one of them was the Tian Hong Group, a state-owned enterprise
authorized by the Shun Yi District Government. Due to the large amount of needed
investment and the venue’s limited post-Games function, the government failed to find
private investors for the project. In 2003, instead of an investor, the governments found a
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cooperation partner, the Tian Hong Group Consortium, 180 and promised that the
governments would offer a piece of land as a compensatory condition (balancing land 181 )
for its partial investment to the Olympic project. However, in 2004, the Central
Government of China started to advocate the “frugal Olympics.” To respond to this
change, the Shun Yi District Government reduced the project’s budget. Correspondingly,
the promised compensation land was withdrawn, which caused arguments between the
government and the consortium. As a result, the consortium quit the project leaving the
governments alone to deal with the project. Lacking the necessary investment capital
after the consortium withdrew, the governments shaved the project by cutting off plans
designed for post-Games use. In fact, except for the function of holding specific sports
events based on the Olympic demands, most other functions were eliminated from the
project. However, Gao also stated that shrinking the project could have its positive side:
the less facilities in the Park, the less cost for maintenance. Moreover, as a rural park, too
many artificial sights might not be appropriate, while natural landscapes might attract
more tourists especially those from urban areas. 182
After the Games, BOCOG had to remove their equipment from the Park, such as
temporary seats and tents. This process lasted until April 2009. The Park was reopened to
the public (with entrance admission CNY 20 (USD 3)) in May 2009. Some tourists
complained that the Park was supposed to be free to the public. According to Gao,
although named with the term “Park,” it was actually a sport venue rather than a public
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park, thus tourists had to pay for visiting the venue. 183
In the summer of 2009, the Beijing Tourism Bureau initiated the Beijing
Olympic-theme Tour, of which the Olympic Aquatic Park was one of the stops. This
brought some tourists to the Park. Considering that mere tourism visits could not generate
enough revenue, the Center decided to develop new projects for entertainment such as
swimming, water skiing, whitewater slalom, and motor boating by using the existing
facilities. Despite the new business, the result was not as good as what the planners
expected. In terms of the reasons, Gao stated that first, the tourists came to the Park for
sightseeing instead of experiencing aquatic sports; second, the aquatic sports operating in
the Park was not popular enough in China; third, public transportation was lacking; fourth,
marketing was weak; and fifth, as an outdoor aquatic park, water sports entertainment
could only be opened in the summer, which significantly constrained the Park’s best
operating season. 184
Realizing that tourism did not bring enough revenue for the Park, the Center
changed its strategy to attract high-end customers by establishing aquatic sports clubs and
providing potential customers with professional sports services. According to Gao, the
Park’s entertainment business would include five sports in the future: sailing, rowing,
dragon boat, kayak, and water skiing, for which relevant clubs would be established by
hiring professional athletes as trainers and coaches. Of these sports, the most popular one
was dragon boat, a traditional Chinese sport. Many organizations and corporations carried
out team building projects for their employees in the Park, which usually included dragon
boat competition. However, Gao admitted that this strategy would take time to flower.
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The size of the customer base was still an issue. Due to the reduced budget before the
Games, a lack of auxiliary facilities such as storage for sporting equipment, locker rooms,
and shower rooms, became a problem. In addition, it was not easy to hire qualified
practitioners at this point. 185
Following the Games, the Shun Yi District Government had been providing the
Park with special funds to aid its operation and maintenance cost. The revenue the Park
made could not support its own expense (Gao was reluctant to disclose the amount of the
government grant). Furthermore, the government had to continue investing in the Park for
its further development, such as those potential high-end sport clubs. For instance, some
auxiliary facilities such as multifunction service areas had to be built in the Park. 186 As a
result, the government is facing a dilemma. On one hand, it cannot give up this Olympic
legacy because it is an iconic landmark showcasing a great image for the local
government. On the other hand, however, if the government keeps it well maintained and
even further developed, it will have to keep investing large amounts of public money into
it because there is not enough revenue made in the Park. Further, the Park’s public service
functions seem to be underused, except for sightseeing of the Olympic facilities in the
Park by paid tourists. It seems strange to the researcher that the government pays a large
amount of public money for the Park each year to support so-called high-end clubs
serving those who are affluent enough to be there, but for sure, those are not the majority
in China.
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2-3-2. BMX Course and Mountain Bike Course: Shi Jing Shan District
There were three Olympic venues clustered close to the Lao Shan area in Shi Jing
Shan District. 187 The Velodrome, a newly-built Olympic venue, was owned and operated
by GASC; the mountain bike course, a pre-existing venue, and the bicycle motocross
(BMX) course, a temporary Olympic venue, were owned by the Shi Jing Shan District
Government. Although the ownerships were different, during the preparation and staging
period of the Beijing Games, BOCOG supervised and coordinated the three venues
together with relevant officials from both GASC and the Shi Jing Shan District
Government. The director of the general office in the Cycling and Fencing Administrative
Center under GASC, Junyan Wang, as the coordinator of BOCOG’s supervision of the
three venues during the Games, described the current status of both venues.
The mountain bike course was established in the 1990s and had been maintained
by the district government since then. When selecting the site for the 2008 Games, the
course was the priority for BOCOG because its physical condition and geographical
environment met the requirements of the International Cycling Union (UCI). Moreover,
since the course was close to GASC’s cycling training base, the other two venues (the
BMX course and the Velodrome) were built there. The course reconstruction did not cost
substantially because the major part of the course had already been in good shape. The
only tasks were to add some obstacles to increase difficulty level and build protective
fences to separate spectators and athletes. Under the instructions from UCI’s technical
representatives, the reconstruction work was completed by local construction workers.
But BOCOG controlled the process of the project. 188
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The Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course was directly supervised by the Bureau of
Parks and Woods of Shi Jing Shan District. After the Games, BOCOG removed all the
equipment and fences quickly and the course became a public park. Tourists and bike
enthusiasts could enter the Park freely. According to Wang, the government would not
sell the Park to any organizations, thus, GASC would not expect to own the course for
national cycling teams, though it was in perfect condition in terms of natural
environment. 189 There have been no competitions (at any level) held on the course since
2008; the only use was for those cycling enthusiasts in the city, without supervision and
security. 190 The course was supposed to be maintained by the Bureau of Parks and Woods.
However, a lack of maintenance could be noticed around the Park. In 2011, the Online
Portal of the Beijing Municipal Government reported that some aspects of public
facilities, such as night lights in the Park, were damaged. 191 Although the problems were
solved by the bureau later, the issue of lack of maintenance was evident. Moreover, Wang
also indicated that the lack of maintenance caused potential safety issues for cycling
enthusiasts. 192 Despite the maintenance issue, the Park was opened to the public for its
sport and recreation purposes. As an Olympic facility in Beijing, the course was still
functioning in its original sport purpose for the public after the Games, which might be
considered an positive acknowledgement of an Olympic legacy.
The Olympic BMX Course built as a temporary venue was neither dismantled nor
maintained after the Games. All the entrances were locked and weeds grew everywhere.
The gatekeeper told the researcher that the venue had been empty and secured since the
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Games finished in 2008; nobody was allowed to enter. For the last three and a half years,
the gatekeeper and his dog have been the only ones witnessing the venue’s gradual
deterioration. 193 According to Wang, BMX was considered a new sport in China, which
meant that its popularity and Chinese athletes’ performances were low. The Olympic
BMX Course in Beijing was built based on the highest UCI standards for world elite
athletes. For instance, the “start stage” was 11 meters high. 194 The venue belonged to the
district government, although GASC attempted to negotiate to buy the venue. According
to Wang, the situation over ownership of the land on which the venue was built was
complicated; negotiations proved fruitless. As a result, the BMX course was not
dismantled, not used for any purposes whatsoever, and not transferred to GASC; it simply
remained there locked up. 195
Although the BMX course was officially categorized as a temporary venue, the
Shi Jing Shan District Government spent around CNY 400 million (USD 61.5 million) to
build it. Unlike those BMX courses in some western countries where they were usually
built temporarily in parks and dismantled after the competitions, the Lao Shan BMX
Course was built on the top of a “wildness hill” with permanent seats around it. In
addition, for the competition track, certain chemicals were used to solidify the surface.
There was no relevant expert in China who could build such a course, so the owner had to
hire a professional company from abroad (recommended by UCI) to complete the design
and construction. Obviously, if the government was called upon to dismantle the venue,
they would have to spend another large amount of money. Currently, there is no plan for
the facility. According to Wang, perhaps in the future, when negotiations between the
193
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district government and GASC continue, the venue might be used in some positive
ways. 196 However, for now, the most economical way for the government might be to
keep the venue secured to save its operation and maintenance cost.

2-3-3. Beach Volleyball Ground: Chao Yang District
The Beach Volleyball Ground located in Chao Yang Park was built as a temporary
Olympic venue. It was supposed to be dismantled after the Olympic Games, based on the
Candidature File of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid. 197 According to a former official
of BOCOG, without criteria and specifications for constructing such temporary sport
venues in China at the time, the design of the venue became one based on the criteria and
specifications for permanent buildings. 198 As a result, the beach volleyball venue was
actually built as a permanent sport facility. This might be one of the reasons that the
venue has not been dismantled three and a half years after the Games.
The Beach Volleyball Ground was supervised by the Chao Yang Park
Administration Committee that was under the leadership of the Chao Yang District
Government. 199 In 2009, a beach-theme park and a swimming pool were established
beside the venue; it embraced three function areas: a swimming area, a beach recreation
area, and a beach volleyball area. 200 In June 2011, the FIVB Beach Volleyball Swatch
World Tour - 2011 Beijing Grand Slam was held in the venue, which was the first time
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after the Olympic Games that the venue held an international beach volleyball
competition. 201
The researcher was unable to interview any official from the Chao Yang District
Government or the Chao Yang Park Administration Committee. All the officials the
researcher contacted were reluctant to accept the interview request. According to the
Beijing Olympic Venues Contact List, the researcher telephoned the committee asking for
an interview and was told that any interview requests regarding the Beach Volleyball
Ground must be approved by the Propaganda Department of the Chao Yang District
Government. Based on this regulation, the researcher went to the Chao Yang District
Government and asked the Propaganda Department for an approval. However, the
researcher was told that the department was only responsible for interview requests from
the media, and interviews for academic purpose were not in their purview. Then, the
researcher telephoned the committee again telling them what the department indicated
and was told that the supervisor was busy without any explanations regarding “approval.”
Also, the researcher was told that the request would be considered carefully when the
supervisor had time. For the next few weeks, the researcher kept calling the committee,
but all the responses were the same: “the boss was still busy.” Finally, the researcher gave
up due to the tight research schedule. 202

2-3-4. Triathlon Course: Chang Ping District
The Olympic Triathlon Course was a temporary venue, located at the Ming Tomb
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Reservoir in the northern outskirts of the city. 203 The venue was owned and supervised by
the Chang Ping District Government. The facility was not dismantled after the games and
has been utilized for triathlon competitions during the last three years. In July 2009, the
inaugural Red Bull Beijing International Triathlon Competition was held there. One year
later, the “Red Bull Competition” was held again; and in September 2011, the ITU World
Championship Grand Final Beijing was held, which was recorded as the biggest event
held in the course after the Games. 204 The competition course along the reservoir was
upgraded after the Olympics. 205 The running route of the course was built on the dam
with removable PVC running track, which insured that the temporary competition
facilities could be installed and removed in five hours. 206 Like the urban cycling road
race, the cycling route for triathlon competitions around the reservoir could be restored to
regular roads for routine traffic after events. The swimming route was still in the reservoir,
as it was during the 2008 Olympics. Thus, the major facilities around the course for the
competitions were temporary and could be restored to regular conditions rapidly, which
would not incur large amounts of cost for operation and maintenance on a regular daily
basis. 207
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2-3-5. Softball Field: Feng Tai District
The Olympic Softball Field, officially categorized as a pre-existing sports venue
(or renovated venue), was located in the Feng Tai Sports Center, Feng Tai District, on the
west side of Beijing. 208 The venue was owned by the Feng Tai District Government and
was supervised by the Feng Tai District Sport Bureau, as authorized by the district
government. The original site for the venue was a baseball field, which was built in 1990
for the Beijing Asian Games. After being selected to be the Olympic softball field,
according to the China IPPR International Engineering Corporation, the Company
re-designed the venue; the original baseball field could not be upgraded to meet the
Olympic demands. Based on its valuation, building a new field facility on the site was the
only solution for the project. 209 As a result, the original field facility was demolished and
a brand-new venue built on the site, which, based on the new design, could transform to a
baseball field when necessary. 210 Therefore, the venue should be categorized as a
newly-built venue specifically for the 2008 Olympic Games.
The venue construction was completed in 2006 for hosting the XI ISF Women’s
World Championship in August. 211 After the competition, temporary seats were removed
and then re-installed in May 2008 for the Olympics. When the Olympic Games
concluded, the rented temporary seats were removed again and only 3,000 permanent
the course was deducted from certain information the researcher found on those official websites related to
the Course. Therefore, the accuracy of it still needs to be further improved by future research.
208
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seats were retained in the venue. In November 2008, an official from the Feng Tai Sports
Center stated that there was no post-Games operation and utilization plan for the venue
because softball was not popular in Beijing and the equipment for softball games was too
expensive for those who might want to try it. 212 Moreover, an official from GASC
expressed that softball was no longer an Olympic sport. Further, it was not popular
throughout the world, which made it difficult to popularize in China. 213 Thus, the venue
had not been opened to the public since 2008, although it had been well maintained. 214
There was a baseball school located in the Feng Tai Sports Center. Most of the members
in the school were teenagers, trained by professional coaches; the goal of the school was
to deliver elite baseball players for the Chinese national team. 215 Registered softball
players in China dramatically decreased after softball was excluded from the Olympics.
Because of the Olympic gold medal strategy, the top priority for Chinese national sport
was certainly not softball. In 2009, there were only 8 teams in China with around 200
registered players. 216 Obviously, the sport authority in China had little interest in softball
in Olympic context. In 2010, the Feng Tai Sport Bureau announced that they would
demolish the warm-up softball field just beside the main field and build a shopping center
on the site. 217 The main field of the venue has been saved for the time being, however,
with no sufficient use either from the public or professional teams, it can be imagined
212
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what kind of future awaits the facility.

2-4. Transferred Ownerships
The venues in this sub-category were distinguished under “transferred
ownerships,” which meant that during the last three and a half years, the ownerships of
the venues, because of various reasons, were transferred from one of the three types of
ownerships described in the last three sub-categories to the other, while they were still
“government-owned” venues. The ownership of the National Stadium was transferred
from the CITIC Consortium Stadium Operating Company to the National Stadium Co.
Ltd., authorized and supervised by BSAM. The ownership of the National Indoor
Stadium (NIS) was transferred from the Guo Ao Investment & Development Co. Ltd. to
the Beijing Performance & Arts Group (BPA), authorized and supervised by BSAM. And,
the ownership of the Olympic Sports Park (including the Olympic Tennis Court, the
Olympic Archery Field, and the Olympic Hockey Field) in the Olympic Forest Park was
transferred from BSAM to the Chao Yang District Government. 218

2-4-1. “Birds’ Nest”
The National Stadium with the popular name “Bird’s Nest,” the main stadium of
the Beijing Olympic Games, is consistently put under the spotlight when Beijing’s
Olympic venues are discussed. It is considered a significant landmark of Beijing, because
of its famous iconic status and symbolic meaning to the city, as well as the entire country.
As Cheng Yang, the deputy general manager of the National Stadium Co. Ltd., stated, the
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National Stadium was representative of the national image, a facility showcasing the new
China, and a symbolic place where a Chinese national dream might come true; or, as
Michael Wines, a journalist of the New York Times, reported, it was a barely disguised
metaphor for China’s rise to worldwide importance. 219 No matter what the Stadium
meant spiritually, focused under a spotlight as it has always been, the significance and
elegant image of it guaranteed that certain controversial issues would be raised, as indeed
they have over the last three and a half years.
To completely depict the controversies, the investment mode of the Stadium,
praised by the government and the media in China before the Games, must be mentioned.
The investment mode was called the “PPP” model, that is, Private-Public-Partnership (or
Private-Public-Project), a cooperation mode between governmental organizations and
private enterprises for construction, management and operation of public projects. 220 This
mode was considered a marketing innovation made by the Beijing Municipal
Government for construction and post-Games operation of the Olympic venues in Beijing
as well as other large-scale public construction projects. 221 During the process of the bid
for the design and construction of venues such as the National Stadium and the National
Indoor Stadium, as well as the construction period following, the PPP mode was
implemented properly based on its Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) procedure, which
meant that for a public project, private enterprise would be responsible for construction
and operation for a specified number of years according to an agreement signed with the
219
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government. At the end of the specified period, the project would be returned to the
government. 222
Specific to the National Stadium, following the qualification evaluation in terms
of design, construction, financing, and operation, the Beijing Municipal Government
finally selected the China International Trust and Investment Corporation

Group

(CITIC) Consortium as the owner and manager of the Stadium. 223 The CITIC consortium
consisted of the CITIC Group, the Beijing Urban Construction Group, the CITIC Group
Affiliate Guan Elstrong from Hong Kong, and the Golden State Holding Group from the
United States. 224 According to the National Audit Office of China, the total investment
attached to the venue was CNY 3.6 billion (USD 554 million) of which the CITIC
consortium was responsible for 42% and BSAM for 58%.225 In August 2003, the
agreements with respect to the Stadium were officially signed. The CITIC consortium,
the winner of the bid, signed the “Chartered Rights Agreement” with the Beijing
Municipal Government, in which the CITIC consortium was granted 30-year chartered
management rights to the Stadium after which the management privileges would return to
the representative of the government, BSAM. 226 Moreover, the CITIC consortium also
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signed relevant agreements with BOCOG and BASM regarding the Stadium. 227 As a
result, the CITIC consortium and BSAM jointly registered a company, the National
Stadium Co., Ltd., by which the CITIC consortium held the management and operation
rights to the Stadium for 30 years after the Olympic Games. 228 However, the agreement
led to controversy in terms of post-Games utilization of the venue, because the
government’s strategy regarding the development of the Stadium, which focused more on
political and symbolic meanings and significances, was different from that of the CITIC
consortium, which focused more on economic value and revenue generating. 229
Following the Games, controversies gradually appeared. According to Yang, the
government was reluctant to see that profit-making became the priority of post-Games
operation for the “Bird’s Nest” stadium. 230 Meanwhile, criticism began to appear in the
media. The People’s Daily, one of the most important newspapers for the Chinese Central
Government as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), complained in July 2009
that the managers of the Stadium overpriced products sold in the Stadium, maximizing
the profit motif. It also contended that as an iconic stadium, and titled with the term
“national,” such immoral business behaviors should be criticized and stopped. 231 The
China Sports Review reported that local residents complained that the Stadium’s entrance
admission was too expensive compared to other sites and attractions in Beijing, and
stated that as a public place used for the Olympic Games, it was supposed to be open to
the public for free. 232 Sport Media, a local sports newspaper, commented that CITIC
227
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should not designate the National Stadium as the home of its own professional soccer
team without paying any rental to the government. 233 An official of the Beijing Sport
Bureau questioned how the National Stadium, as an Olympic sport facility, could attract
tourists in the

long term, and how long the Olympic enthusiasm would last, if the

operation company only cared about its own revenue making. 234 The conflict between
commercial profit-earning and social responsibility became a heated issue, not only
among the media, but also in public and government perspective in 2009. The operation
company was consistently criticized that it should be focused on the Stadium’s public
service function to serve the residents, rather than its “profit motif.”
From the operation company’s perspective, there were other explanations
regarding the commercial actions of the Stadium. The Company was required to pay
CNY 150 million (USD 23 million) per year for operation, maintenance, and interest
payments, which was a burden on the CITIC consortium, not the government. 235 Former
deputy general manager of the Company, Hengli Zhang, stated in 2009 that the Stadium’s
revenue usually included space rental, entrance admission, commercial advertisement,
and souvenir selling, while the major prospect was aimed at the sale of naming rights for
the Stadium. 236 However, the government did not approve the Company’s proposal
regarding the naming rights sale, although the relevant approval had been given when the
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agreement was signed between the CITIC consortium and the government. 237 Zhang
explained that the public might not applaud the naming rights sale of the National
Stadium, which was a possible reason why the government refrained from giving final
approval. 238 In 2009, the major part of the revenue came from tourists; however, Zhang
was concerned that the enthusiasm for visiting the Olympic venue would not be sustained
with time passing by. 239 In addition, in terms of commercial events, the progress was also
not smooth in 2009. Due to the high maintenance expense, the rent for commercial events
was quite expensive, which deterred numerous potential clients. Moreover, due to the
safety concern around the Olympic Park, the government rejected certain commercial
event proposals the Company submitted. 240 What the Company tried to do for the
Stadium was always limited by the government. After the Games, in 2009, the Company
proposed a series of business plans regarding the commercial development of the
Stadium; however, most of them were not approved by the Beijing Municipal
Government. 241 The conflict between the high operation cost and the lack of resources for
revenue generation caused tourism revenue to be heavily depended on. In fact, the
in-depth reason for this continued to be the different visions for the Stadium after the
Olympic Games held by the government and the Company, in other words, which kinds
of value - commercial value or symbolic value – should be pursued in order to embody
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Olympic legacy for the government as well as the public.
Of the issues regarding the post-Games operation of the Stadium, the naming
rights sale was the most debated issue by the media, the public and the governments.
Although approval for the naming rights sale had been outlined in the agreement in 2003,
the government quickly changed its mind after the Games. 242 Some enterprises, both
from China and abroad, expressed huge interests regarding naming the Stadium with their
corporate names, such as Adidas, Coca-Cola, Lenovo, and the Guo Mei Group. 243 For
instance, the negotiation with the Guo Mei Group had progressed smoothly with a price
of about CNY 70 million (USD 10.8 million) per year for at least five years being
entertained, but failed at the last moment because of the government’s intervention. 244
There were different opinions expressed regarding the naming rights sale for the
Stadium. Cheng Yang, the deputy general manager of the Bird’s Nest, told the researcher
that the naming rights sale for the Stadium would not progress in the near future, because
the national image was always the top priority of what the government considered when
the contradiction occurred between social responsibility and commercial benefit. 245
According to Jizhong Wei, the director of the Chinese Olympic Economy Research
Association, the naming rights could be sold only if the title of the Stadium was changed,
that is, the term “National” be removed from the title. 246 Nianguo Cao, the director of the
242
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Investment Department of DTZ, stated that the “Bird’s Nest” represented the national
image and the government placed this above the need for money gained from its naming
rights sale; thus, the government would not approve a naming rights sales deal. 247
Guoping Li, the board chairman of the Beijing Topconsult Real Estate Consulting Co.
Ltd., pointed out that the Olympics should not be politicized; the Bird’s Nest belonged to
a corporation to which the naming rights sale was within its legal rights; if there was a
great value, then selling the naming rights would be a win-win strategy both for the
Company and the government. In addition, a naming rights sale was merely a commercial
activity, and it would be the major revenue resource of the Stadium. 248 Hong Yao, an
official of the Beijing Sport Venue Association, stated that the naming rights sale
depended on various factors such as the venue’s reputation, use frequency, and type of the
use, rather than only the matter of money. 249 Xianpeng Lin, a professor at Beijing Sport
University (BSU), pointed out that it was quite difficult for the Stadium to balance its
financial sheet without selling naming rights, because the last couple of years had seen
that the revenue from tourism and commercial events could not compensate for the
Stadium’s high operating cost. 250 Lin also commented that the naming rights and the
Stadium’s luxury boxes should be for sale as is the practice in North America, as long as
there were needs in the market. 251 Moreover, the Xin Ming Evening News stated that
commercialization of the Stadium’s naming rights was correct; the function of the
Stadium that served the Olympics was finished and its commercial function should be
247
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started as soon as possible. 252 No matter where the debate goes, the fact is that so far the
government has not approved the naming rights sale for the Stadium, and with time
passing by, apparently, the possibility of it, if any, will be decreasing toward zero.
Under such a controversial situation surrounding the Stadium, in August 2009, six
years after the CITIC Consortium was granted 30-year chartered management rights to
the Bird’s Nest, the Beijing Municipal Government elected to take over the Stadium’s
ownership. The government and the CITIC consortium signed a new agreement on
regulating the operation and management mode. The “shareholding status” of the original
agreement remained unchanged. 253 According to the new agreement, the National
Stadium Co. Ltd. would still be in charge of the operation and daily maintenance of the
Stadium, while under the leadership of the Beijing Municipal Government, which meant
that the CITIC consortium had finished its management missions at the Stadium. But, as
a shareholder, CITIC would still benefit from the Stadium in the future.254 In addition, all
the employees in the National Stadium Co., Ltd. voluntarily stayed in the Company
retaining their original working positions. Of the profit made, the Company left CNY 50
million (USD 7.7 million) in the treasury for future development; and the balance of the
profit was distributed to the shareholders. 255 Eventually, the first PPP project in China
culminated with the “private partner” quitting the project. 256 One interesting detail should
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be mentioned. On the same day the new agreement on the transfer was signed, a new
operation and management proposal was released and approved right away by relevant
governmental departments. 257 There was no published document that could indicate
whether the CITIC consortium voluntarily handed over its 30-year chartered management
rights, or if it was forced to do so. However, from this ownership transfer, the CITIC
consortium became a permanent shareholder, but was relieved from the huge ongoing
operating costs of the Stadium, which could be considered a wise move for the
enterprise. 258 On the other hand, the government retained the ownership of the iconic
Stadium, free to carry out plans to embody the Stadium’s symbolic significance and
realize its service functions to the public. In terms of the Bird’s Nest post-Games
operation, commercial exploitation and social responsibilities were supposed to be
attended to simultaneously, which was considered an ideal condition for the Stadium.
However, if the government focuses solely on one side of the equation after taking over
the ownership, potential problematic issues might appear again in the near future.
Various officials and practitioners contributed their points of view with respect to
the development of the National Stadium. Shiwei Shao, an official of GASC, pointed out
that certain previous investment issues existed that led to the situation after the Games. 259
For instance, the public money invested was a significant percentage of the total
investment, probably because the government was overly optimistic regarding the
Stadium’s post-Games operation and revenue return, which led to the controversial
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situation in 2009 and the eventual ownership transition. 260 Despite some enterprises
involved in the investment of the venue, Cao stated that the Stadium’s political and iconic
meanings were over-emphasized by the government, which adversely affected the
Stadium’s post-Games commercial exploitation. 261 Also, Shao commented that the
National Stadium was too large to be utilized for medium size sports events or mass
sports activities, which consequentially caused the underuse issue. 262 Wei agreed, and
stated that the huge size of the Stadium seriously confined its commercial development;
only extra-large events might fit in the venue, with huge organizing costs. 263 Jun Ding, an
official of BOPAC, stated that after the ownership transition occurred, the relationship
between the Stadium and BOPAC improved, by which the collaboration between the
committee and the Stadium became smoother and more coordinated than before.
However, Ding also admitted that the Stadium had not balanced the financial sheet yet. 264
In terms of the Stadium’s operation, Ping Yang, an official of BOPAC, witnessed
its development after the Games. In 2009, the number of paid visitors in the Stadium was
amazing, reaching around several millions; however, for the next two years, it decreased
every year by 50%. Despite the decrease, it was still the first time in Olympic history that
such a considerable number of tourists visited an Olympic stadium in such a short period
of time. As a result, for the first two years, the Stadium’s revenue was mainly derived
from entrance admission sales. However, in 2011, the Stadium started to deal with the
interest payments to the banks, which caused the total expense of the Stadium to reach
around CNY 300 million (USD 46.2 million) per year. The total annual revenue was
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estimated at CNY 180 million (USD 27.7 million), leaving a deficit of about CNY 120
million (USD 18.5 million) for the Stadium. 265 Although Yang did not speak directly
about who would pay for this deficit, considering the new ownership, BSAM might be
the one who would take it in hand under the authority of the Beijing Municipal
Government. Yang also pointed out that the Stadium had started to exploit new business,
expecting to attract more tourists. For the first two years, the large number of tourists
brought great value to the venue. When the tourism business in the venue declined, it was
suddenly found that there was nothing inside but an empty stadium. Therefore, the
situation pushed the managers of the Stadium to exploit new business opportunities. 266
Zheng Shi, a manager of the National Stadium Co. Ltd., shared his opinion with
the researcher. The sales of naming rights and luxury boxes were stopped by the
government. The commercial strategy of the Stadium was completely controlled by the
government, which had nothing to do with the market. From the very beginning, in terms
of the venue’s design, there were little thoughts put on its post-Games utilization. For
instance, the passages under the spectator stands were all open space (prompting safety
issues during the Games) rather than blocked as in standard stadiums such as the Beijing
Workers’ Stadium. This fact led to much more human resource cost incurred than regular
stadiums when hosting events. For a commercial event, the Workers’ Stadium would need
around 500 security guards, while for the Bird’s Nest it could be around 5000. Another
example would be the retractable roof, which was discarded during the design adjustment
in 2003. Without a roof, the best season for stadium use was limited, dramatically
confining its commercial development. In addition, all vehicles entering the Olympic
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Park needed to be checked for security, potentially inhibiting customers who might want
to be there for leisure purposes. BOPAC fenced the Olympic Park and installed security
stations, making the Park more like a tourist destination; however, the function of the
individual venues inside as a place for sports or commercial events would be adversely
affected. 267
In terms of current conditions, Shi admitted that the tourism business declined
dramatically in the venue. The golden time was over. Actually, the big bucks earned from
tourism during the first year after the games was beyond expectation. It was
unprecedented in terms of any previous Olympic main stadium visitation. During the first
three months after the Games, the highest daily revenue reached around CNY 5 million
(USD 0.77 million), while in 2011 for the first eight months, the total revenue of the
Stadium was around CNY 50 million (USD 7.7 million). On the other hand, with time
passing by, maintenance costs increased. As long as the Stadium was opened to the public,
the operation and maintenance expense would cost more than CNY 170 million (USD
26.2 million) per year. Thus, commercial profit had to be emphasized in the Stadium’s
development strategy, although corporate social responsibility was always emphasized by
the government. All the business plans for the Stadium had to be submitted to the
government for approval; only those approved could be carried out. For instance, the
government approved the building of a “cauldron square” at the north side of the Stadium,
but did not approve selling its naming rights to the Hyundai Auto Group. The Hyundai
group offered to pay CNY 20 million (USD 3.1 million) for the naming rights of the
square and another CNY 80 million (USD 12.3 million) for establishing a demonstration
hall in the Stadium. Despite Hyundai’s offer, the government did not approve it. The
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government did not like the Stadium to be branded commercially. In a word, after the
ownership transfer, the government had become the only decision maker for the Stadium;
it controlled the direction of stadium development; at the same time it was responsible for
all potential financial risks. 268
In terms of future plans for the venue, a Bird’s Nest Hotel will be opened inside
the Stadium using the empty space at the north end. In addition, an observation archway
will be built over the venue for sightseeing purposes. All the money for these projects
will come from commercial loans. Besides, the tourism business will be continuing by
adding new attractions to the venue. Meanwhile the Stadium was contemplating
eventually removing entrance fees. The managers had been trying to make the Stadium a
tourism destination with unique experiences that only the Bird’s Nest could offer. Also,
some basic service functions such as rest areas, information desks, and catering services,
might be added, not only in the Stadium but also in the Olympic Park in an effort to keep
tourists staying longer than before. In terms of the Stadium’s function as a commercial
events location, its future development would heavily depend on the government’s will. If
the government would loosen its current strict regulations and demands for organizing
commercial events inside Olympic Park, that might provide opportunities for the venues
in the Park to further explore “the market” in the city. After all, as the venues were
located in the Olympic Central Area, there were lots of positives present in terms of
geographical location, “symbol” of the city, Olympic related reputation, and advanced
architecture and technical conditions. 269 However, as a window to showcase the
government’s political image, the Stadium has become a stage to embody the
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government’s will. As Jun Xiang, the assistant general manager of the Stadium, stated,
the Stadium had been completely led by the government, which meant that it must follow
the government’s direction and carry out what the government wanted it to do; in a word,
the government was the dictator of all. 270 Under such a principle for operation and
management of the Stadium, it is hard to imagine what the future of the Olympic main
stadium in Beijing will look like, but, a good guess might be that it will remain a political
symbol of the government standing there alone occasionally reminding its visitors of its
magnificence in the year 2008.

2-4-2. National Indoor Stadium (NIS)
The National Indoor Stadium (NIS), next to the Bird’s Nest and the Water Cube,
is located in the Beijing Olympic Park. NIS was the competition site during the Olympic
Games for artistic gymnastics, trampoline, and handball events. 271 As one of the three
newly-built venues in the Olympic Park, NIS is always overshadowed by the other two
iconic Olympic venues beside it, which leads to the fact that NIS has seldom been
focused on when discussing post-Games utilization of the Olympic venues in Beijing.
But, in fact, as still another Olympic venue experiencing ownership transition, the case of
NIS’s post-Games development was complicated, and might even be considered a
“peculiar circumstance” in China.
In November 2003, the Beijing Municipal Government selected the Beijing Urban
Construction Investment & Development Co., Ltd., (BUCID) Consortium as the owner of
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two Olympic projects - the National Indoor Stadium and the Olympic Village. The
Consortium would be responsible for the full investment, architectural design and
construction of the two projects; meanwhile the Consortium was granted 30-year
chartered management rights for NIS. 272 In 2005, the BUCID Consortium registered the
Guo Ao Investment & Development Co., Ltd., (Guo Ao Investment) to manage and
operate the two projects. The duties for the Company included investment, venue design,
construction, as well as post-Games management, operation and maintenance. 273 Guo Ao
fully funded the two projects; while the government paid nothing. 274 The two projects
progressed smoothly until the Olympic Games finished. At the beginning of 2009, the
government started to renege on the 30-year chartered management rights granted to Guo
Ao and attempted to transfer the ownership of NIS to a different government-owned
company. 275
Bo Zhang, director of the general office of the Beijing Guo Ao Five-Rings
National Indoor Stadium Commerce Manager Co., Ltd., a sub-company of Guo Ao
Investment, narrated the development of NIS, particularly after the Games. Guo Ao
Investment won the bid for the combination project of NIS and the Olympic Village with
the PPP mode under the direction of the government. For the Olympic Village, the
Company operated the project as a real estate venture, selling portions as residential units
even before the Olympic Games commenced. Due to the impact of the Olympics on the
local housing market, the price of the apartments in the Olympic Village rose to become
272
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among the most expensive in Beijing. In terms of NIS, although the municipal
government granted Guo Ao Investment a 30-year chartered management rights, directly
after the Olympic Games the government adjusted its policy on the venue. 276 In May
2009, the Beijing Municipal Government registered and directly supervised a company
named the Beijing Performance & Arts Group (BPA). The board chairman of BPA was
also the deputy general manager of BSAM, the current owner of both the Bird’s Nest and
the Water Cube. 277 Although the operation team of Guo Ao Investment remained in the
venue, the supervision rights were transferred to the new company, which took over the
responsibility for organizing activities and holding events in NIS. The dispute has existed
since 2009 regarding the ownership of NIS, but the government’s will and behavior have
prevailed throughout the entire scenario. 278
According to Xinxin Zhou, the general manager of the Guo Ao Investment,
operation of NIS under the leadership of Guo Ao endured for only three months after the
Games closed. During that period, NIS held 17 commercial events, including fashion
shows, auto shows, and commercial receptions for corporations. The venue was also
opened to the public with entrance admission (CNY 20 (USD 3.1)); this was later stopped
by the government. 279 Zhou stated that after the ownership transition, there were not
many changes in terms of holding commercial events in NIS. Currently, both companies
remain in NIS. They are responsible for different duties. Under the leadership of BPA, the
new owner of NIS, an operations company, the Beijing BPA Cultural Facilities
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Investment Co., Ltd., was established specifically for operating NIS. Yue Wang, the
engineering service director of the new company, stated that the process of the ownership
transition between BPA and Guo Ao Investment has not been completed yet in 2011,
despite two and a half years having passed. The situation was complicated because of the
intertwined relationships between the government and the state-owned enterprises. 280 The
two companies controlling NIS needed to collaborate in order to coordinate the Stadium’s
function as an assembly place, which seemed not to be the case, because at times the
duties were not defined clearly for each company, which made the team members from
both functions feel confused about their responsibilities. 281
After the Games, there were few sports competition events held in NIS.
According to Zhang, because of high costs incurred in energy, maintenance, human
resources, and security, holding commercial events was much more profitable for the
venue’s revenue production than holding sports events. Sports events in China were
always organized by governmental departments; government never reimbursed the venue
the normal rental rate. Then, too, the sports industry in China was lagging. Most sports
competitions, the basis of the sports industry, were controlled by the various levels of
government in China. Thus, most sport-related events were considered political tasks that
the venues’ owners must carry out. 282 Wang also commented on the relationship between
sports competitions and sport venues in China. The venues in China hardly made a profit
by merely holding sports competitions. There were few professional sports leagues in
China; thus, there was no large sponsor and commercial opportunity for the venues. Even
though some sports events attracted a limited number of sponsors and commercial
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partners, the money would be earned by the organizers and relevant sports associations
instead of the venues, they being only the site providers. Since NIS was not a tourism
destination, there was no tourism revenue after the venue was closed to the public in 2009.
As a result, the revenue from holding commercial events had become the only money the
venue made since then. After the ownership transition, BPA held some art performances
such as acrobat shows and concerts, which generated ticket sales revenue for the
venue. 283 Wang also pointed out that NIS did reduce the cost of daily maintenance and
energy consumption because it was not a tourism destination. If the commercial events
revenue could reach CNY 20 million (USD 3.1 million) per year, according to Wang, it
would compensate the yearly operation cost, which did not include the depreciation of
fixed assets of the venue. 284
Because of the Olympic impact that could temporarily influence the venues’
business opportunities in a positive way, during the first year after the Games, there were
companies from various fields engaging Olympic venues to hold their business events,
especially those in the Olympic Park. However, when the Olympic aura declined, the
venues’ attractions decreased. According to Wang, the three venues (the Water Cube, the
Bird’s Nest and NIS) in the Olympic Park have faced the same situation over the past two
years. In addition, high rent was another factor that kept potential clients away from the
venues. After the Olympic Games, the number of large scale sports venues significantly
increased in the city, which intensified the competitions among the venues; thus, potential
users had more choices to hold their events. Obviously, the high rent of the venues was a
critical weakness when they were in such a competitive market. In particular, as the focus
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shifted to the next edition of the Olympic Games four years hence in London, inevitably
decreasing the attraction of Olympic venues in Beijing, it would aggravate the marketing
process. 285
Putting aside these potential risks regarding NIS’s future development, the dispute
about the ownership had produced a reasonable solution that could satisfy both sides of
the controversy. In terms of the reason the government revoked its decision and took back
the venue, Xinxin Zhou had this to say. During the first three months after the Games, the
operation of NIS was under the complete marketing control of Guo Ao Investment.
According to Zhou, Guo Ao Investment signed its agreement with the government and
fully funded NIS, which definitely gave the Company the right to operate the venue
independently. The resulting record of the three-month experience proved that NIS was
on the right track and would make profit keeping things as they were. Zhou contended
that the duty of a general manager was to keep maximizing profit for the Company rather
than to achieve a balance between commercial benefit and social benefit. However,
officials in the government were more interested in the venue’s public service functions
and how much social benefits the venue could achieve. Therefore, when the government
realized that Guo Ao Investment’s priority was in creating a profit, it endeavored to
change the situation. 286 Actually, after the government proposed the ownership transition,
Guo Ao Investment did host a series of events for some governmental departments based
on the government’s will to change the situation. They held a Beijing PSB Meeting with
16,000 attendees, a Beijing Traffic Police Annual Meeting, and some campaigns for the
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“Whole People Fitness Movement.” 287 Even though NIS was a large scale sport arena, its
condition was not suitable for a large amount of local senior people and young children to
do morning exercise. These Guo Ao initiatives were not enough to satisfy the government.
During the last three years, the process of the ownership transition has never ceased. In
the government’s mind, according to Zhou, NIS should not position itself as a facility
concentrating on high-end, expensive events, with admission prices that those with
regular salaries could not afford. Zhou felt this would be unfair because the Company had
also tried its best to realize the public service function of the venue. 288
In terms of the ownership transition, Ping Yang stated that NIS had not been
opened regularly during the last three and a half years because the ownership transition
had not yet been completed. The ownership decision the government made was not based
on one specific sport venue but based on the strategy of the city’s culture development in
the next fifteen years. The government attempted to integrate a series of culture and arts
performance companies and organizations in the city and to put all of them under the
control of the municipal government, thereby sufficiently utilizing its resources for the
cultural development of the city. 289 As for NIS, it was only one step of the entire strategy.
The ownership of NIS was transferred to BPA, a new government-owned company linked
to Beijing’s culture industry expansion. The new owner now owned a central gathering
location for its various cultural events. Because NIS’s ultimate supervision belonged to
the municipal government, which also supervised other cultural organizations in the city,
the government might well prompt NIS to “book” cultural events from all over the city

287

The Whole People Fitness Movement was a movement developed in China advocating that everybody
should exercise for their own health on a daily basis.
288
Xinxin Zhou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 20, 2011.
289
Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011.

124

and even other cities in China, thus conflicting with Guo Ao Investment’s marketing
strategy. The ideal condition that the government pictured was that NIS, as a perfect
location, could stage the city’s cultural events at any time the government wanted. 290
Based on this explanation, it can be understood that Guo Ao Investment was sacrificed to
the strategy of the city’s culture industry expansion.
In addition, Zhihong Zhang shared his opinion with the researcher regarding
NIS’s ownership transition. The major reason for this was the conflict between the
marketing strategy of Guo Ao Investment and the government’s idea with respect to the
Olympic venue’s development after the Games. Guo Ao Investment contended that the
marketing strategy of the venue should be formulated by the investor instead of the
government. However, Guo Ao ignored the entire investment the government made for
the Olympic Games, such as the infrastructure around NIS, the Olympic Park where NIS
is located, and the public transportation system that connected NIS to the city. From this
perspective, NIS was neither an isolated venue, nor an independent company carrying out
its own marketing strategy without considering what the government considered. 291
Zhang also pointed out that the pressure on the government to finally make the decision
to take over NIS’s ownership was prompted by the fact that even though the facility was a
non-tourism destination, NIS sold entrance admission tickets to visitors. This action,
provoked criticism from the media, especially from foreign media, criticism that
infringed on the image of the government and the Olympic movement in China. The
issue of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues was one which the worldwide media
belabored. Selling entrance admissions was considered to be a basic component of venue
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operation, which showed that Beijing’s Olympic venue management was in a relatively
low level. 292 Xinxin Zhou expressed a different point of view regarding ticket sales.
According to Zhou, the entrance admission sale at NIS lasted only fifteen days and then
Guo Ao Investment peremptorily closed the venue to visitors in order to prepare the
facility for commercial events. Managers thought that visitors in the venue disturbed
staffers’ preparation for commercial events.293 In terms of “high-end” commercial events
that Zhou mentioned, Zhang stated that it was not the major reason for the transition. No
matter what kinds of events the Company organized, according to Zhang, it should be
remembered that the venue was an Olympic legacy, a national symbolic venue, not a
location for purely commercial activities. 294
After ownership transition, NIS was no longer an independent venue with its own
development strategy, but associated with other companies and organizations in the city’s
culture industry. When the government considered the venue’s business, it prioritized the
city’s culture industry, which, according to Zhang, improved the government’s working
efficiency because certain conflicts would be solved inside BPA. However, Zhang also
stated that the establishment of BPA was just the first step of the government’s strategy
for the city’s culture industry expansion. 295 Though the government has created a
framework for the strategy, it has to keep exploring other potentially promising endeavors
in order to achieve its goals of the city’s culture development. Furthermore, with NIS’s
ownership transition, the Beijing Municipal Government now controls the three major
Olympic venues in the Olympic Park, the Water Cube, the Bird’s Nest and NIS. All three
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venues are directly or indirectly supervised by BSAM, which can be considered a typical
condition of venue management in China in which the government has the highest
priority and is the strongest power for operation and utilization of Olympic venues after
the Games.

2-4-3. Olympic Forest Park: Tennis, Hockey and Archery Facilities
The Olympic Tennis Court, the Olympic Hockey Field, and the Olympic Archery
Field, were built together within the Olympic Sport Park at the west side of the Olympic
Forest Park that was located in the region of the Beijing Olympic Central Area. The
hockey and archery fields were temporary Olympic venues that were supposed to be
dismantled after the Games. 296 Three and a half years after the Games, the hockey field is
still operated for public use, gathering membership fees and facility rent. 297 One of the
two archery fields was dismantled in 2009, not because it was a temporary facility, but
because the site had to be emptied and then re-occupied for the construction of a new
tennis court. The other archery field has been closed completely since the Games
concluded. 298 The tennis court, a permanent Olympic venue, has been used for the China
Open competitions since 2009. 299 In addition, a new tennis stadium with a retractable
roof, titled the National Tennis Center, was completed in 2011, replacing the Olympic
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Tennis Court as the main stadium for the China Open events in the future.300 According
to Jinxian Tian, the manager of the Olympic Forest Park, although the estimated use
duration of temporary sports venues is usually five years, the venues in the Olympic
Forest Park could be used for ten years, because of its high quality construction. Thus, the
Chao Yang District Government decided to keep utilizing the two venues and their
auxiliary function rooms as recreation facilities for the public. Tian also pointed out that
dismantling the two venues would cost more than CNY 10 million (USD 1.54 million),
while the renovation work cost approximately CNY 3 million (USD 0.46 million).
Furthermore, by operating sport-related business in these facilities, according to Tian, the
renovation cost would be recovered in three years. 301
In terms of the ownership of the three venues, ownership has been transferred
twice since 2006. Before 2006 the owner/investor of the three venues was the Beijing
2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, a governmental division that supervised
and monitored Olympic construction projects in Beijing. 302 A bribery scandal changed
the government’s plan for these three venues. In June 2006, former vice-mayor of Beijing,
Zhihua Liu, who was in charge of the construction of the Olympic venues at the time,
was ousted for alleged corruption and a notorious life style. 303 Liu was sacked in June
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2006 and expelled from the Communist Party of China in December. 304 Liu used to be
the leader of the Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, the decision
maker regarding the contracts of the construction and the owner of the three venues.
Based on the Xin Hua News Agency’s report, before Liu’s scandal was exposed, he had
already appointed the rights of construction and operation of the three venues to a
construction company that was owned by Jianrui Wang, one of his mistresses. 305 After
the scandal, in 2007, the Beijing Municipal Government withdrew the chartered
construction and management rights and authorized BSAM to take over the ownership of
the three venues. 306
A former official of BOCOG told the researcher that the three venues were
originally planned to be built as temporary facilities funded by the Beijing Municipal
Government; thus, the temporary owner would be the Beijing 2008 Project Construction
Headquarters Office until the facilities were dismantled after the Games. There seems to
be no paper record that links Liu’s scandal situation with the decision to change the three
venues from temporary facilities to permanent installations. However, the BOCOG
official stated that the government assumed ownership of the venues because of the
scandal. As a result, after the scandal, the appointed construction contractor was fired; the
government took over the projects, and BSAM became the new owner of the three
venues. Meanwhile, the basic design of the structures was changed from temporary to
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permanent. After this transition, BSAM, as the new owner, fully funded the three venues,
supervised and monitored the construction work, and then operated and maintained the
venues during the Olympic Games. 307
After the Games, since the Olympic Sport Park was located geographically in the
Chao Yang District, BSAM once again transferred the ownership of the three venues to
the local authority, the Chao Yang District Government. 308 Specifically, the Chao Yang
government registered a company named the Beijing Shi Ao Forest Park Management
Company to operate and manage the venues as well as the entire Forest Park. In addition,
the government built another tennis stadium by investing CNY 540 million (USD 83.1
million); it was named the “National Tennis Center” or the “Diamond Tennis Court.” 309
According to Changsheng Li, the deputy general manager of the Shi Ao Forest Park
Management Company, the high maintenance cost of the Olympic Tennis Stadium put
lots of pressure on the Company’s operation. The revenue from the courts’ rental could
not offset its operation expense, while the strategy for future development was still
unsettled by the government. 310 As to the new tennis stadium, aside from the huge
amount of the monetary investment, the ongoing maintenance expense is an issue for the
Company, because it is only used for the China Open competitions held once a year over
a 10-day period. For the rest of the year it is closed. 311 Although the practice courts
beside the main court were opened to the public in 2010, given the fact that tennis was
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not popular in China, the courts have been underused since then. Moreover, the
complicated traffic conditions around Olympic Sport Park, and the relatively high rate for
using the courts, limit potential users. 312 The Beijing Youth reported that the practice
courts were closed in the winter of 2010 due to severe weather conditions. 313 When the
researcher visited the site in August 2011, the courts were closed; a lone security guard
stood at the main entrance.
In terms of the hockey field, before the Olympic Games the field was chosen as
the new training field for the Chinese national hockey team. 314 However, after the Games,
the national team trained at the NOSC hockey field when they were in Beijing. The only
elite hockey team which trained in the hockey field was the provincial hockey team of
Guang Dong Province. They used the field as their training base for five months in
2009. 315 When the team finished training, the field was closed for renovations until
August 2010. 316 Around the precinct of the hockey field, people could pay an hourly fee
for playing soccer (CNY 30 (USD 4.6)), basketball (CNY 15 (USD 2.3)), and badminton
(CNY 40 (USD 6.2)). In the future, sports such as yoga, ping pong, fencing and roller
skating are on tap to be developed, using the auxiliary function rooms as well as
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peripheral space around the field. 317
Frank Bi, the general manager of the China National Sports Venue Management
Co., Ltd., shared his opinion regarding the operation and management condition of the
Olympic Green venues. In general, managing a sport venue required specialized teams
for each kind of operation duty in the venue. The duties were diverse; thus, the
requirements for the teams were different. In sport venues in the Olympic Park, there was
a lack of specialized management teams and supervisors. Low level management was not
capable of operating such advanced Olympic venues. It could be said that all the venues
in the Olympic Park needed to be improved in terms of post-Games management and
operation. Otherwise, there would be no satisfactory future for Olympic legacies. As to
the hockey field, it was a positive thing to see that the government decided to open the
venue to the public. However, considering its advanced condition and high quality, it
should have been opened to elite teams as a training base. The operation company
assumed only the responsibility of daily operation and maintenance, while due to a lack
of specialized management teams the Company was hardly able to strategically plan the
venues’ future development and maximize their post-Games utilization. 318
Bi also stated that venue management was a general issue throughout the country.
According to Bi, about 97% of the sport venues in China were funded and owned by
various government structures. Advanced management mechanisms based on a free
market principle could not be introduced into government-owned facilities because such
mechanisms and operation modes conflicted with government administration and
317
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operation system. Therefore, without in-depth reform in government, it would be
impossible for Olympic venues in Beijing to improve management conditions in the
future. 319

3. General Administration of Sport China (GASC)-Owned Venues
There were seven Olympic sport venues in Beijing owned by the General
Administration of Sport China (GASC): the Lao Shan Velodrome, the Beijing Shooting
Range Hall and Clay Target Field (both venues were built together), the Capital Indoor
Stadium, and three venues in the National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC): the NOSC
Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium and the Ying Tung Natatorium. After the Olympic
Games, due to their unique features and functions, the Velodrome (newly-built), the clay
target field (pre-existing), and the shooting range hall (newly-built), were used only by
Chinese national teams. Post-Games utilization for the other four venues (pre-existing)
aimed at public recreation and to serve local communities in the same manner they did
before the Games.

3-1. Lao Shan Velodrome
The Lao Shan Velodrome, associated with the Olympic BMX Course and the
Olympic Mountain Bike Course, were located on the west side of the city. Unlike the
BMX Course and the Mountain Bike Course supervised by the local district government,
the Velodrome, a newly-built venue, was supervised by GASC, which was in charge of
Chinese national sport and responsible for China’s Olympic Gold Medal Strategy. 320 As
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the owner of the venue, GASC used the main track as a training site for elite athletes. The
facility’s hallways, function rooms, and corridors around the track served the public as
sports and recreation space.
Junyan Wang, the director of the general office of the Cycling and Fencing
Administrative Center under GASC, provided the researcher with information on the
Velodrome. 321 GASC’s Cycling Administration Center and the Chinese Cycling
Association had been located at Lao Shan since the 1980s. There had been no high
standard indoor cycling track in the Center before the Olympic Games. In terms of the
location selection, the Center submitted several proposals to GASC as well as UCI for
evaluating. Finally, after considering the proximity to both the pre-existing mountain bike
course and the Center and its geographical environment, the unanimous decision was
made that the new velodrome would be built at the foot of Mount Lao Shan. GASC’s
total investment in the Velodrome was approximately CNY 100 million (USD 15.4
million), which was appropriated from the national treasury. The Center supervised the
construction project, while BOCOG provided the project with relevant technical support.
The construction consisted of two phases, the basic structure and the cycling track itself.
For the second part, there was no qualified company in China that could complete the
project based on the criteria established by UCI and the IOC. A German company was
hired to finish the job with special technology aiding athletes to achieve better
performances. Moreover, GASC also hoped that the track would provide the national
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teams with optimum training conditions after the Games. 322
In terms of post-Games use, the Velodrome was mainly used as a training base for
national cycling and fencing teams. The athletes trained on the main track (for cyclists)
and the fencing courses established along the hallways. There were standardized
apartments reserved for the Games. These were renovated as athletes’ residences after the
Games. GASC paid for the entire renovation project. As a result, the original athletes’
residence building beside the venue was transformed into a commercial hotel, thereby
generating revenue for the Center. Utilizing function rooms around the venue, the Center
opened a fencing club targeting young children, which was another way to help the
Center offset maintenance costs. Then, too, since 1984, the Center operated a driving
school utilizing the road around Mount Lao Shan. For more than two decades the driving
school was a constant revenue generator. 323
Moreover, during the last three and a half years the Center organized international
and national track cycling competitions by which the Center sought to attract event
sponsors for a rental price tag in the vicinity of CNY 200,000 (USD 30,800). The Center
had its own marketing department dealing with sponsors. Event sponsors usually
included bicycle manufacturers, sport apparel companies, and companies in the food
industry. Though certain sponsors were eager to sponsor events, for the most part,
marketing people at the Center had to energetically pursue clients. In terms of its
competition events, on most occasions the Center did not sell tickets to spectators. First,
cycling was not as popular as soccer and basketball in China. Even though the Center
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attempted to sell tickets, their effort largely failed. Second, if the Center sold tickets, the
money earned would be less than that which the Center had to pay for the security
requirement of PSB. In addition, there were complicated procedures regarding the
application for spectator events. 324
In terms of operation expense of the venue, GASC had secured special
government funding for the venue every year, which covered most of the costs incurred
in the Velodrome. Generating revenue in the venue was not a priority of the Center,
because it did not need its own revenue to offset the cost. In terms of this, all
GASC-owned Olympic venues were in the same category. It was not necessary for the
Center to explore business opportunities. The major task of the Center was to serve the
national teams and attempt to secure Olympic gold medals. 325
The Center once held commercial events such as exhibition fairs, but realized that
such events did not “fit” in the Velodrome. The Center also considered, but eventually
discontinued, pop concerts in the venue, because the condition of the venue had to be
considerably changed to fit a commercial concert. In addition, in 2009, the Center
approved a pipeline manufacturer, the Ao Po Pipeline Co., Ltd., in Zhe Jiang Province, to
become the Velodrome’s official product provider. This allowed the Company to use the
name and picture of the Velodrome in its commercial advertisements. 326 The Center also
considered changing the title of the venue to the “National Velodrome.” The proposal was
submitted and is still waiting for approval by GASC. 327
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In terms of future development of the Velodrome, Wang stated that the venue was
not suitable for initiating mass sports on the main track, while outside the venue there
was enough space for public recreation and mass sport. At the north end of the Center,
there is an empty area reserved for future commercial exploitation. According to Wang,
the Center planned to add some sports for recreation purposes such as roller skating,
skate boarding, and BMX. A team in the Center has already initiated some preparation
work for this business plan. The target group of this plan would be those young persons
who are enthusiasts of extreme sports, especially those cycling-related. Wang stated that
the Center developed its business plan based on its tradition, that is, it would take
advantage of the core strength of the Center, cycling. New business would try to attract
cycling enthusiasts throughout the city. The Center would provide them with the space,
equipment, instruction (personal trainers), and any necessary services they would need.
Also based on this principle, the Center would provide bicycle manufacturers throughout
the country with a testing, demonstration, and sales facility. By doing this, the Center
would become a venue for manufacturers and distributors to operate their own business
stores, showcase products, communicate with potential clients and business partners,
stage commercial events, and sponsor competitions held in the Velodrome. This would be
a long-term goal for the Velodrome. According to Wang, the current condition of the
venue does not fit this plan and there would have to be numerous facility renovations and
changes in management strategy to achieve the goal. Once again, the plan has to be
approved by GASC before being actually initiated. 328
Speaking of weakness incumbent with the venue’s development, Wang pointed
out that cycling, because it was not as popular as soccer, basketball, table tennis, and
328
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badminton, led to a relatively small population base of potential users. This is especially
so for sports such as BMX and extreme cycling. Under this situation, the Center planned
to organize sports performance shows by elite athletes in order to introduce cycling to the
public and attract those who might be interested. 329

3-2. Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field
The Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field were situated together in
the West Community Area of the Shi Jing Shan District. The Shooting and Archery
Administrative Center under GASC, as well as the Chinese Shooting Association and
Archery Association have been located here since the 1950s. 330 The Shooting Range Hall
was a newly-built venue for the Beijing Olympics, while the Clay Target Field was a
pre-existing venue in the Center and was re-constructed for the Games. GASC fully
financed and supervised the design and construction of both venues and owned them after
the Games. As originally planned, the only occupants of the two venues were the Chinese
national shooting teams. The Center was not opened to the public, except for a badminton
gymnasium and a shooting club behind the Shooting Range Hall. The people playing
badminton or going to the club in the Center had to register with their personal ID card at
the entrance; otherwise they were not allowed to enter. 331 In addition to the Lao Shan
Velodrome, the Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field were the other two Olympic
venues under the leadership of GASC whose sole use was a training base for national
teams.
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Yuping Ding, the deputy director of the business development department in the
Shooting and Archery Administrative Center under GASC, provided the researcher with
relevant information on the venues. Since GASC, as the owner, invested a total of CNY
400 million (USD 61.54 million) for the venues, the purpose of the venues was quite
clear: to provide national shooting teams with world-class training conditions and
services after the Games. Thus, post-Games utilization considered during the design stage
focused on the facility becoming a national team’s training base. There was no
multifunctional design considered. A shooting venue’s layout is unique in order to meet
special competition requirements. But, this limits its general use function, unlike most
regular gymnasium plans for post-Games use. The demands for Olympic competitions
and for team training on a regular basis were altogether different. Anticipating the large
amount of spectators during the Games, a long and spacious grandstand area was built
behind the shooting lanes, an unnecessary feature for regular training use. Behind the
spectator stands, a large and spacious area was built that was specifically for spectators
during the Games. Both large areas remained empty after the Games. Their use for
non-training purposes dictated reconstruction and renovation. For instance, considering
safety issues, they had to be separated from the shooting lanes. The fact was that there
was no special fund from GASC for reconstructing the venue. Separating spectators from
athletes with weapons was difficult for the Center to realize. There were design issues
related to mixing spectator routes with those of the athletes. If the Center was to hold
non-sport events utilizing the function area in the venue, it would have to change the
layout of the venue to separate the shooting region from the functional region. The work
was too complicated to be completed. As a result, for the last three and a half years, the
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venue’s only purpose has been for national team training. 332
Since the priority of GASC’s sport venues was always to serve national teams and
to secure Olympic gold medals, there was no alternative post-Games utilization plan for
these two venues. However, the new Shooting Range Hall indirectly helped the Center to
develop new business utilizing old training venues in the Center. Using a new venue for
athlete training vacated old training facilities. Hence, the gymnasium was reconstructed
and appointed for new business purposes. The Center established a commercial hotel in
the old building in an effort to organize conferences and business meetings. In addition, a
badminton gym had been opened to the public since 2008. However, safety issues were
still the Center’s concern because of its compromising features. Due to the layout of the
buildings in the Center, it could not separate the training area and ammunition storage
from the area which the public used for recreation or conferences. 333
In terms of the Center’s financial condition, GASC financially supported the
Center. At the end of each year, the Center reported its operation cost for the year and
submitted an estimated budget to GASC for the next year. Based on the report, GASC
funded the Center’s operation costs. Therefore, the Center paid little attention to the costs
incurred in the venues. The operation funds usually covered all the expenses such as
energy, regular maintenance, human resources, and security costs. Basically, GASC fully
paid for the new building and, as well, continued funding maintenance and operation of
the venues in order to serve national teams. Only one priority existed - securing Olympic
gold medals for the country. 334
In addition to the training base, the Center also organized international and
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national shooting competitions in the venue. By holding the competition events, the
Center could earn revenue for its own use. Operation costs for holding the events was not
a consideration. They were covered by the operation funds from GASC. The Center also
attempted to find sponsors for the events; the money from the sponsors could be retained
by the Center instead of transferring it to GASC. The Shooting Range Hall included two
areas - the qualification hall and the final hall. The national teams usually trained in the
qualification hall, while the final hall was only opened for large-scale international
competition events. Similar to the reasons attached to the Velodrome, such as strict PSB
(Public Security Bureau) regulations and being an unpopular spectator sport in China, the
competitions held in the Center were not open to the public. In addition, because weapons
were involved in the competitions, a highly sensitive issue in the city, PSB would censor
the application and set ultra-high security levels for the events. As a result, after the
Games, there were no spectators at the competitions in the venue. There is no plan to
change this in the future. Moreover, there was also a shooting club in the Center that was
opened to the public in the 1980s. The club was owned by the Center and operated by
staffers. The club had no marketing promotions or commercial advertisements, due
mainly to its weapons-involved sensitivity. 335 Thus, the Center did not set revenue goals
for the club. Obviously, the club was not operated with market mechanisms in mind.
Furthermore, the Center at one time opened its swimming pool to the public. Though the
pool was popular with the local people, the recreational swimmers had to cross the
pathway of the athletes to reach the pool. The athletes always carried guns and bullets
with them; the safety issue once again produced problematics. Besides, whenever the
Center organized competitions events, the pool had to be closed for at least two weeks, a
335
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situation prompting complaints from those with memberships. Finally, the Center was
forced to close the pool in 2009. 336
In terms of future development, Ding stated that any possible changes to the
Center would depend heavily on GASC’s analysis of the future. As a training base for
national teams, the Center’s operation was fully supported and authorized by GASC.
Thus, as long as GASC does not change its priority for Chinese national sport, the Center
will not change its own operation direction and management mode. Securing status as
national team training site will be the top priority for the Center under the “Whole
Country System,” the major system and strategy for Chinese national sport. 337 According
to Ding, despite the underused condition of the two Olympic venues, the positive thing
has been that the Center exploited the old facilities to generate revenue, from which the
Center could earn approximately CNY 5 million (USD 0.77 million) per year. Plus,
certain enterprises such as Nike and Lining sponsored the national shooting teams; this
sponsorship revenue reverted to the Center. However, Ding pointed out that potential
sponsors were very difficult to find because a sport like shooting was so unpopular in
China, causing its exposure frequency in the media to be quite low. This kept sponsorship
enterprises away from the Center.338
As to GASC and the Center itself, expectations for reforming have appeared. A
high standard of performance for the Chinese athletes was set during the 2008 Beijing
Games. For the 2012 London Games, it was predicted that Chinese athletic performance
could not exceed what was achieved in 2008. Given such a situation, many contended
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that GASC should change its administrative and operation system in order to transfer its
emphasis from national sport and Olympic gold medals to mass sport and school sport.
Correspondingly, the role of Chinese national sport should be changed from a political
meaning to a national strategy for improving citizen health conditions. However, no
action about reform has as yet been initiated. After all, reform probably depends on
changes in wider Chinese social environment and political circumstances, instead of
merely within GASC itself.

3-3. Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS)
The Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) held the volleyball tournament during the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. It is located within the University Area. It was the only
Olympic venue in the University Area not built on a campus. Owned by GASC, CIS was
built in 1968 and specifically renovated in 2007 for the Olympics. 339 CIS was supervised
by the China Winter Sports Administrative Center under GASC. Within the same location
precinct, the Center also administered other facilities, including a skating oval, a
multifunction training gym, and the CIS Hotel. As GASC’s winter sports center, the
Capital Skating Oval was the major site for national team training, while CIS and the
multifunction training gym were backup venues for the teams. Both facilities could be
transformed into ice rinks whenever needed. 340 After the Games, CIS was restored to its
original function as an assembly place for commercial events, job fairs, a clothing market,
339

Official Website of BOCOG, “Capital Indoor Stadium,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/cas/index.shtml
(accessed March 18, 2012); Official Website of the China Winter Sports Administrative Center,
“Introduction of Capital Indoor Stadium,”
http://www.winter-sports.cn/home/backup/2005-07-07/46897.html (accessed March 18, 2012).
340
Internal Circulated Documents of the China Winter Sports Administrative Center, “The Solution about
Opening to the Public after the Olympic Games,” pp. 2-4; Haixia Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu,
August 15, 2011.

143

and sports competitions. 341 GASC invested CNY 150 million (USD 23.1 million) (public
money directly from the national treasury) to upgrade CIS without significant structure
change. 342 The venue was a relatively old sport facility which needed significant
upgrading in electronic systems, telecommunication systems, ventilating systems, and
fire alarm systems. Thus, the Olympic Games were an opportunity for the venue to
update itself and keep functioning well into the future. 343
Haixia Wang, the director of the business management department in the China
Winter Sports Administrative Center under GASC, briefly described the condition of CIS
after the Games. The Center’s first task was to secure national team training, a top
priority for GASC. Even though CIS was not a major training site for athletes, CIS had to
follow the GASC’s development plan based on its main priority. In addition to its training
purpose, as a multifunction sport facility CIS had 17,127 seats (reduced from 18,000
seats prior to upgrading), which dictated that the venue be mainly used for large scale
events, such as pop concerts and other cultural extravaganzas. Besides, through the
corridors surrounding the main hall, the space was suitable to hold clothing markets and
job fairs (see the pictures in Appendix O). 344
The upgrading work for the Olympic Games also considered the facility’s
post-Games commercial business. For instance, sixteen luxury boxes were built above the
spectator stands. In 2010, CIS’s commercial culture business consumed one third of the
total commercial culture events market in the city. CIS owned a long tradition for culture
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shows in Beijing. Its chief competitors were the Workers’ Gymnasium and the
MasterCard Center. 345 Therefore, one of the major tasks for CIS was to market
promotions in order to compete with the competitors in the city. The strength of CIS was
its long tradition and reputation in the market that secured certain old clients who had
loyalty to CIS and constantly brought new business to the venue. Besides, CIS’s rent for
commercial events started at CNY 300,000 (USD 46,154), which was relatively low
compared to its competitors in Beijing. In addition, the Center was a governmental
organization. Governmental clients were more easily dealt with compared to those venues
under private ownerships, such as MCC. Plus, with its long history in the market, the
Center embraced professional staffers for organizing commercial events. Their
experience was a strength for CIS. However, weaknesses were also apparent. First,
physical space around the venue was quite limited, which led to a parking problem for
spectators. Although public transportation was located rather close to the venue, private
vehicles had been expanding rapidly in Beijing and more and more people started driving
their own vehicles to the events. This problem had to be considered by event organizers.
In contrast, certain new venues, such as MCC, offered quite large parking space for
spectators. It is a serious issue that the Center continues to face. Second, new venues
consistently used advanced hardware such as technical equipment and audio-video
systems. The CIS condition in this regard was an obvious weakness. Finally, Wang stated
that the financial operation of CIS was funded by GASC. This meant that the Center did
not need to be concerned by CIS’s costs for holding commercial events. However, if
GASC reforms its sport venue administrative mode in the future, the financial support
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will be limited and venues like CIS will have to face the market independently. If such a
situation arises, then CIS’s business in the commercial events market will be a totally
different story. This is a potential concern for the venue’s future development. 346
In terms of GASC’s support, because the Center was responsible for the Olympic
Gold Medal Strategy, GASC provided the Center with special support funds, called
“energy funds.” According to Wang, this was approximately CNY 10 million (USD 1.54
million) per year. It basically covered all the expenses for the Center. 347 However,
according to an internally-circulated evaluation report on the Center’s operation and
management, the financial condition of the Center was somewhat different than what
Wang stated. Based on the report, the Center had to transfer around CNY 3 million (USD
0.46 million) to GASC for utilizing the three sport venues as well as other facilities
within the Center; plus, the employee salary cost was around CNY 2.4 million (USD 0.37
million) per year and the energy cost around CNY 3 million (USD 0.46 million) per year.
In total, the yearly expense for the Center was around CNY 8.4 million (USD 1.3 million),
while the yearly revenue accrued fluctuated between CNY 6 and 15 million (USD 0.92
and 2.31 million), based on the Center’s financial sheet. 348 The report was completed in
2005; the researcher interviewed Wang in 2011. Thus, the time difference and relevant
policy change could be the reason for the different statements between Wang and the
report. Wang also stated that after the Olympic Games, the operation expense and other
costs incurred in the Center significantly increased, which led to the Center feeling
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pressure in terms of the management and operation of the three sport facilities.349 As a
non-profit organization, the Center was under the leadership of GASC with a balanced
allocation. This meant that GASC only partially funded the venue. CIS needed to earn
money for the venue’s operation. No matter which statement was correct or what number
was “more genuine” than the other, the fact can be seen that GASC basically took care of
the Center’s operational expense because the Center carried the tasks of winning Olympic
gold medals. This was always considered the priority of Chinese national sport. As to the
other business the Center operated, it was not critical. If it could make revenue, then it
could partially offset its expense; but if it could not, the Center would still fully function
under the support from GASC.
GASC would not blame the Center because it did not make money from its
commercial events business, but blame could be levied if the Center did not carry out its
prime mission - securing Olympic gold medals. Every year GASC funded the Center, as
well as the national teams training in the Center. As a return, the Center had to guarantee
the medals. According to Wang, the supervisor of the Center must sign a contract with
GASC regarding the number of Olympic medals guaranteed. Currently, a contract has
been signed in terms of the Sochi Olympic Winter Games, which included the number of
gold, silver and bronze medals the national teams would (instead of could) win. 350 If the
teams did not achieve what they promised, the supervisor of the Center would probably
be removed from his/her position, which in GASC, was usually considered a serious
punishment for a supervisor. Therefore, the supervisor of the Center took the contract and
the task very seriously. There was a clear priority of task. According to Wang, in the
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Center, nothing could disturb a national team’s training plan; all schedules for facilities
followed the plan, which was a principle of the Center. In terms of this factor, CIS’s
counterparts, the Velodrome and the shooting center, functioned identically.351
In terms of future development, Wang admitted that as long as GASC would not
reform its administrative mode, the Center would not change. 352 The Center does not
control its destiny in decision making, which meant that everything about the Center
absolutely depended on its owner. It is a two-edged sword for the future of the Center. In
serving the Olympic Gold Medal Strategy, any business plans for CIS have to be
compromised to national teams training plans; meanwhile, GASC’s financial support
ensures that the condition of the Center remains comfortable. Intensified marketing
competition and struggling to survive in the market are not concerns for the Center. A
venue like CIS will never become a “white elephant” as long as the Olympic Gold Medal
Strategy exists in China and remains as the top priority of Chinese national sport. But,
what if it is changed some day in the future? Wang expressed concern about a possible
policy change. If it does change, there will be no financial support from GASC. If the
Center is no longer responsible for the national teams, it will need considerable structural
adjustments. 353 If that happens, it will be a big transition, not only for organizations like
the Center, but also for national teams.

3-4. National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC)
Together with the Olympic Park, the Olympic Forest Park, and the Olympic
Village in the Olympic Central Area of Beijing, the National Olympic Sport Center
351
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(NOSC) became a significant venue complex. It is located at the south end of the Area.
Unlike the other Olympic venues in the Area that were owned and supervised by
municipal or district governments, NOSC had been owned and supervised by GASC
since its establishment in the 1980s. As one of the main competition sites built for the
1990 Beijing Asian Games, NOSC consisted of seven sports facilities: the NOSC stadium,
the NOSC gymnasium, the Ying Tung natatorium, the hockey field, the tennis courts, and
two multifunction training arenas, of which the first three listed above were used as
Olympic competition venues during the 2008 Beijing Games. For upgrading these three
sport facilities to meet the Olympic demands, renovating the auxiliary facilities adjacent,
and beautifying the perimeter environment, CNY 1.3 billion (USD 0.2 billion) from the
national treasury was invested. 354 During the Games, three events of the modern
pentathlon (event jumping, cross-country running and swimming), handball, and water
polo competition events were held in NOSC. 355
NOSC is one of the largest training bases in Beijing for Chinese national teams.
Eleven national teams have been training in NOSC for judo, wrestling, boxing, hockey,
soccer, tennis, softball, race walking and handball. 356 Ensuring national teams training as
a precondition and priority, NOSC also opens its sport facilities to the public with fees
applied. Currently NOSC has been operating sports clubs for swimming, taekwondo,
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fitness, and badminton. 357 Basically, NOSC’s sport facilities were restored to their
respective original functions after the Games. 358 The three Olympic venues in NOSC
have not been used by any national teams since 2008, but served the public or have been
utilized for assembly events. The manager or supervisor of each venue provided the
researcher with information about the venues.

3-4-1. NOSC Stadium
Weiguo Zhao, the supervisor of the NOSC Stadium and the general manager of
the Beijing Olympic Economy and Technology Corp, shared venue information with the
researcher. The Stadium was originally completed in April 1990 as the main competition
stadium for the Beijing Asian Games. 359 Originally, there were 18,000 seats in the
Stadium, while the number increased to 36,000 after upgrading in 2007 for the Olympic
Games. 360 As an auxiliary facility, a warm-up track was also built adjacent to the Stadium
at the time; it was transformed to a golf practice field after the Asian Games. Also, the
function rooms under the spectator stands such as the anti-doping center, the VIP rooms,
officials and referees’ preparation rooms, have been leased out for commercial purpose
since the 1990s. The Stadium became one of the training bases in Beijing for the national
track and field team. Since a GASC training base was NOSC’s main task during the
1990s, the Stadium had to be ready for the national teams whenever they appeared. When
they vacated, the Stadium could be rented to schools and companies nearby that did not
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have their own facility for holding sports meetings or other kinds of assembly events.
Furthermore, the Stadium also organized international and national track and field
competitions such as the University Games, the Chinese City Games, the National Games
and the Far East South Pacific Games for Disabled (FESPIC Games). 361 The Stadium had
even become the home field for a Chinese professional soccer team since 2002; but two
years later the team left because of its bad performance and a record of few loyal fans in
the city. 362 All the activities in the Center ceased in 2006 to make way for the NOSC’s
Olympic upgrading projects. The projects included upgrading and reconstructing the old
sport facilities and a newly-built athletes’ accommodation center for future national teams,
consisting of a hotel, catering halls, fitness centers, and an anti-doping testing center. All
the money invested in the projects came from the national treasury and GASC. 363
In terms of NOSC’s current financial condition and support from GASC, Zhao
stated that NOSC was an organization with a balanced allocation from GASC. This
meant that GASC only provided NOSC with partial financial aid for its daily operation.
All the facilities in NOSC followed this rule. Under this condition, the sport venues in the
Center such as the Stadium, the Natatorium, and the Gymnasium had to develop their
own business generating revenue to secure their regular operation. With the opportunity
for Olympic upgrading, the Stadium had more physical space under the spectator stands
that could be exploited for commercial leasing. Those rooms for-lease had nothing to do
with national teams training in the Stadium, which meant that the leasing business could
not be influenced by the training schedules of the Stadium. In terms of the operation cost
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and the depreciation of fixed assets of the Stadium, Zhao stated that budget management
was applied instead of target management or indicator management. At the end of each
year, the Stadium needed to submit a budget plan for its estimated revenue and operation
cost for the subsequent year. Based on the plan, GASC would fund the revenue and
expense budget for the next year in the Stadium. For the revenue part, the Stadium would
try its best to meet its target. For the expense part, it would have to keep its operation
costs beneath budget. Due to the financial crisis occurring at the end of 2008, and the
unstable Consumer Price Index (CPI) since then, the Stadium faced difficulties in
attempting to stay on budget. In general, though, the Stadium has met its budget goals
over the last three and a half years. 364
To operate the Stadium more easily and make it more accessible to the market,
NOSC registered a company, the Beijing Olympic Economy and Technology Corp, of
which Zhao was the general manager. The Company managed the Stadium, especially the
business operation linked to the commercial market. The Company, fully supervised by
NOSC, attended to consultancy, venue construction, and management matters. In addition,
an important function of the Company was to operate the Stadium more like a
corporation rather than a governmental department under the bureaucratic supervision of
GASC. Experts associated with the Stadium could deliver their two-decade experience on
venue management to other venues. This was one of the value-added businesses of the
Company. In addition, the Company organized commercial events in the Stadium, leased
commercial space under the spectator stands, and rented the main field to organizations,
companies, or institutions for their events. However, there were conflicts between the
Company and NOSC regarding certain marketing activities, because both sides
364
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considered them differently in terms of philosophy. After all, the Stadium was titled with
the term “national,” which would always be an issue regarding image. Then, too, the
Company was owned by NOSC. Compromises were always made in favor of NOSC. As
a result, the bottom line was that the Company could only carry out what NOSC allowed.
Despite the conflicts, according to Zhao, NOSC and GASC attempted to reform the
administration mode and operation mechanism of its systems, which, perhaps imperfect
for the present, was still a significant step in reform. 365
Speaking of the impact of the Olympic Games on the Stadium, Zhao stated that in
addition to the visible upgrades around the Stadium, intangible influences should not be
ignored. The most valuable attributes the Olympic Games left to the Stadium, according
to Zhao, were the management experiences the employees obtained through the Games,
the regulations and the standardized management methods they learned from on-site
Olympic venue experts, and advanced concepts regarding sport facility operation. Those
were invaluable Olympic legacies for the Stadium as well as NOSC. Employee
qualifications for positions in the venue improved significantly after the Games,
translating into higher quality client service, venue maintenance, and project management.
This further translated into more business opportunities for the Stadium. However, in
terms of the direct Olympic impact on the venue’s business, Zhao admitted that it was
slight. Potential clients would not engage the Stadium to hold their sports meetings or
commercial events merely because this was an Olympic venue. When making a decision
to rent, rates, proximity, accessibility, scale and function, loyal corporation relationship,
and venue history, were factors considered by clients more than simply Olympic
reputation. In contrast, the Company’s consultancy business was influenced by Olympic
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reputation, which was positive in developing potential clients who would put more trust
in a venue management consultant with demonstrated Olympic venue management
experience. 366
In terms of future development, Zhao stated that a flexible rent rate policy was a
strength of the Stadium. Although there were 36,000 seats in the Stadium, the Company
had staged sports meetings with attendees ranging between 800 and 10,000. Rental rates
depended on the size of the event. For instance, for a sports meeting with 2,000
individuals, the rent for the Stadium was CNY 40,000 to 50,000 (USD 6154 to 7692). In
contrast, for an event in the Bird’s Nest with 50,000 individuals, the rent could reach
more than CNY 1 million (USD 0.15 million). Therefore, the NOSC Stadium appealed to
client groups originally contemplating the Bird’s Nest. Meanwhile, to reduce cost, the
Stadium did not plan any renovations and upgrade work for several years. The Olympic
upgrades before the Games resulted in a solid basis for the Stadium. 367
The potential threat to future development of the venue still lay in the
administrative structure of GASC. The management mode of the Stadium cannot be
changed as long as its supervision department remained in the original administrative
mode, which constrained future development of the venue. But Zhao also pointed out that
applying a commercialized operation mode might be a highly possible trend dictated by
intensified competition in the market. After the Olympic Games, the number of large
scale sport venues increased, especially around both the Olympic Central Area and the
University Area in the city. As a result, competition among such venues accelerated.
Potential clients of these venues also increased with Beijing’s economy booming and
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expansion of the culture industry initiated by the government. This intensified
competition in the market place after the Games. To dominate the market and keep
sustainable development of the venues, NOSC had to transform its administrative system
towards a marketing-oriented mode, including allocation systems, decision making
mechanisms and incentive systems. Making this move was the only way to keep NOSC’s
sport venues in tune with competitive developments in the city. 368 However, according to
Bo Chu, the supervisor of NOSC, the Center would remain the major training base for
Chinese national teams to prepare for the London Games and Olympic Games in the
future. This remains the top priority for NOSC’s future development. 369 Based on this
statement, it seems that the conflict between NOSC’s political stance, and the Stadium’s
necessary marketing initiative, will continue to exist in the future.

3-4-2. NOSC Gymnasium
The NOSC Gymnasium, originally built for the 1990 Asian Games, was upgraded
and renovated for the 2008 Olympic Games, together with the Stadium and the
Natatorium in NOSC. Because it was a relatively old building, almost everything relating
to the venue was upgraded in 2007 except its main structure. 370 The expansion
construction projects included interior decoration of the entire venue, updating all
equipment, warm-up court construction, and grandstand seat installation. 371 After the
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upgrade, the Gymnasium could seat 6,400 spectators for handball competitions and Wu
Shu (Chinese Martial Arts) demonstration events during the 2008 Olympic Games. The
Gymnasium also served as a training site during the Paralympics. 372 The Gymnasium was
restored to its original functions after the Games, that is, opening the warm-up court to
the public as a recreation site, leasing rooms for commercial purposes, and holding
various assembly events in the main competition hall.
Weidong Li, the supervisor of the Gymnasium, provided the researcher with
information on the venue. In terms of financial aid, since 1990, the Gymnasium had
gradually changed from being fully supported by GASC to being only partially funded.
This meant that the venue needed to generate revenue on its own. As a result, the
Gymnasium has been earning revenue for NOSC since the 1990s. The revenue demands
of NOSC have increased over the last two decades. In the middle of the 1990s, for
instance, the revenue the Gymnasium turned over to NOSC was less than CNY 1 million
(USD 0.15 million). In 2011, the revenue target NOSC set for the Gymnasium was CNY
14 million (USD 2.15 million). This figure was CNY 3 million (USD 0.46 million) higher
than the revenue the Gymnasium actually earned in 2010. Also in 2011, the expense
budget for the Gymnasium was CNY 5.52 million (USD 0.85 million), a large proportion
of which was energy cost, daily maintenance, and human resources expense. It did not
include major equipment repair or update. Any one-time maintenance or purchase
expense of more than CNY 50,000 (USD 7,962) must be reported to the Center, which
would then be reported to GASC. GASC then paid the bill. Thus, the profit of the venue
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for the year could reach CNY 8.5 million (USD 1.3 million) in 2011. Of the revenue, one
half came from the venue’s commercial space leasing, while the other half came from
renting the main hall and the warm-up court for public recreation purposes, performance
shows, and commercial events. 373
The Gymnasium’s 2,800-square-meter main court with its 6,400 seats was one of
the two major sources for generating revenue. Since the Gymnasium was one of the two
venues in NOSC (the other one being the Ying Tung Natatorium) that was not used as a
national team training site, the venue could be opened to the public on a daily basis. The
Gymnasium was the first public badminton ground opened in Beijing. The average
annual use of the badminton courts reached 100,000 individuals. After the Games, the
wood flooring was upgraded and the interior decoration was updated. This attracted more
users to the venue. However, given such factors as proximity, rental rate, and an
increasing number of competitor venues, revenue from this type of business was largely
static for each year. The venue also operated a badminton club and organized badminton
competitions every year. Although enlisting a few sponsors with relatively small amount
of revenue return, according to Li, hosting such competitions was not for generating
revenue per se, but rather for providing badminton enthusiasts with opportunities to meet
each other and improve skills. The club had professional coaches who paid fees to the
venue in order to be permitted to teach in the club. The venue was responsible for
advertising for the coaches. The Gymnasium had not organized large scale competitions
for years. Original organizing costs were quite high; few spectators were attracted. It was
a trend in China that many national level sport competitions not be held in Beijing
because of complicated censor and sanction procedures. Smaller cities offered relatively
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better support. And, there were other venues in Beijing, especially after the Games, where
conditions such as lighting, quality of flooring, and auxiliary facilities, were more
suitable for badminton matches than the NOSC Gymnasium. These factors relegated it to
second choice for holding high level, large scale competitions. 374
The other major way the Gymnasium generated revenue was to rent the main
court for performance shows and commercial events. At times, the frequency of events
could reach five times in one month. The events included pop concerts, ceremonies, and
anniversary celebrations. The size of the venue dictated the target group in the market.
Venues like CIS and NIS that contained around 18,000 seats were not particular
competitors of the NOSC Gymnasium. According to Li, the Gymnasium focused on the
events having around 4,000 attendees. Thus, the Gymnasium’ major competitor venues in
Beijing were those located on university campuses. The good news was that university
venues usually did not hold commercial events and performance shows, thus eliminating
NOSC Gymnasium competitors. Obviously, this positioning made the NOSC
Gymnasium accrue a relatively good market share regarding show business in the city.
However, Li also mentioned that there was a strong potential competitor, the Workers’
Gymnasium, which had changed its name to the “Workers’ Stadium Theater” and reduced
its capacity to 3,000 seats. 375 By adding the term “theater” in its title, it significantly
reduced organizing cost, which would certainly impact on the NOSC Gymnasium in the
market. 376
In terms of other business the venue carried out, Li mentioned that several years
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ago, the Gymnasium was rented to a TV station for filming some of their programs.
However, since the TV station built its own programming hall, the business completely
disappeared. The venue also attempted but failed to develop venue sponsors. The
exposure rate of the venue was relatively low and the investment return was uncertain.
According to Li, the badminton players per year reached a total of 100,000; and the total
attendees for commercial events per year reached 120,000. Obviously, the grand total of
220,000 could not satisfy potential sponsors who eventually were unconvinced to invest
money in the venue. After the Games the NOSC Gymnasium attempted to sell the
naming rights but this initiative was terminated by the global financial crisis in 2009.
Recently, according to Li, the Center once again approached the naming rights issue. Li
admitted that it was a difficult issue. The price looked awkward. According to Li, CNY 4
to 5 million (USD 0.62 to 0.77 million) per year was the lowest figure the Center would
accept, which, however, was always considered too high by potential buyers. Moreover,
the deal only involved the naming rights sale. Management and operation rights to the
venue would not be part of the deal. 377
After the Games, according to Li, no Olympic impact remained on the venue’s
regular operation and management, except for updated equipment and new furniture left
behind, which might indirectly increase the leasing rate for the commercial space under
the spectator stands. Li also mentioned that the Olympic Games did not bring any new or
potential opportunities to the venue. When choosing their event location, potential clients
would consider more realistic factors than “Olympic mystique,” such as traffic conditions,
parking, and capacity. Though NOSC had a long tradition regarding the Olympics since
the 1990s, according to Li, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games did not enhance the image
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of the venue. In other words, the reputation of the NOSC Gymnasium had nothing to do
with the 2008 Olympic Games. As the supervisor of the venue, Li paid more attention to
develop the facility’s business network in the market and to improve the venue’s quality
of service to attract clients. He cared little about the Olympic image of the venue. 378
As in the case of the NOSC Stadium, Li pointed out that the conflict between
NOSC/GASC’s administrative systems and the marketing-oriented management mode of
the venue would be a threat for the venue’s future development. For instance, according
to Li, if NOSC set the revenue goal for the Gymnasium, then it should allow the venue to
achieve the goal by any means as long as the activities were legal. But this was not the
case. The Center limited venue behavior and controlled decision making in terms of
financial matters, employment policy, and incentive mechanisms for employees. However,
Li admitted that the situation also had a positive side for operating the venue. For
instance, being a non-profit organization, certain tax exemption policies for the venue
were in place, which significantly reduced operation costs for the venue. In addition,
GASC was responsible for any major equipment purchase and maintenance. Li concluded
that the current administrative system was a two-edged sword: the Center could retard the
venue’s development and it could also protect the venue from being trapped into any
awkward financial situations.

3-4-3. Ying Tung Natatorium
The Ying Tung Natatorium (YTN) was originally built in 1990 from a donation by
the Hong Kong entrepreneur, Ying Tung Huo. YTN was named after him. In 2007,
selected as a competition venue for the Olympic Games, YTN was upgraded and
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renovated. During the Games, the venue was used for water polo and the modern
pentathlon (swimming) competitions. After the Games, YTN was restored to its functions
before the Games, serving as a public swimming center and providing commercial space.
Jian Yue, the supervisor of the Natatorium, and his deputy, Chen, greeted the
researcher and jointly shared information regarding the venue. Following the 1990
Beijing Asian Games, YTN was opened for visitors with an entrance admission of CNY
2. 379 However, in one and a half years the number of visitors dramatically declined. Thus,
NOSC decided to open YTN as a public swimming center. It was soon realized that the
operation cost was too high to be borne solely by NOSC. NOSC simply could not afford
such huge expense. It was opened only during the summer; otherwise few swimmers
came due to weather conditions. Further, its high admission rate deterred many.
Especially in the winter time, there were almost no swimmers in the pool. NOSC,
however, had to pay the same operation cost to maintain the regular condition of the
venue. According to Chen, between 1992 and 1994, the underuse situation led to
operation costs much greater than the revenue YTN could generate. In addition, due to
lack of a post-Games plan for the venue in the 1980s to meet the demand for post-Games
regular use, NOSC would have had to reconstruct the venue. However, neither GASC nor
NOSC could afford the investment for a re-build project. 380
Given this state of affairs, NOSC decided to grant YTN management and
operation rights to the Beijing New Auto Group for 12.5 years, starting in June 1994. The
New Auto Group invested a total of CNY 21 million (USD 3.23 million) in YTN,
including re-construction, exploring new business ventures inside the venue, and
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implementing its own marketing promotion. Based on the agreement signed between the
New Auto Group and NOSC, for the first year the New Auto Group paid NOSC CNY 1.5
million (USD 0.23 million), and for the next 11 years, the payment increased 10% every
year. 381 Basically, NOSC did not interfere with the management and the operation of
YTN, being satisfied with the New Auto Group’s contracted payment every year. As a
condition in the agreement, 15 days each year were set aside for NOSC’s free use of YTN
to organize international/national swimming competitions. Since YTN was operated
independently from NOSC, the salary of YTN’s employees was different from those who
worked in other venues controlled by NOSC. Over the first two years, the average salary
level in YTN was higher. But gradually the other venues’ salary levels exceeded YTN’s.
This led to complaints from YTN’s employees, who felt they should be treated at the
same level as others. NOSC attempted to negotiate with the New Auto Group on the issue,
however, the latter resisted increasing salary levels in order to minimize its costs. Thus,
NOSC had to offer extra salary to balance the difference between the two groups of
employees. Despite the controversies in NOSC, as well as GASC, regarding management
and operation rights granted to a private company, the cooperation between both parties
functioned well until 2005. The agreement terminated in 2005 because YTN was selected
to be an Olympic competition venue for the 2008 Games. The Olympic Games in China
were always considered a national mission that had top priority. As a result, the New
Auto Group had to vacate the venue as well as its ongoing business before the contract
was completed. 382
In terms of the cooperation between the New Auto Group and NOSC, Yue stated
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that advantages outweighed disadvantages. Through their cooperation, NOSC learned
practical management experiences from the New Auto Group, gained revenue from the
venue, and developed a number of prospective venue management experts for future
operation of YTN after the 2008 Olympic Games. Thus, at the very beginning of
renovation planning for the Olympics, NOSC, based on the experience derived from its
previous operation, focused on post-Games utilization. With post-Games operation a
priority, the expansion plan for YTN focused on increasing functional space for future
commercial business purposes. The sport facility areas such as the pool and auxiliary
space needed little work to redesign. 383 For instance, if a catering area was planned for
future use, then the design would be function-oriented for catering-suitable purposes.384
As early as 2007 a hotel management company contacted NOSC in an effort to
lease part of the commercial space in YTN to operate its own business. An “agreement of
intent” for cooperation was signed by both sides before the Olympic Games. Right after
the Games, both sides signed a formal contract. The Company would be responsible for
the re-construction of the swimming pool as well as auxiliary facilities and, of course, the
construction of its own hotel inside the venue. As a result, the YTN swimming center was
re-opened in May 2009. Later, in July 2010, Beijing No.1 International Mansion was
opened inside the venue. The business of “Beijing No.1” included a classic restaurant, a
high-end pub, and entertainment shows. As to the rental payment, the Company has paid
more than CNY 7 million (1.1 million) per year to NOSC since 2010. According to Yue,
the yearly revenue goal NOSC set for YTN for 2011 was CNY 18.5 million (USD 2.85
million), while the yearly expense budget was around CNY 11 million (USD 1.7 million).
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As a result, YTN had to turn in around CNY 7.5 million (USD 1.15) as the venue’s
surplus to NOSC at the end of 2011. Like the Stadium and the Gymnasium, YTN’s major
equipment updates and maintenance costs were not included in the expense budget. For
instance, its water cycling system needed inspection and overhaul every other year, which
could cost up to CNY 2 million (USD 0.31 million). This was provided by GASC’s
special support funds. 385
YTN’s projected revenue aimed at CNY 18.5 million (USD 2.85 million),
annually CNY 7 million (USD 1.1 million) from “Beijing No.1,” and CNY 11.5 million
(USD 1.77 million) from other business in the venue. Since Beijing No.1 occupied more
than half of the commercial space in the venue, there was little reserved space left for
exploiting other business ventures. Yue planned to add some new sports such as billiards
and Ping Pong within the limited space. YTN also leases rooms for other business, such
as swimming clubs, clothing stores, and aquatic performance shows. It rents the pool for
small-to-medium scale swimming competitions. The major part of the revenue source
remained the swimming pool for public use on a daily basis, which would generate fixed
revenue of about CNY 10 million (USD 1.54 million) per year. Therefore, according to
Yue, basically, YTN has accomplished its revenue goal for each year after the Olympic
Games. 386
Similar to the supervisors of the other two Olympic venues in NOSC, Yue stated
that the Olympic impact on YTN’s post-Games operation was minor. The Olympic
Games in China might influence people’s concepts regarding a positive correlation
between healthy life style and sports participation, which correspondingly might make
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more people participate in physical activity on a daily basis, but there was no solid
statistical data that could prove a direct cause and effect correlation existed between the
Olympic Games and the condition of a venue’s sport-related business after the Games.
The fact was that YTN consistently emphasized the enhancement of the public service
quality of the venue in attracting potential clients. Moreover, in terms of YTN’s
marketing promotions and advertisements, the Olympic image was seldom used as a
selling point to enhance the venue’s brand. Thus, there was no direct relationship between
YTN’s business and Olympic impact.
The employment policy of the Center, according to Yue, was a weakness that
could threaten the development of the venue. The conflict of employment policies
between government and corporations led to differences in salary and benefits allocation
for employees in the venue. This caused issues on incentive policy that the venue itself
could not solve without permission from superior authority. Another problematic issue for
future concern was the conflict between the venue’s sports competition events and other
functions. Specifically, it meant that the 6,000 seats around the venue occupied too much
space and incurred a significant amount of energy and maintenance cost on a daily basis.
As a venue without a mission for training national teams and staging major competitions,
the necessity of reserving such a large number of seats should be questioned. This issue
could not be solved by YTN itself. Despite all, speaking of future development of YTN,
Yue did not think that significant changes regarding the administrative system of NOSC
as well as GASC would occur in the near future. The system was quite complicated and
there would be too many departments and divisions involved throughout multi-layers of
government. And, this would not merely apply in sport-related fields. The conundrum is
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too big to be solved in the short term. Therefore, maintaining the current administrative
system and operation mode is more realistic and feasible for most of the GASC-owned
Olympic venues. 387

4. University-Owned Venues
There were six Olympic competition venues built on university campuses in
Beijing. They formed 20% of the total number of the competition venues for the Games.
Moreover, there were another nineteen training facilities for the Games located on
university campuses. Building Olympic venues on campus, according to an official of the
Ministry of Education, was a win-win strategy for Olympic host cities. On one hand, the
city and the OCOG saved a great amount of construction expense as well as costs
incurred for removal of local residents. On the other hand, after the Games, the venues on
campus could be fully utilized by both university students and local communities. 388
Thus, the Olympic Movement should be regarded as a support to education in China.
Also, the association between Olympic culture and campus culture in China was seen as
ideal. 389 The government had already been aware before the Games that locating sport
venues on campuses was a practical solution for facility post-Games use. However, Jian
Chen, the director of the Beijing Olympic Economy Research Association, stated that
Beijing’s Olympic venues built on campus, though valuable, were not numerous enough
to solve the issue of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues. 390
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Of the six competition venues, four were newly-built, respectively, at Peking
University, China Agriculture University, Beijing University of Science and Technology,
and Beijing University of Technology. According to BOCOG, the other two were
pre-existing facilities, which were located at Beihang University and Beijing Institute of
Technology. According to Shiwei Shao, an official of GASC, in general, Olympic venues
on campuses in Beijing were well used by both students and local communities after the
Games. 391 Based on the researcher’s investigation, different conditions existed among
those venues over the last three and a half years.

4-1. Peking University Gymnasium
The Peking University (PKU) Gymnasium, also known as the Khoo Teck Puat
Gymnasium, named after the banker, Khoo Teck Puat, the donor of a major amount of
money to build the venue, was located on the campus of Peking University. The
Gymnasium held the table tennis competitions during the Beijing Olympic Games. The
venue was owned by the University and directly supervised by the Department of Sport
and Physical Education in PKU. After the Games the venue was used as both a sport
facility and an assembly place on the campus for students and local communities. As a
table tennis venue, the Gymnasium contained a main competition hall with room for eight
competition tables; in addition, it included a natatorium underneath, which was renovated
after the Games and opened to students in March 2012. 392
Jie Li, the director of the Gymnasium, provided the researcher with information
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on the venue. Li had been in charge of the venue since the beginning of its construction
before the Games. 393 In September 2008, after the Games were concluded, the University
formally appointed Li as the supervisor of the temporary management team for
post-Games operation of the venue. 394 At the time, Li was associate professor and deputy
supervisor of the Department of Sport and Physical Education at PKU. According to Li,
the venue was not an independent unit in the University. Rather, it was under the
leadership of the Department of Sport and Physical Education. Li’s management team
was in charge of daily operation and maintenance as well as carrying out certain
renovation projects. The Department supervised the venue and had priority for utilization
of the venue. In general, then, the University, as the owner of the venue, had ultimate
rights of decision making with respect to the venue’s development. According to Li, the
University originally had a plan set for the venue as an independent unit, but it changed
in 2011. No reason was announced. 395 As to the Gymnasium’s administrative mode, Min
Wang, a physical education teacher in PKU, summarized that of the six Olympic venues
on university campuses in Beijing, only the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) and the
China Agriculture University (CAU), operated similar to PKU. 396
In terms of location of the venue and its construction before the Games, Li stated
that before 2008, PKU, as a top ranking university in China, had for years faced a lack of
large scale sport facilities on campus. When BOCOG announced that some Olympic
venues would be built on campuses in Beijing, PKU thought it would be a great
opportunity for the University to solve the sport facility issue. PKU immediately
393
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expressed a positive attitude towards BOCOG’s announcement. Originally, PKU applied
for a wrestling competition site. At the same time, CAU applied for and received the nod
for the Olympic table tennis competition facility. Later, considering that table tennis was
regarded as the national sport in China, and because it was much more popular than
wrestling, PKU attempted to negotiate with relevant governmental departments in order
to swap with CAU. Another reason for the idea of exchanging was that PKU operated a
professional table tennis club. Finally, PKU was approved to be the venue owner for the
Olympic table tennis competitions in 2008, while CAU became the owner of the Olympic
wrestling arena. 397
As to the investment, PKU originally attempted but failed to attract donations
from private enterprises. To obtain this, PKU initiated a marketing campaign attempting
to attract 10,000 enterprises with a price tag of CNY 10,000 (USD 1,540) each. It was
largely unsuccessful, but several million CNY was generated. 398 In November 2006, the
Khoo Teck Puat Foundation donated CNY 173.3 million (USD 26.7 million) to the
Peking University Education Foundation to support the University’s development. Of the
total amount of the donation, CNY 150 million (USD 23 million) was used for the
construction of the new Olympic Table Tennis venue. 399 One of the conditions for the
donation was that the new venue would be named the “Khoo Teck Puat Gymnasium.” 400
According to Li, the total investment in the venue was CNY 250 million (USD 38.5
million). In addition to CNY 150 million (USD 23 million) from the Khoo Teck Puat
Foundation, a portion of the balance came from a special fund of the Ministry of
397
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Education of China. The final amount needed came from a number of minor donations
and the “PKU Funds.” 401
After the Games, embracing more than 7,700 seats, the venue was mainly used as
a public gathering place for activities such as sports competitions, campus culture events,
organizations’ meetings, commercial events and political campaign gatherings. According
to Li, there were 70 individual activities held in the venue during the last three years
(2009-2011). 402 According to the official website of the venue, thirty-one major activities
were held in the venue between September 2008 and March 2011. 403 In 2009, the Law
School in PKU was expanded and renovated. The University decided that six
departments of the Law School were to move into the PKU Gymnasium as their
temporary office location. As a result, a number of function rooms under the spectator
stands were used as faculty offices for more than one year. According to Li, this change
influenced the utilization of the venue, especially for sport-related events. For instance,
during the “Law School” tenancy the venue could not host sports competitions during the
working hours. As a result, the main hall was merely opened to the public for playing
badminton. A user fee was applied. In addition, students could not use the venue for gym
classes, except for the Yoga classes. Li did not comment on this but pointed out that the
venue was supposed to meet the needs of physical education as well as the needs of
student athletes training on campus. 404
In terms of the venue’s operation costs incurred, basically the University covered
most of the expenses over the last three years. The University offered rooms in the venue
401

Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011.
Ibid.
403
Official Website of the Peking University Gymnasium, “Major Events Held in the Venue,”
http://www.pkugym.com/Events.aspx (accessed March 28, 2012).
404
Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011.
402

170

to other departments on campus, which led to the venue not being open regularly. Little
revenue was generated. Under such a situation, the University did not set a budget for the
venue during the last three years. The University paid for the expense balance. The venue
has not paid for the energy expense for three years. According to Li, every time the bill
arrived, the venue wrote a report to the University regarding the difficulties the venue
faced, such as it being used as faculty offices. It applied for an exemption from paying
the bill. Such applications have been approved. Li also pointed out that all venues on
campus used various ways for reducing operation expenses, such as turning off air
conditioning during summer time and minimally decreasing employees. 405
Quite simply, there was no direct correlation between expenses and revenues for
the PKU Gymnasium. The reason for this was due to the venue’s irregular operation after
the Games. According to Li, the University was not able to calculate the expense and
revenue on a regular basis, a basis that might guide the University towards setting a
budget or revenue goal for the venue. In addition, Li also stated that the University had
never anticipated revenue from the venue; it wanted the venue to serve the University and
its students. 406 No matter what the reasons, the fact is that for the last three years Li and
his management team have not paid much attention towards generating revenue or
reducing operation expense.
What the management team actually focused on was the expansion project for the
venue. It started in the summer of 2010 and was completed at the beginning of 2012. The
expansion and renovation project of the venue, according to Li, was the biggest one
among the six Olympic venues on university campuses following the Games. The project
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included the venue’s reconstruction for functional change and structural adjustment. After
the project was completed, eighteen new sports were added to the venue’s capacity, such
as swimming, squash, fencing, taekwondo, billiards, dancing, fitness, volleyball, and
basketball. The new swimming pool in the venue was reserved but not used until the
project was completed. PKU used to have a small pool (25 meters long) for years. The
new pool was built 50 meters long with 8 lanes. There were also multifunction
conference rooms and newly renovated offices for the Department of Sport and Physical
Education. After the renovation, there was a service area built, including an information
desk, a coffee shop, a convenience store and a rest area for guests. 407 In addition, a fitness
consultancy center was established in the venue - clients and members’ fitness and health
information could be collected and analyzed by relevant experts, followed up by
recommended solutions. 408
The finance for all these expansion projects, more than CNY 10 million (USD
1.54 million), was covered by the University. According to Li, the core task after the
expansion was to serve students, which was the University’s top priority for all sport
facilities on the campus. That was a fundamental reason why the University did not
require the venue’s management team to generate revenue. Although students paid for
using the venue, the rate level was exceedingly low, compared to the rate for the
University’s employees, which was medium, and the rate for the public, which was high.
For instance, the hourly rate for playing badminton was CNY 30-40 (USD 4.6 to 6.2) for
students; the regular rate was CNY 60 (USD 9.2). The rate policy, according to Li,
prioritized students regarding use of the venue. In addition, by applying this rate policy,
407
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the University could control the number of the clients, thereby providing more space and
time for students. Serving students and generating revenue might conflict with each other,
but based on the University’s principle, the venue would definitely regard serving
students as its priority in future development. Neither the venue’s management team nor
the Department of Sport and Physical Education had decision rights with respect to the
venue’s development direction. Adhering to the University’s policies and
decision-making was the only choice for the venue. For instance, according to Li, since
2011 the venue had seldom held large assembly events due to safety issues and PKU’s
sensitivity towards serving students, 409 even though renting space for such activities
might be a favorable way to generate revenue. Despite the compromising condition of the
venue in terms of decision-making, Li expressed confidence regarding the future of the
venue. The future will be guaranteed and predictable, because the University would fully
support the venue. As the venue is under the complete control and leadership of the
University, stability should be maintained for a relatively long period into the future. 410

4-2. China Agriculture University Gymnasium
The China Agriculture University (CAU) Gymnasium, where the wrestling
competition events were held for the 2008 Olympic Games, is located on the east campus
of CAU within the University Area. 411 As early as July 2002, CAU advocated that some
of Olympic venues should be built on university campuses for the Beijing Olympic
Games. Three months later, the Chinese Central Government chose six universities in
409
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Beijing to build Olympic venues on their campuses. CAU was one of those chosen. 412
The funding for the venue’s construction came from three entities: the national treasury,
the Ministry of Education of China, and the University itself.
Following the 2008 Olympic Games, the CAU Gymnasium hosted only one
international level sport competition, the Sportaccord Combat Games, in August 2010. 413
In terms of student physical education courses, based on the Schedule of Gym Classes for
Students in 2011 Spring Term, which was posted on the official website of the venue,
there were four courses held in function rooms inside the venue: table tennis, sport
dancing, aerobics and Yoga. 414 The rooms for education purposes were not open to the
public. Only students and gym teachers were allowed to enter for classes. 415 In addition,
to attend gym classes held in the venue, students had to show their student ID at the
entrance. 416 A badminton area opened in March 2009, located at the practice court beside
the main competition hall. CAU students and employees could play badminton by paying
fees. 417 In terms of the main hall in the venue, student culture and art events were held
there; also, with the University’s permission, it was rented to other organizations for
holding assembly events. After the Games, more than thirty large culture events were
staged in the venue. 418 Utilizing the former news press room and media center in the
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venue, vacant after the Games, the University opened a culture and art gallery in June
2009. The gallery has staged nineteen art exhibitions since then, including calligraphy,
painting, and crafts shows. Also, some famous artists were invited to deliver public
lectures to students and enthusiasts in the gallery. 419
Chengsong He, a staffer in the general office at the Gymnasium management
center in CAU, provided the researcher with relevant information on the venue. In terms
of its administrative mode, He stated that previously the venue was an independent unit
in the University, named the CAU Gymnasium Management Center, separate from the
Department of Sport and Physical Education. In June 2011, the supervisor of the Center
was appointed by the University to be the director of the Department of Sport and
Physical Education. As a result, both the Department and the Center were supervised by
the same person. Although the two units were not merged officially, the supervisor
effected smooth cooperation between the two. 420
The CAU Gymnasium was mainly funded and owned by the University. As early
as 2002, Zhangliang Chen, former president of CAU, first proposed the idea regarding
building Olympic venues on campuses, an idea that would insure that Olympic facilities
be well utilized after the Games. At the end of 2002, CAU was chosen as one of the
universities to build an Olympic venue on its campus. The total investment in the
construction was CNY 158 million (USD 24.3 million), of which CNY 20 million (USD
3.1 million) came from the national treasury as a special fund for China’s general
Olympic project. The rest of the money was generated by the University in the form of

http://tyg.cau.edu.cn/tyg_clt/news/99/8.html (accessed March 29, 2012).
419
Internal Circulated Document in CAU, “A Summary of the Public Introduction of the CAU
Gymnasium,” (March, 2011), p. 3.
420
Chengsong He, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011

175

education loans, charities, and donations from the University’s employees. For instance,
the University initiated a campaign on the campus encouraging staffers, faculty members,
students, and alumni to “donate a seat” for the new venue. According to He, CAU was
not as “rich” as certain universities, such as PKU; thus, CAU had to find its own means
to collect money for the venue. Consequently, under such a financial situation, the
internal decoration of the venue was not as “luxurious” as certain others, especially those
located in the Olympic Park. For instance, before the re-decoration of the venue in 2011,
the floor of the main court had been made of concrete (see the picture in Appendix Q)
and the entrance gates to the spectator stands were made of wood without elaboration. In
addition, a swimming pool was originally built beside the main competition hall.
However, due to a lack of funds, after the Games the pool was filled and some temporary
rooms were built in its place for non sport-related use.421
According to He, the University once embraced plans for post-Games utilization
of the venue. In addition to the swimming pool that was supposed to be renovated, an
indoor basketball court was to be transformed to an indoor track. In terms of the original
warm-up area, it was planned to establish a physiological and aerobic testing center for
students. Moreover, as the largest competition hall among all Olympic venues on
university campuses in Beijing, CAU planned to rebuild it in such a way as to be an
interchangeable gymnasium/skating rink for students. There were also plans for function
rooms around the main hall, and a fitness and weight lifting room. However, none of
theses plans have been carried out yet, three and a half years after the Games. According
to He, the lack of financial aid is the major reason for the situation. 422
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The Center did make some modifications regarding the functions of the venue. At
one time, there was a badminton playing area with seven badminton courts. These were
available to students and employees of the University. According to He, the Center
decided to change this area to a table tennis area and relocate the badminton area to the
main court of the venue. This required changing the flooring of the main court. The
flooring change was completed at the end of 2011. In terms of the function rooms, the
Center assigned them to various student groups, such as yoga groups, musical groups,
drawing groups, and poetry groups. Students could use these rooms for their activities for
free; but they had to apply in advance and wait until the Center’s approval. The Center
did not use function rooms where ventilation conditions were poor, because if the rooms
were used, then air conditioning had to be turned on, which increased energy expenses.
Thus, many activities and gym classes were usually held in the open space of the venue
such as the main court (before the flooring change) and areas along hallways. In addition
to serving students, the University also attempted to rent the newly renovated main court
to potential clients for generating revenue, a vital exercise in terms of financially raising
the venue itself. 423
The project of flooring change cost almost CNY 4 million (USD 0.62 million),
which was paid by the University. Because during the 2008 Games the CAU Gymnasium
was the site for the wrestling competitions, a special cushioned floor was needed. At the
time, to minimize the construction cost, the University simply used original concrete
flooring instead of wood covered by carpet, over which the cushioned floor surface was
placed. However, for the flooring change three and a half years after the Games, the work
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was complicated because first the concrete flooring had to be completely removed from
the venue and then the entire main court area had to be waterproofed before new flooring
was installed. According to He, the University paid the bill for this construction expecting
to recoup its investment by utilizing the facility to generate revenue. It is highly possible
that the newly renovated main court will not be opened to students for physical education
purposes in the future; instead, it might be opened to the public for recreation activities
with a fee applied, such as badminton, basketball and indoor soccer, or rented to
commercial clients for holding large assembly events. 424
The Center did not have a revenue goal set by the University, which was the same
circumstance as the PKU Gymnasium. There was no direct correlation between the
revenue the Center made and the costs incurred. However, the Center, as an independent
unit in the University, had to find its own way to generate revenue and at the same time to
minimize expenses. In terms of revenue, the major portion came from renting the main
court for large events, such as culture events of the Ministry of Agriculture of China and
celebration events of other organizations. In general, the rental fee was around CNY
80,000 (USD 12,308) per day; some large events would take several days. The frequency
of events in the venue is hard to determine, because it was quite irregular throughout a
year’s period. No matter how much the Center earned, all the revenue was returned to the
University. The University would then allocate a certain amount of money on a yearly
basis to the Center to compensate for the venue’s expenses. According to He, the
University’s allocation never fully covered all the costs incurred in the Center. The
University had certain policies, such as partial exemption of energy costs for the Center,
which helped offset the deficit. According to He, the main court usually utilized natural
424
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light rather than electric lights. Moreover, the venue’s sunroof was usually closed to
reduce dust penetrating from outside. Otherwise, cleaning up the entire main hall would
be too huge to be completed by the five cleaning workers in the Center. 425
In terms of other activities staged in the venue, none generated revenue for the
Center. The Center provided the students and staffers in the University with function
rooms for free. In addition, a culture and art gallery was established in 2009. This is open
to the public for free. The University was reluctant to make the gallery too
commercialized; thus, the activities held in the gallery are not revenue involved; namely,
organizers do not need to pay for holding events there. Neither do visitors pay to see
exhibitions in the gallery. There is no employee in the Center specifically responsible for
market exploitation of the gallery. There is no demand from the University regarding the
development of the gallery. 426
As to future development, the Center will try to maximize its revenue so that it
can fund itself without the University’s financial support. In addition, potentially, major
maintenance will be needed next year, five years after the 2008 Games. This will be
difficult to be fully covered by its own revenue if the current operation status
continues. 427 However, the ultimate decision for the future of the venue in terms of its
management mechanism and operational mode will be made by the University. As long
as the University does not take a step towards changing, the venue will be forced to
maintain the current condition. It will be virtually impossible to make any significant
progress in this area by its own efforts.
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4-3. Beijing Institute of Technology Gymnasium
The Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) Gymnasium was used as a competition
site for the 2008 Olympic volleyball events and the goalball competitions of the Summer
Paralympics. 428 The venue, originally named the BIT Sport and Culture Center, broke
ground in September 2003 and was completed in September 2006. 429 In 2005, BOCOG
queried BIT whether its newly-built venue could be utilized as an Olympic competition
site. BIT responded positively. 430 In April 2007, the reconstruction of the venue
specifically for the Olympics began. A temporary indoor warm-up arena was also built
directly beside the venue. 431 Although the BIT Gymnasium was not originally planned
for the Olympics, before the venue had been completed, it had already been approved as
one of the Olympic venues in the City. Moreover, after completion of the original
construction in 2006, the venue was unused by the University before the Olympic
reconstruction started in April 2007. Thus, the BIT Gymnasium actually might be
considered a newly-built Olympic venue, in spite of the original motive for building the
sport facility on campus. Vice president Xianrui Zhao of BIT stated in 2007 that, after the
Games, the Gymnasium would be the University’s main sports, cultural, and assembly
center. 432 According to Zhao, the venue would be used for the University’s daily physical
education courses. In addition, cultural and art activities and other assembly events of the
University would be held there. 433
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the history of the venue, since BIT had not owned a
multifunctional sports facility on campus for years, the University decided to build a
large scale gymnasium at the beginning of the new century. At the time the 2008 Olympic
Games had not yet been awarded to Beijing. The funding for the venue was completely
from the University rather than the national treasury, the Ministry of Education of China,
or BOCOG. When learning that some Olympic venues would be built on university
campuses, BIT considered that a title such as “Olympic venue” was a kind of intangible
capital, one that might enhance the image of the new gymnasium as well as the
University. However, the University missed the deadline for requesting financial support
from the government for Olympic construction projects. 434
In addition to funding the venue’s original construction, completed in 2006, the
University also paid most of the costs for Olympic-related reconstruction to the venue in
2007. At the time, according to BOCOG’s demand, a temporary warm-up arena needed to
be built beside the main venue. Moreover, some function rooms in the venue were built
specifically for the Games. Within the venue, part of structure was reconstructed and
certain equipment and faculties were added such as special elevators, barrier-free
entrances, and special corridors to meet the needs of the Paralympics. Although the venue
was completed two years before 2008, it was never used by students before the Games. In
October 2008, one month after the Games concluded, the venue was opened to students
for the first time. For the Olympic Games, according to Han, the venue was new, which
was part of the reason that the BIT Gymnasium was later selected as one of the “Best
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Olympic Venues.” In terms of the reconstruction expense, according to Han, BOCOG
promised to partially pay for it. However, after the Games, when the two parties
addressed the payment matter, BOCOG offered the University a quantity of furniture and
a small amount of money. Compared to the reconstruction expense the University paid,
the amount of money that BOCOG offered was too small to even matter. At least,
according to Han, the University fully owned the venue, which was definitely considered
an Olympic legacy for the University. 435
The University authorized the Department of Physical Education and Sport to
supervise the venue, a practice present at other institutions with regard to Olympic sport
venues built on campuses. That the Physical Education Department managed the venue
ensured that serving students would be the priority of the venue’s functions. Using the
venue as a means to generate revenue for the University was a lower priority. Han
pointed out that certain universities regarded their sport venues as places where the major
mission was to generate revenue. This was definitely not the case for BIT. University
sport facilities were supposed to serve students for physical education courses and student
athlete training; other purposes were secondary. To achieve such a fundamental goal,
university sports facilities must be supervised internally, namely, by a department of
physical education. According to Han, the University did not expect the venue to generate
revenue, but did expect that its primary service was to students. 436
Han further explained in detail how this fundamental principle was applied to
venue’s routine operation. The top priority was student physical education classes and
student athlete training. For most of the morning, the venue was only open for student
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physical education classes; from 3:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon during weekdays, the
facilities in the venue, such as the weight lifting room and the main court, are available to
intercollegiate teams, such as basketball, volleyball, martial arts, and track and field. The
second priority is to serve the University, meaning that the University and various
faculties might use the venue to hold large assemblies, such as convocation, campus job
fairs, culture events, and anniversary celebrations. There are 4,500 permanent seats and
1,000 retractable seats in the venue, making it entirely suitable for large scale gathering
events on campus. The last priority was to open the main court to the public for playing
badminton, table tennis, and basketball. The users could be students, university
employees, and local residents, all of whom paid different use-rates. In terms of the rate,
if the badminton courts were available in the morning of weekdays (most of time they
were occupied for physical education classes), the rate was CNY 10 (USD 1.5) for each
court per hour; for the evening time (6:00 pm to 10:00 pm), the rate was CNY 40 (USD
6.2) for wood flooring courts and CNY 50 (USD 7.7) for the anti-slip PVC flooring
courts. The venue did not reserve the courts in advance, because university events had
higher priority. Whenever large gathering events were held, all activities in the venue
ceased because of the safety issue. 437 In addition, the BIT men’s soccer team was one of
the thirteen professional soccer teams in the A Soccer League of China. 438 Its home field
was adjacent to the BIT Gymnasium. The visiting team accommodation area was located
in the Gymnasium. Thus, whenever the BIT soccer team played at home, based on the
Beijing PSB rule, the venue must be vacated. As a result, every year, there would be
some fifteen days in which the venue was closed during the soccer season, but,
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fortunately, most of them were Saturdays. Although it was called a professional soccer
league, the games were free for spectators. 439
In terms of the venue’s operation cost, it consisted of expenses for energy (not
including heating costs in winter, which comprised the major part of the energy cost and
was paid by the University), maintenance, human resources, and equipment update. Any
incurred cost that exceeded CNY 100,000 (USD 15,400) needed application for special
funds from the University. According to Han, unlike other universities where the venues
sought to maximize revenue, the BIT Gymnasium focused squarely on minimizing
expenses in an attempt to balance its financial condition. The annual revenue of the BIT
Gymnasium, in general, was CNY 1.2 million (USD 0.18 million), while its annual
expense figure was around CNY 0.6 million (USD 0.09 million). The profit went into a
special fund for major maintenance and the venue’s possible expansion in the future. The
venue used various strategies to reduce cost on a daily basis. In terms of employees, the
venue has less than 20 staffers; most of them perform multiple duties. In contrast, there
are more than 70 staffers in the PKU Gymnasium. As to energy, there is a difference of
electricity rate for commercial-purpose use (CNY 1.8 (USD 0.28) per unit) and
educational-purpose use (CNY 1.5 (USD 0.23) per unit); the venue paid its electricity
bills under the rate for educational-purpose use, even though the business of the venue is
not totally for educational-purposes. In addition, the venue turns off its lights whenever
there is no formal game scheduled. Natural light is used as much as possible. Air
conditioning is usually turned off because it cost more than CNY 5,000 (USD 770) per
hour. That is considered too much for the venue. In terms of the profit the venue gained
each year, the University gives part of it back to the venue for its operational fund. This
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amount, of course, depended on how much the venue earns.440
Since 2009, during winter and summer breaks, the venue does not hold any
commercial events. In 2009, the venue rented the main hall to a company to hold its own
commercial event over several days. The event organizers had not gained the necessary
approval to hold the event. The supervisor of the venue was criticized by the University,
even though the University received CNY 278,000 (USD 42,769) from the business.
After that, the venue was not rented out for any commercial events because of potentially
high risks regarding legal and safety issues. Moreover, according to Han, the University
has not demanded that the venue “pursue business” since the Olympic Games
concluded. 441 The venue has held events during summer breaks, such as sport-related
summer camps and athletic training for middle school students. 442 By doing this, the
teachers in the department earned extra income, while the venue also generated revenue
for the University. 443
According to Han, in terms of future development, the venue will likely continue
to follow the University’s top priority - serving students. It is highly possible that the
current conditions will be maintained for a relatively long period, in terms of
administrative mode, business operation, and financial condition. Han also emphasized
that among Olympic venues in Beijing, there were various management modes and
visions, which could not be directly and simply judged by right or wrong for the time
being. It might be too soon to draw a conclusion regarding the post-Games utilization of
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Olympic venues three and a half years after the Games. 444

4-4. Beihang University Gymnasium
The Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics (BUAA) Gymnasium, also
known as the Beihang University Gymnasium, 445 a pre-existing sport venue, is located at
the south end of the BUAA campus. It was originally built in 2001 for the World
University Games in Beijing. In 2007 it was reconstructed and expanded for the
Olympics. 446 Half of the reconstruction investment came from BUAA, while the other
half came from the national treasury. 447 During the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the
BUAA Gymnasium hosted the Olympic weightlifting competitions. The power lifting
competitions for the Paralympics were also held there. 448
The facility consisted of a main competition hall, a rest & catering area, a
swimming pool, and various function rooms. For the Olympics, a weightlifting
competition platform and a background wall were temporarily built in the main
competition hall. They were dismantled following the Games (see the pictures in
Appendix R). 449 The rest & catering area was built in 2007 for athletes, coaches, referees,
and officials during the Games. After the Games, the area was renovated to become a
badminton venue in which a badminton club, named the Yangyang Badminton Training
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Center, was located (see the picture in Appendix R). 450 In addition to serving its
registered members, the club was also opened to the public for playing badminton, with a
fee applied (CNY 50 (USD 7.7) per hour).The swimming pool, located beside the
Gymnasium, was used as a practice area during the Games and afterwards opened to the
public. Swimmers who utilize the pool buy tickets under a different rate schedule: CNY 8
(USD 1.2) per hour for BUAA’s students (with valid student ID) and CNY 30 (USD 4.6)
per hour for non-student users. Function rooms that were used during the Games are now
leased out for commercial purposes (see the picture in Appendix R). Of the lessees, the
major one thus far has been the Beihang Fitness Club; personal trainers teach sport
dancing, Yoga, and martial arts. 451
In terms of the venue’s educational function, a venue staffer informed the
researcher that physical education classes for students did not take place there. All such
classes used outdoor sport facilities and an older gymnasium on the campus. Upon
randomly asking students passing by the Gymnasium, the researcher received similar
responses, namely, the Olympic venue was not used for physical education purposes. The
venue was used as an assembly place for University gathering activities such as
convocation, job fairs, and culture events staged by student organizations. Whenever it is
available, the venue is open to the public as a badminton facility where students as well
as other users pay to play (see the pictures in Appendix R). 452
The University registered a company in 2009 called the Beijing Ao Ju Sport and
Culture Company. Its mission was to manage the Olympic facility. The Company was
controlled by the BUAA Holdings Co., Ltd., a University-owned assets management
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company under the full authority of BUAA. 453 Yonggang Qian, manager of the Company,
declined a request from the researcher for a personal interview. He consented to be
interviewed via telephone. According to Qian, the management principle of the venue
was to serve the University first and then, “modestly,” to open to the public to generate
revenue. Even hosting Olympic competition in 2008 did not influence the basic principle
of the management and operation of the venue.454
In terms of the financial condition of the venue, Qian stated that the venue’s
operation after the Games approximately balanced the financial condition of the
Company. Before the Company was established, all the revenue from the venue was
returned to the University, which in turn allocated money to the venue to support its
operation. This situation was similar to the administrative modes applied to the Olympic
venues located at PKU, BIT, and CAU. After the Company was formed, the venue was
operated under semi-independent management rights, which meant that, theoretically, the
venue could independently set its top priority as one generating revenue instead of
serving student physical education classes. The major commercial uses of the venue,
according to Qian, were the badminton courts, which generated stable revenue yearly. In
addition, the main competition hall was rented for staging various events such as pop
concerts, corporate celebrations and receptions, and other cultural activities with large
number of attendees. Considering the safety issue and atmosphere on campus, according
to Qian, the Company attempted to select events that were less commercialized in order
to maintain a positive image for the University. Moreover, the Company rented function
rooms in the venue to sport-related businesses such as the Beihang Fitness Center, or non
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sport-related entities, such as an English Language Training Center. 455
Although Qian consistently emphasized the venue’s independence from the
University, he also admitted that the profit the Company made would continue to be
returned to the University, while the University, in turn, would aid the Company if a
deficit was incurred during its operation. In other words, despite the Company being
registered to independently manage the venue with market mechanisms in mind, Qian
and his company were “hamstrung” by University rules; no decisions could be made
independently. After all, the Gymnasium was owned by the University. The owner
ruled. 456
In terms of profit, Qian stated that whether or not the venue showed a positive
balance on its financial sheet largely depended on how the expenses were calculated. For
instance, the BUAA Gymnasium showed a profit on its financial sheet because the
expenses calculated consisted of human resources, energy, logistics, and maintenance
costs, but excluded depreciation of fixed assets of the venue. Further, Qian stated that if
the depreciation of fixed assets were included in the cost calculations, every sport venue
in China would reflect a negative summation on their financial balance sheet records. As
to future development, Qian admitted that there was neither a plan nor a goal for the
Company’s further development. According to Qian, perhaps maintaining the current
condition might be the ideal way for the BUAA Gymnasium to function. 457
Of the six Olympic competition venues built on various campuses, the BUAA
Gymnasium was the only one that registered a company to manage its own venue.
Regarding this, other university Olympic venue supervisors shared various opinions. Qi
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Han, supervisor of the BIT Gymnasium, argued, in negative fashion, that students at
BUAA had to pay to utilize the Olympic venue on their own campus. So, too, did BUAA
itself. For instance, the University paid CNY 20,000 (USD 3,077) per game for its men’s
volleyball team to use the BUAA Gymnasium in competition with other teams in the
league. The good thing was that at least the University retained an older gymnasium so
that student physical education classes could be held there. 458
Jie Li, supervisor of the PKU Gymnasium, applauded what BUAA implemented
regarding its Olympic venue management. He stated that BUAA had the longest history
regarding operation of Olympic venues on campus among the six universities. It was the
first one to introduce a market mechanism into its venue management mode, which might
be the way for the other universities to proceed in the future. Furthermore, in terms of the
advantage of BUAA’s operation mode, Li suggested that it removed the University from
disputes with the venue’s business clients because the Company would deal with any
disputes and conflicts, in effect, acting as a buffer zone for the University. However, Li
also stated that it should take care when copying BUAA’s mode, because of
encroachment on the priority of serving students, a violation of the original purpose for
building Olympic venues on campuses. 459
Huadong Zou, supervisor of the Beijing University of Science and Technology
(USTB) Gymnasium, stated that a key point remained university ownership. Therefore,
management policy should be guided by the owner. The marketing of the BUAA
Gymnasium was done more effectively before the Olympic Games than after. By the time
of the Games, the venue’s yearly surplus had reached CNY 2 million (USD 0.31 million).
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However, after the Games, BUAA limited its activities and business because of safety
and campus atmosphere issues. In addition, some new university research buildings were
established directly adjacent to the venue complex, which influenced the ease of reaching
the venue. The two complexes were so close to each other that disturbances inevitably
occurred. This was part of the reason why the University decreased assembly activities
held in the Gymnasium. 460
Pu Wang, supervisor of the Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) Gymnasium,
pointed out that although the Company represented BUAA in the management of the
Gymnasium, the University ultimately was responsible if potential disputes or accidents
happened in the venue. After all, the venue belonged to the University; no matter who the
manager was, the owner was the ultimate responsible authority. 461 As Li stated, the
BUAA Gymnasium was a pioneer in the case of Olympic venues located on campuses.
Its operation and management mode has not as yet been seriously tested by any other
university. Therefore, current problems faced by BUAA might be faced by other
universities in the future. Then, too, the lessons experienced by BUAA should be needed
by other universities.

4-5. University of Science and Technology Beijing Gymnasium
The University of Science & Technology Beijing (USTB) Gymnasium was a
newly-built Olympic venue on the campus of USTB. It hosted Judo and Taekwondo
competitions during the 2008 Olympic Games. Wheelchair basketball and wheelchair
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rugby competitions were also held there during the Paralympics. 462 In October 2002,
USTB was selected as one of the four universities to build new gymnasiums on their
campuses for the Beijing Olympic Games. Throughout the design and construction of the
venue, its post-Games use was thoroughly considered by the University. For instance, the
venue was designed to have 4,000 permanent seats and 4,000 temporary seats for the
Games. After the Games, according to the design, seating would be reduced to 3,800
permanent seats and 1,200 temporary seats. The space occurring in place of the removed
seats was planned for tennis and basketball courts. 463 The venue was completed in 2007.
At that time all the space for post-Games use had been set. For instance, after the Games
the press room would transform to a dancing room; the news center would become a
catering center and an exhibition room; the athlete rest area would become a fitness
center; and the anti-doping testing center would become a sport clinic for student athletes.
In addition, the warm-up area was built over a swimming pool located beside the main
competition hall. The pool was restored after the Games. 464
Following the Games, the venue was mainly used for student physical education
courses. There were eight classes held simultaneously in various places within the venue:
swimming, badminton, table tennis, Yoga, sport dancing, aerobics, Judo, and
Taekwondo. 465 The venue also accommodated the University’s sports competitions and
various arts and cultural events organized by the student council or other student
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organizations. In addition to serving an educational purpose, the venue was also operated
for generating revenue. The swimming pool, badminton courts, table tennis courts, tennis
court, and basketball courts were all opened to students and the public with certain user
fees applied. 466 The venue also rented its main hall to commercial clients for holding
large assembly events, such as business fairs, pop concerts, corporate sports meetings,
and commercial exhibitions. 467
Huadong Zou, director of the USTB Gymnasium, provided the researcher with
information regarding the history, current status and future development of the venue.
USTB owned a long sports tradition since its establishment in the 1950s. But, it had
never had a multifunctional gymnasium. Thus, the University embraced the idea of
building an Olympic venue on its campus. Its selection as a recipient for a new
gymnasium occurred in 2002. 468 Both national treasury funds and USTB monies covered
the investment for construction. According to Zou, each party contributed approximately
a half. The total investment was around CNY 220 million (USD 33.85 million). The
University applied for special loans to finance its share of the venue. Although Zou stated
that private monies were not solicited for the venue, 469 a list of financial patrons
embossed on an elaborate board hung on the wall beside the main entrance of the venue
showing that there were a number of organizations and individuals, among them students,
faculty members, alumni, university-related groups, and corporations, who donated
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money for construction of the venue (see the picture in Appendix S). 470
The location of the venue was in an area previously used by the University’s
kindergarten, professor residences, and a beautification center. Because most of the
University’s staffers, faculty members, and students supported the building of an
Olympic venue on campus, all the old buildings were removed and relocated, emptying
the site for the new venue. The venue was completed in November 2007. During the
design period, post-Games use of the facility had been emphasized. Students use was the
top priority in the facility’s design and construction. 471
During construction, it could readily be seen that all the facility’s function rooms
reflected a standard layout and arrangement so that they could be easily converted to
accommodate different purposes in the future. The seats on the upper level of the
spectator stands were temporary. When the Games concluded the seats were quickly
removed and the resulting space accommodated two basketball courts and a tennis court
for student use (see the pictures in Appendix S). 472
Because the detailed plan had been made before the Games, the reconstruction
project after the Games took less than six months to complete. The venue was opened to
the public in April 2009. In addition to the two new basketball courts and the tennis court
at the upper level platform as well as the renovated swimming pool, the main competition
hall became a badminton area with 20 courts. The original athlete rest and registration
area became a table tennis area with 21 Ping Pong tables. The hallway outside the main
competition hall, partially covered by removable mats left after the Games, became an
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area for Judo and Taekwondo classes. 473 There was an abundance of material left after the
Games used for renovation and reconstruction. Moreover, a new fitness room was built in
the venue. It was leased to a commercial company which operated a sports club business.
According to Zou, the total reconstruction expense, around CNY 2 million (USD 0.31
million), was covered by the University. 474
In terms of administrative mode, Zou stated that the USTB Gymnasium
Management Center was an independent unit under the direct authority of the University.
The Center was financially controlled by the University. Its revenue was returned to the
University’s financial department. The Center’s operation team was formed during the
Olympic Games. Most employees, such as technicians and security guards, have been
working in the facility since then. New staffers for reception, services, and marketing
joined the team when the venue was reopened in 2009. The Center was separated from
the Department of Sport and Physical Education, which was a different condition than
PKU, CAU, and BIT. Despite the separation, the Center cooperated and collaborated
closely with the Department. Since Zou used to be a student athlete at USTB, he
maintains close working and personal relationships with the Department. 475
According to Zou, securing physical education needs for students and training
requirements for student athletes are the top working priorities of the Center. Physical
education classes are held in the venue. During the academic term, before 11:00 am and
between 1:00 pm and 3:00 pm during weekdays, the venue is open for educational
purposes. The time between 11:00 am and 1:00 pm is the period during which the pool
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and the courts are open to University employees. After 3:00 pm, the venue is open to the
public until 10:00 pm. Although the fitness club in the venue is owned by a company and
the Center merely leases the space, as a condition in the agreement, the fitness club must
provide its equipment and its space for student physical education classes and student
athlete training before 3:00 pm whenever needed. After that the club is open for its own
business. 476 In a week, on average, there are 92 physical education classes held in the
venue. The number of the students involved is about 3,000. 477 The venue, especially the
main competition hall, is also used by the University to hold events such as convocation,
job fairs, and student cultural events. In addition, during the “down time” such as
weekends and summer/winter breaks, the Center rents the main hall for commercial
purposes. The rental rate is around CNY 70,000 (USD 10,770) per day. During
summer/winter breaks, the Center organizes sports training classes for youth, such as
swimming, badminton and table tennis. At times when there are no such activities, the
venue is usually opened to the public for recreation purposes. In general, according to
Zou, the business operated during the “down time” earned the major part of revenue
generated by the Center. 478
Speaking of revenue and expense, according to Zou, the Center has earned a
slight surplus since it reopened in April 2009. Each year, the University set an expense
budget for the venue, based on its record of the previous year. On average, the annual
budget was around CNY 5 million (USD 0.77 million). It included energy, maintenance,
human resource, and daily operation costs. Similar to other universities, or most venues
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in China for that matter, the depreciation of fixed assets of the venue was not included as
a kind of cost. In terms of energy cost (water, electricity, and heating), the University
covered one half of the total, while the Center was responsible for the other half.
According to Zou, the University exempted half of the energy expense for the venue
because the University used the venue gratis as an assembly place for educational matters.
Such exercise occupied 50% of the total time of the venue’s regular operation. Under
these circumstances, the Center earned a surplus of more than CNY 1 million (0.15
million) for the year 2010 and 2011. The University did not set revenue goals for the
venue, but arranged an incentive policy for the Center. If the venue’s surplus reached
CNY 1 million, then 70% of it would return to the University, while the Center would
retain 30%. If the surplus exceeded CNY 1 million, 60% of the exceeded portion would
return to the University, while the Center would retain 40%. 479
Zou expressed his satisfaction about the current policy and management mode
applied in the venue. After all, the venue’s daily operation and its current condition
satisfied both the University and the students, the two most important constituencies that
the venue served. Since the relationships between the Center, the Department of Sport
and Physical Education, the University, and the students, were harmonious, according to
Zou, the current status of the venue should be maintained in the future. 480

4-6. Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium
Unlike the other Beijing Olympic venues built on campuses located in the
University Area, the Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) Gymnasium, a
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newly-built venue that hosted badminton and rhythmic gymnastics competitions during
the 2008 Olympic Games, was located in the East Community Area of Beijing. Moreover,
the BJUT Gymnasium, according to BOCOG, was the only Olympic venue located in
Beijing’s southeastern area. 481 The investment in this venue was about CNY 200 million
(USD 30.8 million), of which around CNY 60 million (USD 9.2 million) came from the
national treasury; the balance was largely covered by the Beijing Municipal Commission
of Education. 482 Of the six universities in the city with Olympic competition venues,
BJUT was the only one that belonged to the Beijing Municipal Commission of
Education. 483 The municipal government of Beijing paid particular attention to the
location of this venue. To obtain the land adjacent to the University to build the new
venue, the municipal government had to persuade local residents to relocate, an
expensive exercise to complete. 484 The BJUT Gymnasium was the only large scale
multifunction sport facility in city-south. Since 2008 the facility has been used by the
University as an assembly place for sport competitions and cultural events, as well as a
leisure and recreation site for local communities.
The Gymnasium, completed in September 2007, consisted of a main competition
hall with a total of 7,500 seats and a warm-up arena. 485 According to Ailin Zhang, vice
president of BJUT, the Gymnasium remained an important cultural legacy of the Beijing
Olympics and became a landmark on the campus as well as Beijing’s southeastern
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area. 486 A year before the Games, Zhang stated that after the Olympics, the venue would
maintain three functions: the University’s activity center, a recreation center for
neighboring residents, and a training base for national badminton athletes. 487 During his
investigation in Beijing, the researcher visited the BJUT Gymnasium on two occasions.
On each visit a badminton competition was in progress. One was the Beijing PSB
Badminton Competitions (see the picture in Appendix T) and the other was the Li Ning
Cup National Badminton Championship organized by GASC. Staffers there told the
researcher that various badminton competitions were frequently hosted in either the
warm-up arena or the main competition hall. Because of the advanced technology
installed in this badminton-specified venue, many badminton match organizers in the city
sought the BJUT Gymnasium for their competition’s site. 488
However, frequent badminton competitions held in the venue often influenced the
physical education function of the venue. For instance, during the Li Ning Cup National
Badminton Championship on 6 September 2011, students who were scheduled to have
physical education classes in the venue were stopped at the entrance and were told that
the venue was closed because of the competitions. Having had no advance notice,
students complained that the venue management center or their gymnasium teacher
should have notified them. This was not the first time that students faced this kind of
situation. In addition, according to one of the venue staffers, due to overuse, the venue’s
wood flooring had deteriorated considerably during the last three years. Thus, in the
summer of 2011, the University decided to upgrade the flooring of the main competition
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hall (see the picture in Appendix T). Consequently, the rate for playing badminton for
individual players was increased from a previous CNY 10 (USD 1.5) per hour to CNY 40
(USD 6) per hour. According to one of the physical education teachers in the University,
between generating revenue from holding large scale events and its renting for recreation
use, the main hall was not available for physical education purposes. Students used the
warm-up arena as a substitute venue. 489
To investigate the current status of the venue’s post-Games utilization, the
researcher attempted to contact the individuals who were in charge of the venue. Qicai
Ren, the deputy manager of the BJUT Gymnasium, was reluctant to discuss the situation
regarding the venue, even though he accepted the interview request via telephone. As a
result, the interview with Ren lasted less than five minutes without any useful
information provided. The researcher later contacted Pu Wang, the manager of the BJUT
Gymnasium, who also accepted the interview request and did provide relevant
information for the study. Wang was appointed as the manager of the venue in 2011;
before that he was the vice chairman of the employee labor union in the University.
According to Wang, as a recreation center, the venue was opened to the public for such
activities as basketball, badminton, table tennis, fitness, fencing, and indoor climbing.
Customers were required to pay different rates to indulge in these activities. According to
Wang, charging fees for these on-campus recreation activities was illegal, although most
universities in China were doing so. Universities were non-profit organizations, which
meant that they were not supposed to operate profit-driven businesses. The legal issue
aside, since the University had been operating the venue as a business, it was supposed to
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establish a revenue target for the venue. The University had never done this. 490 Despite
the fact that the venue has hosted various large events, including national sport
competitions and some commercial events, which definitely generated profit for the
University, 491 there is neither a revenue goal for the venue nor any incentive policy for its
employees. 492
Wang pointed out that the management mode applied to the venue did not match
with the business operation of the venue. The University demanded fees from those
individuals who came to use the facility, while the venue was opened to the students
having physical education classes for free. According to Wang, the cafeteria on campus
charged fees to students because its operation was conducted by a company, not the
University. In other words, the University should consider registering a company
specifically to operate the business in the Gymnasium, similar to what the BUAA
Gymnasium did. According to Wang, the University did consider leasing the venue to a
company. A similar example existed on campus. A hotel on campus was leased to a
private company that paid the University a specified amount of money per year to
maintain the chartered management rights to the hotel. The result of this, according to
Wang, was that the University experienced inconvenience whenever it needed to use the
hotel, while the hotel business was not as good as what the University expected. Thus, the
University became reticent about the Gymnasium being in the hands of a management
company. 493
Wang addressed the priority schedule for the venue’s use. For the BJUT
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Gymnasium, the top priority is to serve the University directly and indirectly, including
providing space for the activities the University organizes for its educational and public
relations purposes. 494 To achieve this goal, the venue renovated its original function
rooms to a new conference hall, a VIP room, an entertainment room (karaoke room), a
coffee house, a music salon, a commercial conference center, and some multifunction
recreation rooms. 495 The venue also added a series of new services for facility users,
especially those invited by the President of the University. The second priority, according
to Wang, is to generate revenue for the University, obtained by leasing the main hall for
sports and commercial events and opening the courts for playing badminton, table tennis,
basketball, and volleyball. Although the University did not set revenue goals for the
venue, Wang, as the manager of the venue, admitted that the Gymnasium needed to earn
as much money as possible to offset its operating expenses. However, due to safety issues
on campus, the University had to choose relatively “safe” events to stage, such as those
organized by governmental departments, sport bureaus, or ministries. Thus, safety issues
can influence the venue’s revenue generation. The last priority for the venue is to serve
students for physical education purposes. The students used the warm-up area for
physical education classes; the main competition hall was opened to the public on a daily
basis. Whenever large events were held in the venue, all the scheduled physical education
classes in the venue had to be transferred to outdoor sport facilities on campus. 496
According to Wang, the three-level priority system was the working principle for
him. The function of the venue must satisfy the leaders of the University and their guests

494

Ibid.
Official Website of Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium Center. “New Services in the
Gymnasium,” http://cgzx.bjut.edu.cn/etcms/booking/yumaoqiu_active.html (accessed April 7, 2012).
496
Pu Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 6, 2011.
495

202

visiting campus. They can play sports and enjoy the entertainments offered in the venue,
which was the major reason that new sports and amusement services were added. This
principle remains as the venue’s core strategy for future development. Wang emphasized
that the most important goal of the venue in the future was to become a key factor in
serving the University’s public relations activities. 497 Unlike its counterparts on campuses
such as USTB and BIT, in terms of post-Games utilization, the BJUT Gymnasium has not
placed sports and physical education functions for students as the venue’s top priority and
the core value of this advanced Olympic facility. Considering its unique location and the
original goals expected, the Olympic legacy of this venue hardly embodies its value as
the only multifunctional sport facility at city-south, as long as its top priority is heavily
focused on serving the University administrative leaders and their guests.

5. Private Enterprise-Owned Venues
5-1. MasterCard Center and Baseball Field
The MasterCard Center (MCC), originally named the Beijing Olympic Basketball
Gymnasium, then changed to the Wu Ke Song Arena, is located at the Wu Ke Song Sport
& Culture Center, the site at which the Olympic Baseball Field was built. During the
2008 Games, the Olympic basketball preliminaries and finals were hosted in the venue,
while the adjacent Olympic Baseball Field served as a temporary venue. It hosted the
2008 Olympic baseball tournament, perhaps baseball’s final Olympic appearance. 498
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Baseball has been discontinued as an Olympic sport. The Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture
Center is now owned by the Bloomage International Investment Group, a private
enterprise entity in China, embracing a business range of project investments, corporate
acquisitions and other development projects including real estate, finance, and
biotechnology. In China, real estate business has been the Company’s focus. 499 The venue
was the only Olympic venue in Beijing that was owned solely by private enterprise. 500
Moreover, the naming rights of the venue were sold to MasterCard in January 2011 under
a five-year deal. The venue has been known as the MasterCard Center since then. It is the
first and the only Olympic venue in the city so far that has been rebranded
commercially. 501 MasterCard (MCC) is operated by the Beijing Wu Ke Song Arena
Management Co. Ltd., owned by the Bloomage International Investment Group. 502 As the
strategic partner of Bloomage, the US-based Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG), one
of the leading international sports and entertainment companies, provides consultancy
support in the operation of MCC. 503 After the 2008 Olympic Games, the venue was
commercially exploited by holding various commercial events there, such as the NBA
China Games, the Beyoncé concert, the Amway China Annual Conference, and the CBA
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All-star Weekend. 504
The baseball field, located beside MCC, was dismantled and obliterated right after
the Games and the site has been empty since. Because the baseball field was originally
designed as a temporary sport facility, there was no post-Games utilization plan for it.505
When the researcher visited the original baseball competition site in August 2011, it
could be seen that due to no maintenance and no security around the area, the former
Olympic Baseball Field had become an abandoned place in which there was nothing but
rubble, wild grass and weeds, and debris and trash scattered about. There was nothing left
that could help the researcher associate the place with the Olympic Baseball Field for the
2008 Games; it was more like a ruin or a dumping site. There were vestiges of some
equipment used for the Games left on site; workers were in the process of removing it. In
the middle of the site, some shabby shelters were built in which migrant workers lived.
Between the former baseball field and MCC, a large temporary tent was erected, used as
a flea market. This “dumping site” was separated from MCC by an iron fence. On the
other side of the fence, MCC was starkly different, well maintained and no one was
allowed to enter without proper IDs, even when there was no commercial event held
inside (see the pictures in Appendix U). 506 The Bloomage International Investment Group,
owner of the land, has done nothing yet on the previous baseball field site since the
Games concluded. According to Jerry Han, events director of the Beijing Wu Ke Song
Arena Management Co. Ltd., after the 2008 Games, Bloomage had plans to develop the
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baseball field to a commercial and recreation area to complement its own local real estate
business. However, the financial crisis erupting at the end of 2008 stopped, or at least
postponed, Bloomage’s business plan for the site. Han also pointed out that Bloomage, as
the landlord, did not worry too much about the exploitation of the site; after all, it owned
the land and could wait for better timing to carry out its plan. 507
In terms of construction of the venue, the original plan of the Wu Ke Song Sport
& Culture Center included the Olympic Basketball Gymnasium, the Olympic Baseball
Field, and some other complementary commercial and sports facilities. Construction was
awarded to the Consortium of the Beijing Centergate Development and Construction Co.,
Ltd. (BCDC) in September 2003. 508 The BCDC Consortium included four shareholders:
the CENCONS Group 509 , the Hai Dian District State-owned Assets Investment Co., Ltd.,
the Beijing Urban Construction Group Co., Ltd., and the Beijing Tianhong Group.
According to Han, the budget of the project was more than CNY 1 billion (154 million).
Construction broke ground in 2005. However, the project did not progress smoothly.
During the construction stage, financial problems occurred, leading to a significant delay
of the project. In addition, the consortium expressed pessimism regarding the investment
return on the project, especially for the period following the Olympic Games.
Consequently, some corporate entities in the consortium attempted to quit the project.
This resulted in a critical situation, prompting the government to seek a solution in order
to continue the project. At the time, Bloomage envisioned that it would be a great
opportunity to get involved in such an Olympic-related project, which might well
507
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improve its local real estate business and its relationship with local government. As a
result, Bloomage, with the government’s authorization, invested in the project. By doing
this, Bloomage became the project’s largest shareholder. At the same time its investment
offered the government a solution. After that, Bloomage negotiated with both government
and private enterprise within the consortium to buy their business shares. In the end,
Bloomage became the sole owner of the Wu Ke Song Sports & Culture Center.510
Despite the ownership transfer, the CENCONS Group continued to play the major
role in charge of the project’s construction. 511 Although Han did not disclose any details
regarding the negotiation between Bloomage and the government, relating that he did not
know anything about it, he stated Bloomage’s “step up” action was considered a huge
favor to the government, one which translated into potential benefit from the government
for its real estate business. In addition, Bloomage inherited the land from the government,
not only for the basketball gymnasium and the baseball field, but also the peripheral area
on which Bloomage planned to develop real estate projects. Therefore, according to Han,
the cooperation between the government and Bloomage was a win-win strategy at the
time. 512
On 8 October 2008, one month after the Beijing Olympic Games, China
International Business reported that AEG, one of the world’s leading providers of live
sports and entertainment events, had acquired management rights of the Beijing Olympic
Basketball Gymnasium for post-Games operation. 513 Because of its partnership with the
National Basketball Association (NBA), AEG planned to stage NBA games in the
510
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Gymnasium. At the time AEG was confident of this plan. According to Sam Piccione,
general manager of AEG in Asia, other Olympic venues in Beijing did not have the same
sustainability as the Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium, an important factor in the
AEG – NBA initiative. 514 Moreover, Alan Graham, AEG’s general manager of the
Gymnasium at the time, stated that the venue could be a catalyst to open the concert
market in China. The facility might well become the centerpiece for the entire Western
Community of the city. 515 According to the report, AEG believed that the venue could
host a big event every three days, once the facility was fully operational. 516 AEG staged
two NBA pre-season games in the venue, one between the Milwaukee Bucks and the
Golden State Warriors in October 2008, and the other between the Denver Nuggets and
the Indiana Pacers one year later. 517 In addition, during AEG’s management period, the
venue also hosted Canadian singer Avril Lavigne’s first concert in Beijing, “the Best
Damn Tour,” in October 2008. 518
However, according to its official website, at the end of 2011, MCC (formerly the
Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium or the Wu Ke Song Arena) is operated by the
Beijing Wu Ke Song Arena Management Co. Ltd., which is owned by Bloomage
International Investment Group, whereas AEG, together with NBA, had become the
strategic partner of Bloomage providing consultancy support in operating MCC. 519
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According to Han, AEG has not managed and operated MCC since the beginning of 2010.
In terms of the management rights changing, Han shared certain information that might
be helpful to understand AEG’s role transformation. AEG became involved in the
business of the Wu Ke Song Arena at the beginning of 2008 through a recommendation
by the NBA. At the time, it was AEG’s first experience in attempting to exploit the
market in China. As a foreign company, AEG might have felt over-confident regarding
China’s market, and the commercial operation of the Gymnasium. This was probably due
to a lack of thorough pre-analysis of the Chinese market and the unique circumstances
encountered there. Business in China was totally different from AEG’s normal business
experience acquired largely in the United Sates and Australia. AEG underestimated the
complicated situation regarding management and operation of a sport venue in China.
Thus, according to Han, over-optimism and high expectation for the venue’s commercial
success in the future were major reasons that led to AEG’s frustration and unrest that
arose when facing difficulties during its operation. One of the most significant problems
resided in the cooperation and communication between AEG and the Beijing Public
Security Bureau (PSB), in other words, the conflict between AEG’s western concept
regarding the venue’s operation mode following free market rules versus the police
regulations in China. 520
Zhihong Zhang, supervisor of the operations department of the Beijing Gong Ti
Center, contributed his point of view in terms of AEG’s involvement in the Wu Ke Song
Arena. AEG attempted but failed to manage and operate the venue effectively, because it
was quite difficult at the beginning to understand the venue’s operation mode in China.
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Neither did AEG understand nor appreciate why PSB was involved in so much of the
venue’s business. Nor did AEG understand why the government had so many concerns
regarding the venue’s business, especially with regard to holding large commercial events.
Based on AEG’s concept, it was simple that if the Company had the management rights
of the venue, then how the Company operated was its own business as long as all
business actions obeyed relevant laws. Moreover, AEG might have dismissed such
security encroachment as soccer hooliganism as “normal” conduct, which could be
handled following relevant bylaws. However, such “security encroachment” would be
considered seriously by the government in China, because based on government concept,
such incidents would always be associated with political issues that might potentially
undermine the regime’s stability. Therefore, the government always supported PSB’s
involvement in the business of city venues to secure and insure complete spectator
control. This was considered a normal business environment for Beijing’s large scale
sport venues, which AEG or any other foreign companies could not change. 521 According
to Han, due to the conflicts in terms of the thoughts and actions at the beginning of its
management, AEG always attempted to direct PSB to “back off,” which probably further
poisoned the relationship between the two. 522 Further, Zhang pointed out that PSB
consistently operated on the premise that it was the venue’s full responsibility for any
“incidents” occurring during the events, 523 incidents that would severely and adversely
affect the venue’s future application for commercial events. In China, if a venue planned
to hold an event, the organizers had to submit applications to PSB for approval. Therefore,
an unpleasant relationship with local PSB authorities would quite obviously compromise
521
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business initiatives for the venue.
As a result, when conflict between AEG and PSB, as well as other relevant
governmental departments, became more pronounced, AEG began to entertain the idea of
giving up business in the Wu Ke Song Arena at the beginning of 2010. AEG and
Bloomage signed an official memorandum of understanding; 524 AEG agreed to continue
to cooperate with Bloomage as a strategic partner offering consultancy support on the
operation of the venue, but not operate the venue’s business directly. The management
team that AEG had established voluntarily remained and continued to manage the venue.
According to Han, most of the Chinese employees from the original team chose to stay
and continued to work there. Now the team is under the direct and full control of the
venue’s owner, the Bloomage Group. 525
Although the situation AEG had consistently faced still existed, the lessons from
AEG’s experience were learned by Bloomage as well. According to Han, the operation
and management became more realistic and more effective than before. The Company
came to understand and accept the reality regarding the unique circumstances in China,
which the management team of the venue necessarily had to deal with. The Company
tried its best to maintain the relationships with relevant governmental departments and
PSB. Despite AEG’s failure, Han admitted that AEG absolutely left behind valuable
legacies for venue operation and management. First, AEG provided the owner with a
detailed post-Games operation plan. Based on the plan, the owner invested some CNY
200 million (USD 30.8 million) to the reconstruction project of the venue after the Games.
The project took 9 months to complete. After the reconstruction the venue was suitable
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for its post-Games use. A solid basis for its operation and future business development
was established. In addition, AEG left its advanced management experience to the
Company, such as the venue’s organizational structure, internal administrative regulations,
detailed service standards, events staging procedures, employment regulations, and
incentive mechanisms, all of which were considered the “soft” capital for the venue’s
management and development. However, Han commented that this “soft” capital should
combine with the Company’s current strategy in terms of the way it should deal with the
relationships between it and government departments and the PSB. Said Han, that was
the only way to successfully operate an Olympic venue in the city, especially one owned
by private enterprise. 526
In terms of the venue’s current operation, Han expressed satisfaction with
operational and management conditions. Since the reconstruction was completed and the
management rights transferred from AEG to Bloomage in the middle of 2010, the venue
has hosted more than 60 events, of which 15% of the total have been sports events
(commercial games), 10% non commercial events, and 75% commercial events with
admission fees. There is no doubt that the major business of the venue’s post-Games
utilization is to host commercial events. According to Han, the venue’s operating cost has
reached CNY 30 million (USD 4.6 million) per year. This did not include loan repayment,
depreciation of fixed assets, and major maintenance expenses. As to revenue, Han did not
disclose figures regarding the annual revenue, but stated that the financial sheet of the
venue was balanced and a surplus appeared after the naming rights sale to MasterCard. 527
AEG played a role in terms of the naming rights sale for the venue. MasterCard
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was introduced to Bloomage by AEG. At the time, Bloomage sought money from the
naming rights sale to compensate for the venue’s huge operation cost. Meanwhile,
MasterCard faced its own problem in China’s market. Its major competitor, VISA, was a
TOP partner of the IOC and initiated significant marketing promotions in China during
the 2008 Olympic Games. MasterCard felt it had to act in some way to try and gain in
China’s prospective market. As a result, according to Han, the two parties responded
positively when AEG introduced the deal to both sides. The government, initially
reluctant, later approved the sale of naming rights. Also, on the government’s demand,
the terms “gymnasium,” “sport center,” and “Wu Ke Song,” were required to be retained
in the new title of the venue. MasterCard did not like this requirement. Finally, through
negotiation, the title of the venue was changed from “Wu Ke Song Arena” to
“MasterCard Center.” Although the exact amount paid for the naming rights was not
revealed, Han stated that the number was large enough to cover the venue’s annual
operating cost. In addition to the naming rights fee, MasterCard also established a
promotion program in the management company, by which, based on MasterCard’s final
approval, the Company could financially aid its clients by offering sponsor fees to their
events in order to attract more potential clients.528
In terms of the venue’s strength and potential opportunity in the future, Han
stated that the business experiences AEG left behind, and the current management mode,
were major strengths of MCC. Moreover, hi-tech equipment and the high quality of the
venue’s internal environment are also strengths in terms of possible competition with
other Olympic venues with roughly the same capacity and scale in the city. Speaking of
its competitors, Han considered NIS in the Olympic Park as MCC’s major competitor in
528
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the future. Although a private enterprise can independently operate its business to
maximize profit, the nature of being private is also a weakness in China, especially
compared to state-owned enterprises. For instance, land taxes for certain
government-owned venues are exempted by the government, while it would be quite
difficult for MCC to achieve any tax redemption status. As to potential opportunity, Han
suggested that one of the key factors influencing the development of MCC in the future
will be the relationship between Bloomage and the government, which was the reason
why one of MCC’s core tasks was to maintain the relationships with the government as
well as relevant governmental departments. 529 As a result, MCC attempts to work on a
positive basis with government. A case in point - on 15 March 2012, the Beijing Sport
Bureau announced that if the Beijing basketball team won the semi-finals for the CBA
Championships, the final games started in six days would be held in MCC, a mere six
days away. 530 When MCC received the final confirmation regarding hosting the final
games in MCC, there were only two days left for the employees in the venue to prepare
for the matches. 531 MCC made all the preparations in two days, securing the necessary
“clearances” for the contests to be staged smoothly. In addition, during the following nine
days, MCC was used for three final games for free. 532 Since MCC’s scale was much
larger than that of the Beijing basketball team’s home arena, the team’s ticket sales
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revenue for the three final games was equal to the revenue gained from the rest of the
games during the whole season. 533 As a private enterprise-owned Olympic venue, MCC
has to be careful when it comes to interfacing with the government. Sometimes MCC has
to put aside its economic goal, albeit briefly, so that it can partially serve the
government’s goal. After all, without government’s satisfaction and support, MCC’s
development in the future will be unpredictable and unsettled.
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Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Conclusions
This research made efforts to investigate the conditions of the Olympic facilities
in Beijing through the entire competition venues line three and half years after the Games,
which had not been done since the 2008 Beijing Games finished. As an exploratory
research, this study is the first one covering this specific academic field. It significantly
contributed to the international Olympic knowledge base in terms of the post-Olympic
utilization of Olympic facilities in Beijing. Through this study, the researcher examined
the post-Games status of all the Olympic competition facilities in Beijing, in terms of
their management, operation, and utilization. The study was initiated by categorizing
those venues. To systematically code the data collected through the investigation, three
categories were applied to this study: Category 1 referred to the nature of the venues in
terms of them being newly-built, pre-existing, or temporarily-built; Category 2 was based
on their geographical disposition in the city; and Category 3 was based on their
ownership.

1-1. Category 1: New, Pre-existing, and Temporary
According to BOCOG, of thirty-seven sport venues that were used as the
competition sites for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, thirty-one venues were located
within the city of Beijing, including twelve (12) sport facilities built specifically for the
Olympic Games, eleven (11) converted or expanded pre-existing venues, and eight (8)
temporary sport facilities built especially for the Games and planned to be transformed
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for other functions after the Games or obliterated altogether. 1 Through the investigation,
however, the researcher found a difference between the original official
BOCOG-established category and the actual existing condition.
Two “pre-existing” venues, in BOCOG’s Official category, were actually
newly-built ones based on the researcher’s investigation. The Feng Tai Sport Center
Softball Field was built specifically for the 2008 Olympic Games, although there had
been a baseball field on the site before the new one was built. The baseball field was too
small and old to meet Olympic standards. The government decided to completely
demolish the old one and rebuild with a totally new design. The BIT Gymnasium was
built before it was selected to be an Olympic venue. However, the investigation showed
that the BIT Gymnasium had never been used before the 2008 Olympic Games. In
addition, after its completion in 2007, the venue was specifically reconstructed for the
Games. Therefore, the two venues should be considered as newly-built. Moreover, the
Olympic Tennis Center, also known as the Lotus Tennis Court, was planned to be built as
a temporary venue in 2006, according to the Beijing Municipal Commission of
Development and Reform. 2 However, one year later, in 2007, the government changed its
mind and built it as a permanent sport facility.3 Therefore, the Olympic competition
facilities in Beijing should include fourteen (14) newly-built venues, nine (9) expanded
pre-existing venues, and eight (8) temporary venues.

1

Official Website of BOCOG, “Olympic Venues,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/
Official Website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Beijing
Construction Projects in 2006: Temporary Olympic Venues in the Olympic Park,”
http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/tzgl/zdjs/2006_zdgc/zdqqxm/aycg_2006/200607/t124920.htm (accessed April 13,
2012).
3
Official Website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Beijing
Construction Projects in 2007: Olympic Tennis Center in the Olympic Park,”
http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/tzgl/zdjs/2007_zdxm/07zdxm/07zd_ay/200706/t180329.htm (accessed April 13,
2012).
2
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In terms of the eight temporary venues, instead of being dismantled after the
Games, three of them continue to be used in their original sports functions, though with a
different frequency use for each of them. According to the investigation, the triathlon
course at the Ming Tomb Reservoir has been used for national and international triathlon
competitions held annually. When it is not in use, the spectator area is empty and locked.
The race course has been restored to an urban road for regular traffic on a daily basis. The
hockey field in the Olympic Forest Park is open to the public for playing ball games with
a user fee applied. There was only one occasion when a professional hockey team trained
on the field during the last three and a half years. The Olympic Beach Volleyball Ground
at the Chao Yang Park has not been opened to the public after the Games. Beside the
venue a beach-theme park was established in 2009 using the sand from the venue. In
general, the beach volleyball court has been unused during the last three and a half years,
but did host two beach volleyball competitions. As to the other five temporary venues, the
fencing area was removed from the China National Convention Center. The cycling urban
race course was restored to a regular urban road. The BMX course was abandoned; the
site has been empty and locked with no use of any kind. The archery field in the Olympic
Sport Park was partially demolished for the construction of a new tennis stadium. The
baseball field was completely dismantled, and the site became a “dumping area” after the
Games. Considering their poor current condition, and the high-standard of construction
originally committed, these temporary venues must be regarded as an absolute waste
because there will be no social or financial return generated in the future.
Based on this investigation, the researcher summarized eight avenues of
post-Games utilization for the Olympic venues in Beijing: (1) tourism, (2) mass sport
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(including leisure time recreation, amateur sport training, and sports meetings), (3) elite
sport (including national training bases and national/international competitions), (4)
commercial events, (5) public assembly (not sport-related), (6) commercial complexes, (7)
educational purposes, and (8) commercial space leasing. Except for those demolished or
abandoned, most of the venues in Beijing were utilized in some of the eight ways after
the Games. As to the venue post-Games utilization status analyzed through Category 1,
the results indicated that those pre-existing venues generally reflected a better current
status than those newly-built, but not with respect to those built on university campuses
(see Table 1 on next page). Pre-existing venues, such as the Workers’ Stadium, CIS, the
NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, and the Ying Tung Natatorium, with
pre-Olympic traditions in sports event hosting, venue management, and their own
business modes, maintained relatively stable revenue sources, good reputations, and loyal
customers. According to the study’s results, the Olympic Games had little positive
influence on those venues in terms of their post-Games operations. However, of those
new sport venues built especially for the Olympic Games, competition among them has
intensified during the last three and a half years. Competing with their newly-built
counterparts, pre-existing venues suffered from such weaknesses as a lack of advanced
technology and superior equipment, and less comfortable physical environments. On the
other hand, the “software,” such as management and operation modes, quality of services,
and customer loyalty, could be considered strengths for pre-existing venues.
According to the results, among newly-built venues, those located on university
campuses were better utilized than others of the same classification. Most of the new
venues on campuses such as the USTB Gymnasium and the BIT Gymnasium, considered
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Table 1. Venues’ Post-Games Utilization in Category 1
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student use for physical education courses as the top priority for venue post-Games
utilization. In addition, university venues are also used as assembly places, leisure time
recreation areas open to the public, and precincts for commercial events renting. In
contrast, some newly-built venues such as the Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field, the
Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park, the Olympic Tennis Center, and the Lao Shan Velodrome,
have been under utilized after the Olympic Games. Furthermore, venues such as the
Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field (SRH & CTF), and the National
Indoor Stadium have been single function facilities after the Games. For instance, SRH &
CTF have been used only for national team training and competition. Since GASC is the
owner of the two venues, the original purpose for the venues was to serve as a training
base for national elite athletes. This has not been changed for the last three and a half
years.

1-2. Category 2: Location
The researcher also categorized Beijing’s Olympic venues based on their
geographical distribution. According to BOBICO in 2001, Beijing’s Olympic competition
venues were to be located in four areas of the city: (1) the Olympic Green (the central
area), (2) the Western Community Area, (3) the North Scenic Area and (4) the University
Area. 4 In the Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games published in 2010,
BOCOG reiterated this same disposition regarding venue geographical distribution. 5
Realizing the inaccuracy of the BOBICO’s distribution statement, the researcher
developed a new geographical distribution category for the venues, attempting to place

4
5

The Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, January 2001.
Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 27-38.
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all the venues into relevant groups.
Except for the road race cycling route, all thirty venues were grouped into five
geographical areas: (1) the Olympic Central Area (including the Olympic Green and
NOSC), (2) the West Community Area, (3) the University Area, (4) the East Community
Area, and (5) the North Scenic Area. According to this new category, ten Olympic venues
were located in the Olympic Central Area; six were in the University Area; eight were in
the West Community Area; four were in the East Community Area; and two were located
at the North Scenic Area, which was a rural area north of the city.
The investigation showed that generally the venues in the University Area were
well utilized after the Games (see Table 2 on next page). This area included five venues
built on university campuses plus the Capital Indoor Stadium. In the Olympic Central
Area, the three venues (the Stadium, the Gymnasium and the Natatorium) built in the
NOSC were well utilized after the Games. In contrast, some venues in the Olympic
Central Area, such as the Olympic Tennis Center, the Bird’s Nest, and the National
Indoor Stadium, show general underuse.
In the West Community Area, the investigation showed that after the Games most
of the venues were underused, especially the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay
Target Field and the Lao Shan Velodrome, whose main halls were solely used by the
national team. Also, the Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field was underused, partially
because of the unpopularity of softball in the city. In contrast, the Lao Shan Mountain
Bike Course became a very popular site for biking enthusiasts, though a lack of
supervision and maintenance for the course was always an issue after the Games. As to
the MasterCard Center, it became a major venue at city-west to hold commercial events.
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Table 2. Venues’ Post-Games Utilization in Category 2
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However, its sport function was weakened due to few national/international competitions
being held there after the Games, except for two “commercial games” during the last
three and a half years and three CBA Final games in March 2012. Furthermore, adjacent
to MCC, the Olympic Baseball Field was demolished directly after the Games. Adjacent
to the Mountain Bike Course, the Lao Shan BMX Course has been locked up without any
use for three and a half years. Demolishing or abandoning venues at least could save a
large amount of maintenance expenses for the owners if cost was really a concern to
them.
In the East Community Area, the investigation showed that the Workers’ Stadium
and the Workers’ Gymnasium Theater were well utilized after the Games, especially the
Workers’ Stadium, with its long tradition in terms of the venue’s business operation and
exploitation of sport in the city. It was used not only as a soccer stadium for the Chinese
Professional Soccer League, but also a place for commercial events. As well, it served as
a business complex by using space under the spectator stands. The BJUT Gymnasium, as
the only large scale multifunction gymnasium in city-south, was also well utilized as a
public leisure time recreation and sporting place, as well as a popular competition site for
badminton. The Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground was planned to be dismantled
after the Games; but it remained intact, though seldom used. The owner of the venue
thought that the cost for demolishing the venue would be higher than post-Games
maintenance and operation costs. Envisioned daily cost for operation and maintenance
would be aggregated over time by an uncertain revenue return to compensate.
The Olympic Central Area and the University Area were adjacent to each other.
Both areas were at city-north. The number of the Olympic venues in city-north totaled
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sixteen, more than half of the Olympic venues in Beijing. In addition, there were eight
venues at city-west, while only four venues were located at city-east. For city-south, there
were none. In terms of sport facility service functions for local communities in the city,
the geographical distribution of Olympic venues in Beijing reflected an imbalance
between city-north and city-south, and between city-west and city-east. As one of the
principles of the study, the researcher contended that with the opportunity of hosting the
Olympic Games, host cities should strategically consider the balanced development of
city sport as one of the most important elements in its blueprint for post-Olympic urban
development. However, Beijing’s distribution of Olympic venues did not completely
serve this strategy.
The imbalance of venue distribution caused at least two problems. First, on the
northwestern side of the city, twenty-four Olympic venues were located, which was 80%
of Olympic venues in Beijing. Especially at city-north, after the Games, the plentitude of
venues (pre-existing ones and newly-built ones) led to competition among them being
dramatically increased, which brought more difficulties in terms of their business
operation. On the other hand, on the southeastern side of the city, especially city-south,
there was no large multifunction sport facility for the public. The BJUT Gymnasium was
the only one built within the area of city-south. As to city-east, the Chao Yang Park Beach
Volleyball Ground was not opened to the public, but only used for two
national/international beach volleyball competitions since the Games closed. This was
definitely “underused.” As a result, in city-east, only the Workers’ Gymnasium Theater
and the Workers’ Stadium in the Beijing Gong Ti Center were well utilized after the
Games. However, considering the large population in the area, the researcher concluded
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that the government of the city missed its greatest opportunity, to develop sport facilities
for local communities at city-south as well as city-east.

1-3. Category 3: Ownership
The researcher also addressed the question of venue ownership and its impact on
operation, management, and use. According to the investigation, Olympic venues in
Beijing reflected four types of ownership: (1) government-owned venues, (2)
GASC-owned venues, (3) university-owned venues, and (4) private enterprise-owned
venues. Based on the information derived from interviews as well as the documents of
relevant organizations and official websites of venues, the researcher reported the history,
use, current operation condition, and future development of each.
Sixteen Olympic venues in Beijing were owned by multilevel governments,
including the Beijing Municipal Government, the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions
supervised by the municipality, five district governments also under the supervision of
the municipality, and specific government-owned enterprises. Seven venues were owned
by GASC, the Ministry of Sport of China. Although GASC might be considered a
governmental department, because of its special meaning and importance for Chinese
national sport, the venues owned by GASC were separated by the researcher so that their
special significance could be dissected. Six venues were owned by universities. Finally,
two venues were owned by private enterprise. One of them, the Olympic Baseball Field,
was demolished directly following the Games. In addition to GASC, closely associated
with government, the six universities were supervised by either the Ministry of Education
of China or the Beijing Education Commission, which means that they were actually
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under the leadership of government. As a result, for the total of thirty-one Olympic
competition venues in Beijing, twenty-nine of them were under the leadership of
government directly or indirectly, while the remaining two were owned by private
enterprise.
Of the four groups, the University-owned venues, in general, were well utilized
after the Games (see Table 3 on next page). All six venues are used as both leisure time
recreation and sporting places for the public and university assembly places. Moreover,
except for the BUAA Gymnasium, all university venues are used for student physical
education courses. Also, except for the BIT Gymnasium, all are available to the public to
host commercial events. These venues are also used for student athlete training and for
hosting sports meetings for both students and other organizations away from campus.
Having a stable user base, namely, students and gym users in the communities nearby, the
venues on campuses are utilized more frequently on a daily basis. As sport venues, the
more frequently they are used, the better maintenance they gain, and the more they
benefit society. 6 Campus venues proved this well.
In terms of the financial condition and supervision of venues on campuses, there
was no direct correlation between revenue the venues generated and the expense incurred.
The final decisions for current operation and future direction of venue management and
operation modes will be made by university authority. In general, the universities are
responsible for supervising the revenue that venues generate. They also cover venue
operation expense. Under the umbrella of university authority, the future of these venues

6

Ben Blanchard, and Haze Fan, “Beijing’s Underused Olympic Venues are Draining Funds,” The Globe
and Mail, April 19, 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-birds-nest-to-white-elephant-beijings-underused-olymp
ic-venues-are-draining-funds/article2396560/ (accessed April 16, 2012).
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appears secure and predictable: the university will fully support the venue, as long as the
venue remains under the complete authority of the university. As long as universities do
not take steps towards changing this relationship, something that has not been seen during
the last three and a half years, it will be unlikely that a venue’s administrative mode,
business operation, and financial condition, will change.
For those venues owned by GASC, the investigation showed diverse conditions in
terms of their post-Games utilization. The Stadium, the Gymnasium and the Ying Tung
Natatorium in NOSC and the Capital Indoor Stadium showed reasonably good utilization
condition after the Games. But the other three, the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay
Target Field and the Lao Shan Velodrome were relatively underused; indeed the main
parts of those venues are used only for elite athlete training. The Velodrome and the
shooting complex were specifically built by GASC for national team training after the
Olympic Games. No public use was planned. Thus, from one point of view, the venues
continue to be used with their original purpose in mind. In addition, the administrative
center of each of them generates revenue from other business, which partially
compensates for the venue’s maintenance expense. For instance, in the Velodrome, the
Center utilizes the function rooms around the corridor in the venue to operate a fencing
club for youth. But for total operation cost, including especially major repairs and
equipment update, it had to depend on financial support from GASC. Making a profit
from the venues was not the priority of the supervision departments of those venues.
They did not need to generate revenue to offset cost. It was not necessary for them to
explore “venue business.” If GASC wanted the venues to make a profit, venue
management would attempt to do it. But, if there is no direct requirement from GASC
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towards revenue generating, then there is no call for marketing development. After all,
the major task of these Centers was to serve national teams in a mission to secure
Olympic gold medals for the country.
In this group, GASC also financially aided those venues that demonstrated
positive conditions of post-Games utilization. These types were all pre-existing and
multifunction venues that could generate revenue to help compensate for their daily
operation costs. For instance, the Capital Indoor Stadium had been generating revenue
from its venue business since the Games concluded. Such revenue partially compensated
for its maintenance expenses. However, even if it did not do that task well, the CIS
management Center would still operate through the financial support of GASC, because
the Center is responsible for the Olympic Gold Medal Strategy of the country, GASC’s
top priority. GASC would not cast blame the Center because it did not make money from
its venue business, but would blame it if the Olympic gold medal count for the country
seriously declined. Therefore, GASC-owned venues such as the Velodrome and CIS will
unlikely become a “white elephant,” as long as the Olympic Gold Medal Strategy exists
in China. Correspondingly, it is unlikely that the administrative mode of these venues will
change as long as GASC, as the owner, takes no measures towards reform in terms of its
own structure and administrative system.
In the “Government-owned” group, there were three sub-groups: (1) state-owned
enterprise, (2) municipal level government, and (3) district level government. The
ownership of certain venues in this group was transferred: (1) the National Stadium (the
Bird’s Nest)’s ownership was transferred from the CITIC Consortium Operating
Company to BSAM, a state-owned enterprise; (2) ownership of the National Indoor

230

Stadium (NIS) was transferred from Guo Ao Investment to BPA, another state-owned
enterprise; and (3) ownership of the Olympic Tennis Court, Hockey Field and Archery
Field altogether, were transferred from BSAM to the Chao Yang District Government. As
a result, each of the four Olympic venues in the Beijing Olympic Park: CNCC, NIS, the
Water Cube, and the Bird’s Nest, are owned by different state-owned enterprises. In
addition, nine venues are owned and supervised by five different district governments in
Beijing; and the other two in the Gong Ti Center (the Workers’ Stadium and the Workers’
Gymnasium Theater) belong to the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions.
The venues in the Gong Ti Center had been utilized quite well even before the
2008 Olympic Games. CNCC, owned by Beijing North Star, a state-owned enterprise,
hosted the fencing competitions and was used as both the Olympic International
Broadcasting Center and Main Press Center during the Games. After the Games the
fencing hall was dismantled and the building restored to its originally planned function,
that being, an international convention center. Although lacking supervision and proper
maintenance, the Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course has become a popular biking site for
numerous cycling enthusiasts in the city. The public does not pay to use the site for biking,
walking, and climbing. In this group, the four venues noted above demonstrated better
utilization status than the others.
The Water Cube is owned by BSAM, a state-owned enterprise. Basically, the
venue has been well used as a public aquatic recreation center, especially after its indoor
water-theme park commenced to operate in 2009. The Company also leases the main
competition hall to clients for hosting commercial events. However, due to the huge
operation costs, the operational management company officially admits that the venue
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currently faces a CNY 10 million (USD 1.5 million) annual deficit. In addition, as a
world-class natatorium, the Water Cube seldom hosted international swimming
competitions, considered by many as its major utilization shortcoming after the Games.
The venue, closely associated with the Bird’s Nest as both are located in the Olympic
Park, is one of the landmark tourism destinations in Beijing. During the first two years
after the Games, the venue’s tourism revenue was significantly high, so that potential
questions in terms of post-Games utilization were hardly apparent. But as time passed,
tourist enthusiasm declined causing dramatic revenue decreases since the third year after
the Games. Although the owner had a post-Games utilization plan for the venue before
the Games, the management team made no necessary revisions to the plan based on the
changes in social environment, economic situation, and political circumstance over the
last five years. The original plan is no longer suitable for the venue, indeed, it has been
largely abandoned.
Based on the investigation, the other two venues in the Beijing Olympic Park, the
Bird’s Nest and the National Indoor Stadium, showed even more underused status than
the Water Cube. The ownerships of the two venues changed from different enterprises
(state-owned) back to the government; and then the government transferred them to other
enterprises (state-owned). The aim was for better control. The ownership transitions
might be one of the major reasons for the venues’ underused condition. The CITIC
consortium signed a “chartered rights agreement” with the Beijing Municipal
Government in August 2003, in which the consortium was granted 30-year management
rights to the National Stadium. However, one year after the Beijing Olympic Games, the
government decided to take over the rights from the consortium. After the transition, the
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National Stadium was actually under the full authority of the government. Because of this
transition in authority, the first PPP project in China failed. In terms of NIS, the BUCID
consortium was also granted a 30-year management rights contract for the venue. At the
beginning of 2009, three months after the Paralympics, the government withdrew the
rights from the Guo Ao Company (the operating company of the venue representing the
consortium) and attempted to transfer the ownership of NIS to BPA, which was a
state-owned enterprise whose major business was in the culture and art industry. The
operation of NIS under the complete leadership of the Guo Ao Company lasted three
months. Due to the dispute between NIS’s old owner and the government, the transition
process took almost two and half years to complete. Under such a situation, regular
post-Games utilization of the two venues was adversely affected.
Based on the investigation, the nine venues owned by five different district
governments were underused after the Games. Some of them were targeted to be
demolished after the Games, such as the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, the
Ming Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Course, and the Olympic Hockey Field. However, they
were designed and built under such high architectural and construction criteria that they
qualified as permanent venues. Thus, their owners were reluctant to dismantle them. As a
result, these venues continued to exist, each one heavily underused. In addition,
newly-built permanent venues such as the Shun Yi Aquatic Park, the Feng Tai Sport
Center Softball Field, and the Olympic Tennis Center, also showed underutilization
conditions. The district governments did not engage specialized professionals to manage
and operate the venues; they regarded the venues as extensions of the government’s will
and behaviors, which led to the venues functioning in a mode dictated by the government
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instead of following a free market mechanism. For the other two in this subgroup, the
Lao Shan BMX Course and the Olympic Archery Field, the investigation indicated that
they were completely unused following the Games. The former has been closed for three
and a half years since the Games finished, and the latter was partially demolished to
create a site for a new tennis court construction right beside the underused Olympic
Tennis Court.
In terms of the final ownership group, there were two Olympic venues in it, the
MasterCard Center and the Olympic Baseball Field. Both of them were owned by the
Bloomage International Investment Group, the only private owner of Beijing’s Olympic
venues. The two venues were built together in the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center.
The baseball field was demolished right after the Games. The original name of MCC was
the Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium, later changed to the Wu Ke Song Arena.
After the naming rights sale of the venue to MasterCard in 2010, the venue was officially
named MCC. It was the first and only Olympic venue in the city that was rebranded
commercially. Based on the investigation, the major business of its post-Games
utilization has been to host commercial events; most of which are not sport-related. As
the only private enterprise-owned Olympic venue in the city, MCC’s financial sheet was
balanced and a surplus even appeared after the naming rights sale. One of the key factors
influencing the development of MCC has been the relationship between its owner and
government, which was the reason why one of MCC’s core tasks was to improve such
relationships because MCC’s future will definitely need government’s support.
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1-4. Post-Games Use
Through discussion of the three categories, the general conditions regarding
post-Games utilization of Olympic competition venues in Beijing were described (see
Table 4 on next 3 pages). In general, during the last three and a half years after the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games: (1) the venues built on university campuses were well
utilized; (2) the pre-existing venues were largely well utilized, such as the Workers’
Stadium, the NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, the Ying Tung Natatorium, and the
Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course; (3) the multifunction venues were largely better
utilized than those of mono function capacity, such as the Beijing Shooting Range Hall
and the Clay Target Field, the Olympic Archery Field, and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic
Park; (4) the medium scale venues were better utilized than the large scale venues, such
as the Bird’s Nest and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park; (5) venues owned by the
government, especially the five district governments, were underused, which included the
Feng Tai Sport Center Softball Field, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, the
Olympic Tennis Court, the Ming Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Course, and the Olympic
Hockey Field; and (6), in contrast, venues owned by the universities, GASC, and private
enterprise, showed better utilization portraits than their government-owned (district
governments) counterparts. In addition, most of the venues continued to maintain their
sport functions, either for mass sport or for elite sport, except for CNCC, NIS, the
Workers’ Gymnasium Theater, and, of course, those venues demolished.
In terms of the financial condition of the venues, except for MCC, owned by
private-enterprise, all receive financial support, more or less, from government or
relevant governmental departments, directly or indirectly. Some of the venues, especially
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Table 4. A Summary of Venues’ Post-Games Utilization
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those built on university campuses and those in NOSC and the Gong Ti Center showed
positive financial conditions, while deficits were reported for others, such as the Water
Cube and the Bird’s Nest. Whether or not a venue showed a positive figure on its
financial balance sheet largely depended on the way that the expenses were calculated.
For instance, the BUAA Gymnasium showed a positive “bottom line” on its financial
sheet because the expenses calculated consisted of human resources, energy, logistics,
and maintenance cost, while excluding depreciation of fixed assets. If the depreciation of
fixed assets were counted in the cost calculation, not only the BUAA Gymnasium, but all
the Olympic venues investigated, would show negative results on their financial balance
sheets.
Regarding Olympic venues in Beijing after the Games, their functional status
varies. Different types of ownership, geographical locations, administrative systems,
management modes, even visions, cannot be directly and simply judged by right or
wrong at this time. Furthermore, the evaluations for host cities post-Olympic
development are constantly ongoing. For example, Cashman focused on post-Olympic
effect on the city of Sydney from 1999 to 2006 during which the changing conditions
regarding the Olympic venues in the city were reported and analyzed continually. 7 The

7

Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes, “Cost and Benefits,” in Staging the Olympics: The Event and Its
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IOC initiated its assessment project regarding the Olympic Games Impact on host cities
in 2002. Specifically for Beijing, the project lasted for 11 years since then. 8 Also, the IOC
proposed a 15-year cycle for one Olympic Games regarding its financial impact as well
as an impact on natural and built environment and local communities. 9 Thus, it might be
too soon to draw definitive conclusions regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic
venues three and a half years after the Games. More time will be needed to test what has
to be done to the venues in the city of Beijing. Because of the co-existence of both
well-used and underused venues in Beijing based on the investigation, the researcher
contended that the status of Beijing’s Olympic venues at this point not be evaluated as
either positive or negative in general, due to the complicated socio-cultural environment,
historical tradition, and rapidly evolving present/future. However, some practical
observations can be passed on to potential Olympic host cities.

2. Recommendations
Derived from the investigation, the researcher puts forward fifteen
recommendations regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic venues for potential
Olympic host cities in the future. The order of the recommendations followed the order of
the findings part of the study.

Impact, eds., Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999), pp. 195-200; “What is
‘Olympic Legacy’?” In the Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000, edited by Miquel de Moragas,
Christopher Kennett, and Nuria Puig (Lausanne: International Symposium, November 2002), pp. 31-42;
Richard Cashman, The Bitter-Sweet Awakening: The Legacy of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Sydney:
Walla Walla Press, 2006).
8
Beijing Olympic Games Impact (Abstract), a document that is included with the published electronic
version Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.
9
Christophe Dubi, Pierre-Alain Hug, and Pascal van Griethuysen, “Olympic Games Management: From
the Candidature to the Final Evaluation, an Integrated Management Approach.” In The Legacy of the
Olympic Games: 1984-2000, edited by Miquel de Moragas, Christopher Kennett, and Nuria Puig
(Lausanne: International Symposium, November 2002), pp. 403-413.
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Recommendation 1. Considering the post-Games four-year effect!
As to the first four years after the Olympic Games, this study indicated that the
people’s enthusiasm in terms of visiting the venues, using the Olympic facilities, and
focusing on and enjoying the Olympic spirit will rapidly decline. Moreover, the new
Games occurring every four years further dampen enthusiasm about the Olympic venues
in the previous host cities. Therefore, energetic use during the first four years after the
Games is a must in order to fully take advantage of Olympic momentum. Closing a venue
for any reason during the period is a grave danger. If there is a post-Games utilization
plan established before the Games, then follow the plan; if not, then refrain from
reconstructing, renovating, or altering function. Halting a venue’s presence during this
four-year period will seriously affect its later operation and development, especially for
those major iconic Olympic venues. The first four years after the Games is the “golden
time” in terms of Olympic venues’ post-utilization; thus, reconsider carefully on carrying
out any further reconstruction projects for venues after this period.

Recommendation 2. Making a plan and then revising it constantly!
Having a post-Games utilization plan is good, but not good enough. After the
Games conclude, factors such as social environment change and economic circumstance
alteration might seriously affect preliminary plans for post-Games venue utilization. The
plan might no longer be suitable to changing conditions. Therefore, constant and regular
evaluation of the plan should be carried out, adjustments and corrections made, further
evaluation undertaken.
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Recommendation 3. Avoiding “risk avoidance”!
Modifying or correcting preliminary plans regarding post-Games utilization of
venues, approved by “removed” authorities, could pose potential risks. Unavoidably,
relevant supervision authorities mandating change will be responsible for the
consequences no matter what they will be. However, this should not be an excuse for not
acting in a proactive manner in pursuing changes. To deal with potential risks and
relevant responsibilities, mechanisms such as responsibility, decision making, risk
sharing, and potential crisis management should be associated with preliminary
post-Games utilization plans.

Recommendation 4. Considering a sport’s popularity and performance level in cities!
When deciding which Olympic venues should be built permanently for certain
sports and which should be built temporarily, the sport’s popularity as well as national
elite athlete performance level should be considered. For instance, in Beijing, the Lao
Shan BMX field and the Wu Ke Song Baseball Field were built as temporary facilities,
because the two sports were quite unpopular in the city and the elite athlete performance
level in China was relatively low compared to the world’s top athletes. Therefore,
building them as temporary facilities was a wise choice of the authority.

Recommendation 5. Realistically thinking on a venue’s post-Games function!
Planning for post-Games utilization should be based on a venue’s actual functions
and scale. The existing conditions of a venue should be considered as the priority for
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developing its post-Games utilization, instead of adding new functions or expanding the
scale and structure of the venue to match potential new business. Avoiding re-investment
on Olympic venues after the Games is an efficient way to reduce its operating cost and
generate revenue in the relatively short term.

Recommendation 6. Function-oriented design!
The design of a venue in terms of its layout, functioning structure, and reservation
space should be function-oriented toward post-Games utilization so that it will not have
to invest extra money after the Games for re-design and reconstruction. Therefore,
positioning post-Games function (s) clearly and in detail before the Games is critical for
its long-term strategy.

Recommendation 7. Marketing prior to the Olympic Games!
Marketing promotion before the Games for post-Games utilization of Olympic
venues must be considered seriously for permanently-built venues. No matter what
purposes venues will serve after the Games - serving mass sport, offering commercial
space for lease, as a gathering place for holding commercial events, or being a tourist
destination - marketing promotions and public relations activities must be carried out
before the Games so that the public, the media, and potential clients become fully aware
of future use options. A constant public exposure must be enhanced, the sooner the better.

Recommendation 8. Sport-related departments manage on-campus venues!
In terms of those Olympic venues on university campuses, sport-related
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departments should manage and operate the venues instead of service departments,
logistics departments, supplies departments, maintenance departments, or facilities
management departments. Sport-related departments such as recreation centers, faculties
of physical education, or athletics supervision centers will place sports, physical
education, and recreation-related activities and events as the priority for a venue’s
post-Games utilization, which is the original purpose for which Olympic venues were
built on campus. By doing this, the working emphasis of a venue’s operation will focus
on serving students from a sport base rather than commercializing the venues for
generating profit.

Recommendation 9. Balancing venue location around the city!
Under the condition of meeting the IOC’s demands regarding geographical
distribution of Olympic facilities for a host city, decision makers of the city should try
their best to balance the distribution of Olympic venues, that is, locate the venues
(especially those with multi-functions) in areas where sport faculties are lacking. By
doing this, Olympic-related infrastructure construction can help the city balance and
improve its own urban development in terms of mass sport and residents’ participation in
physical activity.

Recommendation 10. Management teams switching!
The team that is responsible for operation and management of Olympic venues
before and during the Olympic Games should be replaced for post-Games operation and
management. The operation focus and working principles for the two-week plus Olympic
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events vs. post-Games utilization on a regular daily basis are absolutely different.
Specialized professionals must be engaged. If one team can handle the duties
professionally in both periods, then fine; otherwise, recomposing the management team is
necessary.

Recommendation 11. Targeting user groups for post-Games utilization!
When devising post-Games utilization plans, the purpose as well as the potential
user groups of Olympic venues should be clarified. Generally speaking, in terms of those
venues built and owned by municipal or district governments, the need for mass sport
should be the priority for their post-Games use. On the other hand, venues financed by
sport ministries of the country, for instance, GASC in China, can be primarily used for
elite athletes on national teams. In addition, those venues built on campuses should focus
on both mass sport for students in general and elite sport for gifted student athletes. Those
owned and developed by private enterprise should normally focus on exploring
commercial sports and cultural events as their major post-Games utilization goals. Based
on Beijing’s condition investigated in this study, indications were that it was quite
difficult to mix two or more purposes or client groups together into one Olympic venue,
no matter where it was located and the type of ownership attached.

Recommendation 12. Be careful about the conflict between functions!
Olympic venues, especially those iconic examples such as the Water Cube and the
Bird’s Nest in Beijing, face conflict in terms of being tourism destinations, gathering
places for sports competitions or commercial events, or integrated into population
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neighbourhoods. These functional purposes can lead to different requirements for the
peripheral environment, structure of the region in which the venues are located, auxiliary
facilities, and even administrative modes and operation mechanisms. Therefore,
distinguishing the major and minor functional purposes and then identifying the priority
for a venue’s vision of future development will be an efficient way to minimize the
conflict.

Recommendation 13. Professional training offered to venue managers!
Professional training for post-Games management and operation should be
offered to venue managers and directors. And the training course should be offered
during the preparation phase of the Olympic Games instead of after the Games.

Recommendation 14. Private investment? Be careful!
The Olympic sport venues are always considered public products in China. They
are financially and politically supported by multilayered government branches or
departments. The study indicated that most of the venues in Beijing were funded by
government sources or government-owned enterprises using public funds. In addition,
some venues funded by government-owned enterprises were reclaimed right after the
Games by the municipal government, such as the Bird’s Nest and the National Indoor
Stadium. But, fundamentally, it can be seen that three and a half years after the Beijing
Games, most of the Olympic venues in the city are directly or indirectly under the
authority of government. Furthermore, unlike the United States and other western
industrial states where professional sport has vigorously developed for decades, in China,
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professional sport is in its early infancy stage. As a result, there are few opportunities that
might urge private enterprise to enter the realm of professional sport. Obviously, this
suggestion is only pertinent from the perspective of the Beijing Olympic Games. For
future host cities, the specific situations have to be applied relevantly.

Recommendation 15. Applying advanced management mode but fitting it into the local
social environment!
Certain advanced management and operation modes for Olympic venues,
especially those in western countries such as the United States and Australia, have been
proved practical and feasible for venue post-Games utilization. However, future host
cities have to carefully consider their specific conditions in terms of their own social
environments, historical tradition regarding sport and recreation, and cultural context
within which the relationship between governmental departments and venue owners
might be critical for a venue’s development. Thus, combining both sides might be the
best way for venue post-Games utilization.

3. Future Research
In terms of possible research on this topic in the future, four aspects are developed
based on the current study. First, follow-up research is needed to further investigate the
status of the venues in Beijing in two to four years hence. Associated with the current
study, future research will extend a longitudinal line that can achieve a further and
longer-term assessment of post-Games utilization of Beijing’s Olympic venues. Second,
deeper investigation regarding district government-owned venues should be done in the
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future. During the investigation for the current study, because of certain accessibility
issues, the investigation of district government-owned venues was limited, which might
influence the evaluation in general. Thus, future study should be focused on those types
of venues in Beijing. Third, the possibility of privatization of the government-owned
venues in Beijing should be studied in the future. Although currently most of the venues
in the city are owned by governments or governmental authorities, given the fast pace of
development and reform in China, possible privatization of sport facilities in the future
cannot be ignored. Lastly, two relationships should be treated in future research. In terms
of the government-owned venues, the relationship between the government’s
administrative system and the venues should be carefully weighed, because it is the key
factor that will influence future development of the venues. And, in terms of those
GASC-owned venues, the relationship between the strategy of Chinese national sport and
the venues should be examined even more thoroughly, because it will directly decide
possible reform of the venues in the future, in terms of management modes and
supervision structures.
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Appendix A. Brief Maps of the Olympic Venues in Beijing

Source: Google Earth (the author marked all the venues’ locations)
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Source: Google Earth (without the Triathlon Course and the Shun Yi Aquatic Park)
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Appendix B. List of the Olympic Venues in Beijing
Newly-Built Olympic Venues (12)
Venue Name
Sports Events
National Stadium (Bird’s Nest)
Athletics, Football Final, and Opening/Closing
Ceremonies
National Aquatic Center (Water Cube)
Swimming, Diving, and Synchronized Swimming
National Indoor Stadium (NIS)
Gymnastics, Artistic, Trampoline, and Handball Final
Olympic Green Tennis Center
Tennis
Beijing Shooting Range Hall
Shooting (Pistol and Rifle)
Lao Shan Velodrome
Track Cycling
Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park Rowing, Canoeing/kayak Flatwater, Canoeing/Kayak
Slalom, and Marathon Swimming
Wu Ke Song Indoor Stadium
Basketball
Peking University (PKU) Gymnasium
Table Tennis
China Agricultural University (CAU)
Wrestling
Gymnasium
University of Science and Technology
Judo and Taekwondo
Beijing (USTB) Gymnasium
Beijing University of Technology (BJUT)
Badminton and Gymnastics (Rhythmic)
Gymnasium
Converted or Expanded Existing Venues (11)
Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT)
Volleyball
Gymnasium
Beihang University (BUAA) Gymnasium
Weightlifting
Beijing Shooting Range Clay Target Field
Skeet Shooting and Trap Shooting
Feng Tai Softball Field
Softball
Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS)
Volleyball Final
Workers’ Stadium
Football
Workers’ Gymnasium
Boxing
Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course
Mountain Bike Cycling
Olympic Sports Center Stadium NOSC
Football, Modern Pentathlon (Riding and Running)
Olympic Sports Center Gymnasium
Handball
Ying Tung Natatorium
Water Polo and Modern Pentathlon (Swimming)
Temporary Venues (8)
China National Convention Center
Fencing and Modern Pentathlon
(CNCC)
(Fencing and Shooting)
Olympic Green Archery Field
Archery
Olympic Green Hockey Field
Field Hockey
Wu Ke Song Baseball Field
Baseball

257

Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground
Beach Volleyball
Lao Shan BMX Field
BMX
Triathlon Venue
Triathlon
Urban Road Cycling Course
Road Race
Sources: Official Website of BOCOG and the Official Report of the Beijing 2008
Olympic Games.
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Appendix C. Outline of Interview Questions
Part I. The history of the venue.
1. When was it built? And was it specifically built for the 2008 Olympic Games, or a
renovated one, or a re-built one on the top of an existing venue in the city?
2. About the venue’s location? Who was (were) the decision-maker (s)? What
reasons were considered when the decision regarding the location was made? And
in addition to sport consideration and budget consideration, is there any
consideration regarding its future function around local community? From a
current point of view, please describe the advantages (or disadvantages) of the
location.
3. What were the main/original functions and features of the venue? And what kinds
of sport events were hosted during the 2008 Olympic Games?
4. What was the original ownership of the venue before and during the 2008
Olympic Games? And was the investor the owner?
5. What was the total cost/financing scheme if the venue was brand-new and built
specifically for the 2008 Olympic Games? And who paid for the design and
construction (central/municipal government or private/corporate)?
6. (If the venue is a renovated or redesigned one), why and how could the venue be
chosen as a major Olympic site (based on what you knew about, what could be
the main principles for the Beijing Olympic sites and venues chosen among the
existing sport venues)? What was the original functions/features and scale of it
prior to the change and how about the new one? What was the major difference
between them? Who was the original owner and what about the new one? Who
paid for the design and construction cost? And what was the total cost?
7. Was there any plan made at the beginning for the venue’s utilization and
management after the Games? If yes, please describe it briefly, such as what was
it about? Who made it? Who would be the one responsible for the future of the
venue? What would be the financial resources for the future of the venue? What
would be the targeted purpose and functions of the venue in the future? And was
it a legal agreement or a kind of suggestion without legal effect?
8. (If the answer to the above question is NO), please talk about the reasons for the
lack of plan for the venue’s future utilization after the Games.
9. Is there anything that relates to the history of the venue that you feel I did not
touch on that you would like to comment on?
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Part II. The venue’s present status.
10. As the manager/supervisor/director of the venue, looking back three years, what
do you think can be the major contributions of the venue to the community as
well as the city? And if any, what do you think can be the major concerns for the
venue currently?
11. Please describe current functionality of the venue (in general sport-related use, in
specific sport-related use, or multi-functional purpose for both sport-related and
non sport-related use). Speaking of the functions, are there any different functions
between the Games period and post-Games period?
12. Compared with its original settings, is there any change on scale, layout, capacity,
or functioning structure? If yes, please provide details or any written materials
regarding it. And why did these changes happen?
13. Has the ownership of the venue been changed since the 2008 Olympic Games
finished? If yes, please talk about the transition of the ownership as well as the
context and background information.
14. What are the annual operational and maintenance cost of the venue (including any
expenditures of structural redesign, personnel cost, technique upgrading)? And is
there any financial legacy from the Games or the Olympic Movement that can
offset the cost?
15. Is there a healthy financial condition for the venue now? If yes, what is the
primary financial resource for the venue to make it gaining profit during the last
three years? If not, what can be defined as the major problems or difficulties that
cause the financial deficit for now? Please give details about either of the
situations.
16. Who have been the tenants or major patrons of the venue during the last three
years? Who are the expected majority customers whom the venue serves? What
kind of services does the venue provide? And is there any change about service
content and targeted patrons during the last three years?
17. As the manager/supervisor/director of the venue, what do you think can be
considered both major strengths and weaknesses of current operating conditions
of the venue? Please provide details to support your point of view.
18. Is there anything that relates to present status of the venues that you feel I did not
touch on that you would like to comment on?
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Part III. The future of the venue.
19. Please identify if, by now, there is any potential plan for the future development,
with either short term goal or long-term strategy. If there is a plan, does it come
from the private ownership, municipality, or a public-private joint venture? And is
the plan a part of the strategic development of the city or local district?
20. If there is a certain of financial profit coming from the operation of the venue,
how can it be distributed and is there any expansion plan for it?
21. If the venue has any financial trouble now, as the manager/supervisor/director of
the venue, what are you going to do? Is that possible that municipal authority
could help out?
22. What do you think can be considered both major opportunities and threats for the
future of the venue? Please provide details to support your point of view.
23. If there are both “DO list” and “DO NOT DO list” regarding post-Games
utilization of Olympic venues for future Olympic host cities or venues’ owners;
what points do you think should be put on the lists?
24. Is there anything that relates to future development of both your own venue and
Olympic venues in general that you feel I did not touch on that you would like to
comment on?
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Appendix D. Venue Category by Newly, Pre-existing and
Temporarily Built
Newly-built Venues (12)
National Stadium
(Bird's Nest)
National Indoor Stadium
(NIS)
National Aquatic Center
(Water Cube)
Olympic Green Tennis
Court
Beijing Shooting Range
Hall
Lao Shan Velodrome

Existing Venues (11)

Temporary Venues (8)

Workers Gymnasium

Road Cycling Course

Workers Stadium

Triathlon Venue

Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS)

Chao Yang Park Beach
Volleyball Ground

Beihang University
Gymnasium (BUAA)

Wu Ke Song Baseball Field
(Dismantled)

Beijing Institute of
Technology Gymnasium
(BIT)
Feng Tai Sports Center
Softball Field

MasterCard Center Wu Ke
Lao Shan Mountain Bike
Song Arena (Olympic
Course
Basketball Stadium)
Peking University
National Olympic Sports
Gymnasium (PKU)
Center Stadium
China Agricultural
National Olympic Sports
University Gymnasium
Center Gymnasium
(CAU)
University of Science &
Ying Tung Natatorium
Technology Beijing
Gymnasium (USTB)
Beijing University of
Beijing Shooting Range Clay
Technology Gymnasium
Target Field
(BJUT)
Shun Yi Olympic
Rowing-Canoeing Park
Source: Created by the author

Fencing Hall - China National
Convention Center (CNCC)
Olympic Green Hockey
Stadium
Olympic Green Archery Field
Lao Shan Bicycle Moto Cross
(BMX) Venue (Scrapped)
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Appendix E. Venue Category by Geographical Location
Location

Beijing Olympic Venues

National Stadium (Bird's Nest)
National Indoor Stadium (NIS)
National Aquatic Center (Water Cube)
Olympic Green Tennis Court
Olympic Central Area
Fencing Hall - China National Convention Center (CNCC)
(Olympic Green &
Olympic Green Hockey Stadium
NOSC)
Olympic Green Archery Field
National Olympic Sports Center Stadium
National Olympic Sports Center Gymnasium
Ying Tung Natatorium
Beijing Shooting Range Hall
Beijing Shooting Range Clay Target Field
Lao Shan Velodrome
Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course
West Community
Lao Shan Bicycle Moto Cross (BMX) Venue (Scrapped)
Area
MasterCard Center-Wu Ke Song Arena
(Olympic Basketball Stadium)
Wu Ke Song Sports Center Baseball Field (Dismantled)
Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field
Peking University Gymnasium (PKU)
China Agricultural University Gymnasium (CAU)
University of Science & Technology Beijing Gymnasium
University Area
(USTB)
Beijing Institute of Technology Gymnasium (BIT)
Beihang University Gymnasium (BUAA)
Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS)
Workers Stadium
Workers Gymnasium
East Community Area
Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground
Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium (BJUT)
Triathlon Venue
North Scenic Area
Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park
Road Cycling Course
Source: Created by the author based on the investigation
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Appendix F. Ownerships of the Venues
OWNERSHIP
BSAM
State-owned
Enterprises

Municipal
level

Beijing North Star Co.,
Ltd.
Beijing Federation of
Trade Unions
Beijing Municipality
Shi Jing Shan Distr. Gov.

District
level
Government-owned

Chao Yang Distr. Gov.
Chang Ping Distr. Gov.
Shun Yi Distr. Gov.

Transferred
Ownership

Feng Tai Distr. Gov. &
Sport Bureau of Feng Tai
Distr.
CITIC Consortium
Stadium Operating
Company to BSAM
Guo Ao Investment
(Consortium of Investors)
to BJPAG

BSAM to Chao Yang
Distr. Gov.

General Administration of Sport, China (GASC)

Beijing Olympic Venues
National Aquatic Center
(Water Cube)
Fencing Hall - China
National Convention
Center (CNCC)
Workers’ Stadium
Workers’ Gymnasium
Road Cycling Course
Lao Shan Bicycle Moto
Cross (BMX) Field
Lao Shan Mountain Bike
Course
Chao Yang Park Beach
Volleyball Ground
Triathlon Venue
Shun Yi Olympic
Rowing-Canoeing Park
Feng Tai Sports Center
Softball Field
National Stadium
(Bird's Nest)
National Indoor Stadium
(NIS)
Olympic Green Tennis
Court
Olympic Green Hockey
Stadium
Olympic Green Archery
Field
Capital Indoor Stadium
(CIS)
Beijing Shooting Range
Hall
Beijing Shooting Range
Clay Target Field
Lao Shan Velodrome
NOSC Stadium
NOSC Gymnasium
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University-owned

Private Enterprise-owned

Source: Created by the author based on the investigation

Ying Tung Natatorium
Peking University
Gymnasium (PKU)
China Agricultural
University Gymnasium
(CAU)
University of Science &
Technology Beijing
Gymnasium (USTB)
Beijing University of
Technology Gymnasium
(BJUT)
Beijing University of
Aeronautics and
Astronautics Gymnasium
(BUAA)
Beijing Institute of
Technology Gymnasium
(BIT)
MasterCard Center-Wu Ke
Song Arena
(Olympic Basketball
Stadium)
Wu Ke Song Sports
Center Baseball Field
(Dismantled)
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Appendix G. Map of the Venues in the Olympic Central Area

Source: Google Earth
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Appendix H. Map of the Venues in the West Community Area

Source: Google Earth
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Appendix I. Map of the Venues in the University Area

Source: Google Earth
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Appendix J. Map of the Venues in the East Community Area

Source: Google Earth
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Appendix K. Map of the Venues in the North Scenic Area

Source: Google Earth (The Olympic Central Area is shown in this map as a reference).
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Appendix L. Map of the Olympic Central Area

Source: Google Earth
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Appendix M. Route for the Urban Road Cycling Race

Internet Source
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Appendix N. Aerial View of the Olympic Archery Field in 2010

Source: Google Earth (photo taken in 2010)
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Appendix O. Pictures of CIS

Top: The Capital Indoor Stadium; Bottom: The Board signified an “Apparel Show and
Market” was held in the venue. (Source: Photos taken in August 2011 by the author)
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Top: The Board signified a “Job Fair” was held inside the venue; Bottom: An inside look
of the “Apparel Show and Market.” (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 by the author)
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Appendix P. Aerial View of the National Olympic Sport Center

Source: Google Earth
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Appendix Q. Pictures of the CAU Gymnasium

The venue’s main competition hall during the 2008 Olympic Games
Source: Official Website of China Agriculture University Gymnasium
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Top: Before the renovation (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 by the author); Bottom:
after the renovation in 2011, (Source: Official Website of China Agriculture University
Gymnasium).
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Appendix R. Pictures of BUAA Gymnasium
Interior view of BUAA Gymnasium before and after the Games

Top: The view before the Games (Source: Official Website of BOCOG); Bottom: The
view after the Games (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 2011).
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Top: The current view of the original resting & catering area; Bottom: Commercial space
for lease around the BUAA Gymnasium (Source: Photo taken by the author in August
2011).
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Appendix S. Pictures of USTB Gymnasium

Top: The upper level platform, where the temporary seats were installed during the
Games (Source: Official Website of BOCOG); Bottom: The platform became two
basketball courts after the Games (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 2011).
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Top: The other side of the upper level spectator stands, now it became a tennis court;
Bottom: The list of the patrons printed on an elaborate board and hung up on the wall
right beside the main entrance. (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 2011)
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Appendix T. Pictures of BJUT Gymnasium

Top: Beijing PSB Badminton Competitions were held in the warm-up venue in August
2011; Bottom: The upgraded flooring of the main competition hall (Source: Photo taken
by the author in August 2011).
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Appendix U. Pictures of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture
Center

An aerial view of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center. The dismantled Olympic
Baseball Field was on the left, beside which, the MasterCard Center (originally, the
Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium) was on the right (Source: Google Earth, photo
taken in 2010).
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Top: The Olympic Baseball Field during the Games in 2008 (Source: Wikipedia); Bottom:
What the Field looked like in August 2011 (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 by the
author).
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Top: The previous baseball field in 2011, and MCC situated at the far end; Bottom: MCC
and the previous baseball field were separated by iron fences (Source: Photos taken in
August 2011 by the author).
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Top: A big tent was built up between the previous baseball field and MCC; Bottom: The
other side of the tent, while MCC was at the far end (Source: Photo taken in August 2011
by the author).
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Top: Someone worked on the dumping site; Bottom: The shelters were located around
MCC where some migrant workers lived (Source: Photos taken in August 2011 by the
author).
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Top: The former Olympic Baseball Field had become a dumping site and a temporary
park lot; Bottom: No one was allowed to enter into MCC without necessary IDs when
there was no commercial event held inside (Source: Photos taken in August 2011 by the
author).
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